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Abstract: In Relevance: Communication and Cognition, we outline a new approach to the study of human communication, one based
on a general view of human cognition. Attention and thought processes, we argue, automatically turn toward information that seems
relevant: that is, capable of yielding cognitive effects - the more, and the more economically, the greater the relevance. We analyse
both the nature of cognitive effects and the inferential processes by which they are derived.
Communication can be achieved by two different means: by encoding and decoding messages or by providing evidence for an
intended inference about the communicator's informative intention. Verbal communication, we argue, exploits both types of
process. The linguistic meaning of an utterance, recovered by specialised decoding processes, serves as the input to unspecialised
central inferential processes by which the speaker's intentions are recognised.
Fundamental to our account of inferential communication is the fact that to communicate is to claim someone's attention, and
hence to imply that the information communicated is relevant. We call this idea, that communicated information comes with a
guarantee of relevance, the principle of relevance. We show that every utterance has at most a single interpretation consistent with
the principle of relevance, which is thus enough on its own to account for the interaction of linguistic meaning with contextual factors
in disambiguation, reference assignment, the recovery of implicatures, the interpretation of metaphor and irony, the recovery of
illocutionary force, and other linguistically underdetermined aspects of utterance interpretation.
Keywords: attention; communication; comprehension; implicature; irony, metaphor; nondemonstrative inference; pragmatics;
relevance; speech acts; style; thinking
In Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Sperber &
Wilson 1986a, henceforth Relevance), we present a new
approach to the study of human communication. This
approach, outlined in the first chapter, is grounded in a
general view of human cognition developed in the second
and third chapters. Human attention and thought, we
argue, automatically turn toward information which
seems relevant: To communicate is to claim someone's
attention, hence to communicate is to imply that the
information communicated is relevant. We call this thesis
the principle of relevance, and show in the fourth chapter
how it is enough on its own to account for the interaction
of linguistic meaning with contextual factors in utterance
interpretation.
In this precis, we will follow the general plan of the
book. However, we have had to leave out several steps in
the argumentation, many side issues, most examples,
almost all discussion of other approaches, and all traces
of wit.
1. Communication
1.1. The code model and its limits. Communication is a
process involving two information-processing devices.
One device modifies the physical environment of the
other. As a result, the second device constructs represen-
tations similar to representations already stored in the
first device. Oral communication, for instance, is a modi-
fication by the speaker of the hearer's acoustic environ-
ment, as a result of which the hearer entertains thoughts
similar to the speaker's own.
The question is: How can a physical stimulus bring
about the required similarity of representations when
there is no similarity whatsoever between the stimulus
(e.g., sound patterns) on the one hand and the represen-
tations (e.g., human thoughts) it brings into correspon-
dence on the other? From Aristotle through to modern
semiotics, all theories of communication were based on a
single model, which we call the code model. A code is a
system which pairs internal messages with external sig-
nals, thus enabling two information-processing devices
(organisms or machines) to communicate.
Linguistic utterances - the most important means of
human communication - do succeed in communicating
thoughts; the hypothesis that utterances are signals that
encode thoughts seems to explain this fact. However, it is
descriptively inadequate: Comprehension involves more
than the decoding of a linguistic signal. Although a lan-
guage can be seen as a code which pairs phonetic and
semantic representations of sentences, much recent work
in psycholinguistics, pragmatics, and the philosophy of
language2 shows that there is a gap between the semantic
representations of sentences and the thoughts actually
communicated by utterances. This gap is filled not by
more coding, but by inference.
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The study of the semantic representation of sentences
belongs to grammar; the study of the interpretation of
utterances belongs to what is now known as pragmatics.
Among its tasks, pragmatics must explain how hearers
resolve ambiguities, complete elliptical or otherwise se-
mantically incomplete sentences, identify intended ref-
erences, identify illocutionary force, recognize tropes,
and recover implicit import. These are some of the ways
in which the context-independent semantic representa-
tion of a sentence falls short of determining the in-
terpretation of an utterance of that sentence in context.
To justify the code model of verbal communication, it
would have to be shown that the interpretation of utter-
ances in context can be accounted for by adding an extra
pragmatic level of decoding to the linguistic level pro-
vided by the grammar. Much recent work in pragmatics
has assumed that this can be done.3 At the programmatic
level, pragmatics has been described, on the analogy of
phonology, syntax, and semantics, as a code-like mental
device underlying a distinct level of linguistic ability. In
practice, however, most pragmaticians have described
comprehension as an inferential process.
Inferential and decoding processes are quite different.
An inferential process takes a set of premises as input and
yields as output a set of conclusions which follow logically
from, or are at least warranted by, the premises. A
decoding process takes a signal as input and yields as
output a message associated with the signal by an under-
lying code. In general, conclusions are not associated
with their premises by a code, and signals do not warrant
the messages they convey. Does it follow that pragmat-
icians who hold to the code model but describe com-
prehension in inferential terms are being inconsistent?
Not necessarily: It is formally conceivable that a decoding
process should contain an inferential process as a subpart.
However, for this to be possible, speaker and hearer must
use not only the same language but also the same set of
premises, because what makes the code model explanato-
ry is that symmetrical operations are performed at the
emitting and receiving ends.
The set of premises used in interpreting an utterance
constitutes what is generally known (see Gazdar 1979;
Johnson-Laird 1983) as the context. A context is a psycho-
logical construct, a subset of the hearer's assumptions
about the world. Each new utterance, though drawing on
the same grammar and the same inferential abilities as
previous utterances, requires a rather different context (if
only because the interpretation of the previous utterance
has become part of the context). A central problem for
pragmatic theory is to describe how the hearer constructs
a new context for every new utterance.
For code theorists, the context used by the hearer
should always be identical to the one envisaged by the
speaker. Can this condition be met? Because any two
people are sure to share at least a few assumptions about
the world, they might be expected to use only these
shared assumptions. However, this cannot be the whole
answer in that it immediately raises a new question: How
are the speaker and hearer to distinguish the assumptions
they share from those they do not? For that, they must
make second-order assumptions about which first-order
assumptions they share; but then they had better make
sure that they share these second-order assumptions,
which calls for third-order assumptions, and so on indefi-
nitely. Assumptions or knowledge of this infinitely re-
gressive sort was first identified by Lewis (1969) as "com-
mon knowledge" and by Schiffer (1972) as "mutual
knowledge."
Within the framework of the code model, mutual
knowledge is a necessity. However, pragmaticians have
offered no independent support for the claim that indi-
viduals engaging in verbal communication can and do
distinguish mutual from nonmutual knowledge. In Rele-
vance, we present several arguments to show that the
mutual knowledge hypothesis is psychologically im-
plausible. We therefore reject the code model of verbal
communication that implies it.4
1.2. The inferential model. In 1957, Paul Grice published
an article, "Meaning," which has been the object of a
great many controversies, interpretations, and revisions.5
In it Grice analysed what it is for an individual to mean
something by an utterance in terms of intentions and the
recognition of intentions and tried to extend this analysis
of "speaker's meaning" into such areas of traditional
semantic concern as the analysis of "sentence meaning"
and "word meaning." Grice's analysis provides the point
of departure for a new model of communication, the
inferential model, and this is how we use it in Relevance.
We look in detail at Grice's own proposal, as well as at
some of the objections that have been raised and some of
the reformulations that have been proposed, notably by
Strawson (1964), Searle (1969), and Schiffer (1972). Here
we will give a short informal account of the basic idea
before outlining some developments of our own.
Suppose that Mary intends to inform Peter of the fact
that she has a sore throat. All she has to do is let Peter hear
her hoarse voice, thus providing him with salient and
conclusive evidence that she has a sore throat. Suppose
now that Mary intends, on June 2, to inform Peter that
she had a sore throat on the previous Christmas Eve. This
time she is unlikely to be able to produce direct evidence
of her past sore throat. What she can do though is give
him direct evidence, not of her past sore throat, but of her
present intention to inform him of it. She may do this, for
instance, by saying "I had a sore throat on Christmas
Eve," or by nodding when he asks her if she did. Mary's
utterance or nod is directly caused by her present inten-
tion to inform Peter of her past sore throat and is therefore
direct evidence of this intention. Suppose now that Peter
assumes that Mary is sincere and well-informed. Then
the fact that she intends to inform him that she had a sore
throat on that date provides indirect but nevertheless
conclusive evidence that she had one. Mary's intention to
inform Peter of her past sore throat is fulfilled by making
him recognise her intention.
This example shows that information can be conveyed
in two different ways. One way is to provide direct
evidence for it. This should not in itself be regarded as a
form of communication: Any state of affairs provides
direct evidence for a variety of assumptions without
necessarily communicating those assumptions in any in-
teresting sense. Another way of conveying information is
to provide direct evidence of one's intention to convey it.
The first method can be used only with information for
which direct evidence can be provided. The second
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method can be used with any information at all, as long as
direct evidence of the communicator's intentions can be
provided. This second method is clearly a form of commu-
nication; it can be called inferential communication be-
cause the audience infers the communicator's intention
from evidence provided for this precise purpose.
A communicator intentionally engaging in inferential
communication perceptibly modifies the physical en-
vironment of her6 audience - that is, she produces a
stimulus. She does so with two characteristic intentions:
the informative intention, to inform the audience of
something, and the communicative intention, to inform
the audience of her informative intention. Note that the
communicative intention is itself a second-order infor-
mative intention.
This description of communication in terms of inten-
tions and inferences is, in a way, commonsensical. As
speakers, we intend our hearers to recognise our inten-
tion to inform them of some state of affairs. As hearers, we
try to recognise what it is that the speaker intends to
inform us of. The idea that communication exploits the
well-known ability of humans to attribute intentions to
each other should appeal to cognitive and social psychol-
ogists. To justify this appeal, however, what is needed is
not merely a descriptive account, but a genuine explana-
tion of communicative success.
How are informative intentions recognised? The key to
an answer is again suggested by Grice (1975a, 1978), who
argues that a rational communicator tries to meet certain
general standards. Grice describes these standards as a
"cooperative principle" and nine associated "maxims."
From knowledge of these standards, observation of the
communicator's behaviour, and the context, the audience
can normally infer the communicator's informative inten-
tion. In Relevance, we discuss in detail both Grice's
proposal and its elaborations by others. Here a brief
illustration must suffice.
Consider the following dialogue:
(1) Peter: Do you want some coffee?
Mary: Coffee would keep me awake.
Unless some further assumptions are made, Mary's an-
swer fails to satisfy one of Grice's maxims: "Be relevant."
However, Peter should take for granted that Mary is not
flouting the maxim; he can justify this assumption by
assuming, further, that she intends him to infer from her
answer that she does not want to stay awake and hence
does not want any coffee. These contextually inferred
assumptions, recovered by reference to the cooperative
principle and maxims, are what Grice calls implicatures of
her utterance. Such implicatures are communicated not
by coding, but by providing evidence of the fact that the
speaker intends to convey them.
Although more systematic than the reconstructions
that can be elicited from unsophisticated speakers, the
analyses of implicature proposed by Grice and his fol-
lowers have shared with these reconstructions the defect
of being almost entirely ex post facto. Given that an
utterance in context is found to carry particular im-
plicatures, what both the hearer and the pragmatician can
do is to show how, in intuitive terms, an argument based
on the context, the utterance, and general expectations
about the behaviour of speakers justifies the particular
interpretation chosen. What they fail to show is that, on
the same basis, an equally well-formed argument could
not have been given for a quite different and in fact
implausible interpretation.
Grice's idea that the very act of communicating creates
expectations which it then exploits provides a starting
point. Beyond that, the inferential model needs radical
reworking in order to become truly explanatory. A psy-
chologically realistic answer must be given to such basic
questions as these: What shared information is exploited
in communication? What forms of inference are used?
What is relevance and how is it achieved? What role does
the search for relevance play in communication?
1.3. Cognitive environments and mutual manifestness.
In analysing the nature of the shared information in-
volved in communication, we introduce the notion of a
cognitive environment (analogous, at a conceptual level,
to notions of visual or acoustic environment at a percep-
tual level):
A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that
are manifest to him.
A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if, and only if,
the individual is capable at that time of representing it mentally
and accepting its representation as true or probably true.
To be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or inferable. An
individual's total cognitive environment consists not only
of all the facts that he is aware of, but of all the facts that he
is capable of becoming aware of at that time and place.
Manifestness so defined is a property not only of facts but,
more generally, of true or false assumptions. It is a
relative property: Facts and assumptions can be more or
less strongly manifest. Because manifest is weaker than
known or assumed, a notion of mutual manifestness can
be developed that does not suffer from the same psycho-
logical implausibility as mutual knowledge.
The same facts and assumptions may be manifest in the
cognitive environments of several people. In that case,
these cognitive environments intersect, and their inter-
section is a cognitive environment that the people in
question share. One thing that can be manifest in a shared
cognitive environment is a characterization of those who
have access to it. For instance, every Freemason has
access to a number of secret assumptions, which include
the assumption that all Freemasons have access to these
same secret assumptions. In other words, all Freemasons
share a cognitive environment that contains the assump-
tion that all Freemasons share this environment. Any
shared cognitive environment in which it is manifest
which people share it is what we call a mutual cognitive
environment. For every manifest assumption, in a mutual
cognitive environment, the fact that it is manifest to the
people who share the environment is itself manifest. In a
mutual cognitive environment, therefore, every manifest
assumption is mutually manifest.
If a cognitive environment is merely a set of assump-
tions that an individual is capable of mentally represent-
ing and accepting as true, the question becomes: Which
of these assumptions will the individual actually make?
This question is of interest not only to the psychologist,
but also to every ordinary communicator who wants to
modify the thoughts of her audience but can directly
affect only its cognitive environment.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1987) 10:4 699
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00055539
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:52:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
1.4. Relevance and ostension. Most discussions of infor-
mation processing, whether in experimental psychology
or in artificial intelligence, have been concerned with the
achievement of preset goals. However, many cognitive
tasks consist not in reaching a fixed state, but in increasing
the value of some parameters. Human cognition as a
whole is a case in point: It is aimed at improving the
quantity, quality, and organization of the individual's
knowledge. To achieve this goal as efficiently as possible,
the individual must at each moment try to allocate his
processing resources to the most relevant information:
that is, as we will shortly show, information likely to bring
about the greatest improvement of knowledge at the
smallest processing cost. Our claim is that this is done
automatically and that an individual's particular cognitive
goal at a given time is always consistent with the more
general goal of maximising the relevance of the informa-
tion processed.
Human cognition is relevance-oriented. As a result,
and to the extent that one knows the cognitive environ-
ment of an individual - which one does when the environ-
ment is mutual - one can infer which assumptions he is
actually likely to entertain and how a change in that
environment might affect his train of thoughts. This
makes it possible to affect people's thoughts in a partly
predictable way by modifying their cognitive environ-
ment.
Peter and Mary are sitting on a park bench. He points
in a direction where she had not so far noticed anything in
particular. This time, she takes a closer look and sees their
acquaintance Julius in the distance, sitting on the grass.
In other words, as a result of Peter's behaviour, the
presence of Julius, which was weakly manifest in Mary's
cognitive environment, has become more manifest, to
the point of being actually noticed. Moreover, it has
become manifest that Peter had himself noticed Julius
and intended her to notice him too. Such behaviour -
which makes manifest an intention to make something
manifest - we call ostension.
How does ostension work? For instance, how does
Mary discover, when Peter points in a certain direction,
which of the many phenomena visible in that direction he
intended her to notice? Any request for attention, and
hence any act of ostension, conveys a presumption of
relevance; it does so because attention goes only to what
is presumed relevant. By pointing, Peter conveys to
Mary that by paying attention she will gain some relevant
information. This makes it reasonable for her to pay more
attention than she had before; discovering the presence of
Julius, she may reasonably assume that Peter thought it
would be relevant to her, and, moreover, that this was
part of his reason for bringing it to her attention.
Ostension provides two layers of information to be
picked up: The first consists of the information that has
been pointed out; the second consists of the information
that the first layer of information was intentionally point-
ed out. In our example, the first basic layer of information
- Julius's presence - was already manifest and is merely
made more manifest by the ostension. In other cases, all
the evidence displayed in an act of ostension bears on the
agent's intentions and on nothing else directly. In these
cases, it is only by discovering the agent's intentions that
the audience can also discover, indirectly, the basic
information that the agent intended to make manifest. As
we show in Relevance, there is a continuum of cases
between those that provide full direct evidence for the
basic information made manifest (i.e., they "show some-
thing") and those that provide only indirect evidence
(e.g., by "saying something"). We argue that inferential
communication and ostension are one and the same
process, but seen from two different points of view: that of
the communicator who is involved in ostension and that of
the audience who is involved in inference.
1.5. Ostensive-inferential communication. Most ac-
counts of communication take "saying that" as their
paradigm case, and assume that the communicator's in-
tention is to induce certain specific thoughts in an au-
dience. We want to suggest that the communicator's
informative intention is better described as an intention
to modify directly not the thoughts but the cognitive
environment of the audience, with only partly foresee-
able effects on the audience's actual thoughts. We there-
fore reformulate the notion of an informative intention:
Informative intention: the intention to make manifest or more
manifest to the audience a certain set of assumptions.
Why should someone who has an informative intention
bother to make it known to the audience? In other words,
what are the reasons for engaging in ostensive commu-
nication? So far we have discussed only one of these
reasons: Making one's informative intention known is
often the best way, or the only way, of fulfilling it. There is
another major reason for engaging in ostensive commu-
nication. Mere informing alters the cognitive environ-
ment of the audience. True communication is "overt" in
Strawson's sense (Strawson 1964); in our terms, it takes
place in the mutual cognitive environment of the au-
dience and communicator. Mutual manifestness may be
of little cognitive importance, but it is of crucial social or
interpersonal importance. A change in the mutual cog-
nitive environment of two people is a change in their
possibilities of interaction (and, in particular, in their
possibilities of further communication). This is why we
redefine the communicative intention as follows:
Communicative intention: the intention to make mutually
manifest to audience and communicator the communicator's
informative intention.
Ostensive-inferential communication, which, inciden-
tally, need not be intentional, can itself be defined as
follows:
Ostensive-inferential communication: The communicator
produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to com-
municator and audience that the communicator intends, by
means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the
audience a certain set of assumptions.
Instead of treating an assumption as either communi-
cated or not communicated, we have a set of assumptions
which, as a result of communication, become manifest or
more manifest to varying degrees. We can think of com-
munication itself, then, as a matter of degree. When the
communicator makes strongly manifest her informative
intention to make some particular assumption strongly
manifest, then that assumption is strongly communi-
cated. An example would be answering a clear "Yes,"
when asked "Will you take John So-and-so as your lawful
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wedded husband?" When the communicator's intention
is to increase simultaneously the manifestness of a wide
range of assumptions, so that her intention concerning
each of these assumptions is itself weakly manifest, then
each of them is weakly communicated. An example would
be sniffing ecstatically and ostensively at the fresh seaside
air. Often in human interaction weak communication is
found sufficient or even preferable to the stronger forms.
Nonverbal communication is often of the weaker land.
One of the advantages of verbal communication is that it
allows the strongest possible form of communication to
take place; it enables the hearer to pin down the speaker's
intentions about the explicit content of her utterance to a
single, strongly manifest candidate, with no alternative
worth considering at all. On the other hand, what is
implicitly conveyed in verbal communication is generally
weakly communicated. Because all communication has
been seen as strong communication, descriptions of non-
verbal communication have been marred by spurious
attributions of definite meaning; and in the case of verbal
communication, the vagueness of most implicatures and
of nonliteral forms of expression has been idealised away.
Our approach, we believe, provides a way of giving a
precise description and explanation of the weaker effects
of communication.
We began this section by asking how communication is
possible. Our answer is that it is possible in at least two
very different ways: by means of a code shared by commu-
nicator and audience, or by means of ostensive stimuli
providing the audience with evidence from which the
communicator's informative intention can be inferred.
We argue against upgrading either model to the status of a
general theory of communication. It is particularly impor-
tant to keep the distinction between the two modes of
communication in mind when it comes to describing how
they can combine, as they do in human verbal communi-
cation.
2. Inference
In the second chapter of Relevance, we outline a model of
the main inferential abilities involved in verbal com-
prehension. This model is concerned with only one type
of inferential process - that of nondemonstrative in-
ference from assumptions to assumptions, which, we
claim, takes place automatically and unconsciously dur-
ing comprehension. We do not discuss conscious reason-
ing, which sometimes plays a role in comprehension; we
merely suggest how unconscious inference may be ex-
ploited in conscious reasoning.
In presenting this model of inference, our aims are
twofold. First, we claim that the general notion of rele-
vance is instantiated differently in each particular in-
ferential system. By describing one system, however
sketchily, we make it possible to give a detailed example
of such an instantiation. If future research shows that
human inferential abilities not only are much more com-
plex and varied than our model (which of course they are),
but also radically different from that model, this il-
lustrative purpose would still be served.
Our second aim is to show how the study of inferential
comprehension may shed light on central thought pro-
cesses. We accept in broad outline Jerry Fodor's view of
the modularity of mind (Fodor 1983; 1985); like him, we
see linguistic decoding as modular. Unlike him, however,
we see the inferential tier of verbal comprehension as the
application of unspecialised central thought processes to
the output of the linguistic decoding module. We argue
that verbal comprehension is more typical of central
processes, and much more amenable to investigation,
than scientific theorizing which, for Fodor, is the para-
digm case of a central thought process. Like all other
models of human inference, the sketch we offer is tenta-
tive: The evidence available so far is compatible with very
different approaches. However, as we try to show, the
requirement that such a model should help account for
inferential communication is both constraining and
suggestive.
2.1. Nondemonstrative inference and strength of as-
sumptions. Inference is the process by which an assump-
tion is accepted as true or probably true on the strength of
the truth or probable truth of other assumptions. In
demonstrative inference, the only form of inference that
is well understood, the truth of the premises guarantees
the truth of the conclusions. In nondemonstrative in-
ference, the truth of the premises merely makes the truth
of the conclusions probable. Clearly, the process of in-
ferential comprehension is nondemonstrative: The evi-
dence provided by the communicator never amounts to a
proof of her informative intention.
According to what may be called the "logical view" of
human nondemonstrative inference, every assumption
resulting from such an inference consists of two represen-
tations. The first is a representation of a state of affairs: for
instance, (2a) below. The second is a representation of the
probability or confirmation value of the first representa-
tion: for instance, (2b):
(2) (a) Jane likes caviar.
(b) The confirmation value of (a) is 0.95.
How are these two representations arrived at? The first,
so the story goes, is the output of a nonlogical cognitive
process of assumption formation. The second is the out-
put of a process of logical computation which takes as
input the assumption to be confirmed on the one hand,
and the available evidence on the other.
According to the "functional view," which we put
forward, an assumption consists of a single representa-
tion, such as (2a). The confidence with which this assump-
tion is held - what we call its strength - is a result of its
processing history and not of some special computation.
The initial strength of an assumption depends on the way
it is acquired. For instance, assumptions based on a clear
perceptual experience tend to be very strong; assump-
tions based on the acceptance of somebody's word have a
strength commensurate with one's confidence in the
speaker; the strength of assumptions arrived at by deduc-
tion depends on the strength of the premises from which
they were derived. Thereafter, it might be that the
strength of an assumption is increased every time it helps
in processing some new information and is diminished
every time it makes the processing of new information
more difficult. According to this view, the strength of an
assumption is a functional property, just like, say, its
accessibility; it need not be represented in the mind
(though it can be). We argue moreover that the strength
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of an assumption, unlike its confirmation value, is, in the
terms of Carnap (1950), a comparative rather than a
quantitative feature: It allows only gross absolute judg-
ments, and finer comparisons of closely related cases.
2.2. Deduction and its role in nondemonstrative in-
ference. By its very definition, a nondemonstrative in-
ference cannot consist in a deduction. Many authors seem
to make the much stronger and unwarranted hypothesis
that a nondemonstrative inference cannot contain a
deduction as one of its subparts. The recovery of
implicatures, for example, is a paradigm case of nonde-
monstrative inference, and it is becoming a commonplace
of the pragmatic literature that deduction plays little if
any role in this process.7 We maintain, on the contrary,
that the spontaneous and essentially unconscious forma-
tion of assumptions by deduction is a key process in
nondemonstrative inference. More generally, the ability
to perform deductions provides the mind with a uniquely
adapted means of extracting more information from infor-
mation it already possesses, of deriving the maximum
cognitive benefit from new information, and of checking
the mutual consistency of its assumptions.
To model this unconscious deductive ability, we de-
scribe a deductive device which takes as input a set of
assumptions and systematically deduces all the conclu-
sions it can from them. If this device were equipped with
a standard logic, it would derive an infinity of conclusions
from any given set of premises; its operations would
therefore never come to an end. However most of these
conclusions would be of a trivial sort (e.g., (P and Q), ((P
and Q) and Q), deduced from P and Q by the standard rule
of and-introduction). On the other hand, many deduc-
tions which do play a role in ordinary thinking would not
be made at all; for example, the deduction from premises
(3) and (4a) to the conclusion (5) would not be performed,
because it requires a nonstandard rule of concept logic
allowing (4b) to be deduced from (4a):
(3) If a relative of Peter's was present, he must have been
happy.
(4) (a) Peter's mother was present.
(b) A relative of Peter's was present.
(5) Peter must have been happy.
One gets a more adequate picture of human deductive
abilities by assuming that the rules available to the deduc-
tive device are not those of a standard logic but are
elimination rules attached to concepts. We treat concepts
as triples of (possibly empty) entries - logical, lexical, and
encylopaedic - filed at a single address. The logical entry
of a concept consists of deductive rules that apply only to
sets of premises in which that concept occurs, yielding
only conclusions from which that occurrence has been
eliminated. Examples of such elimination rules are the
standard and-elimination rule, or Modus ponendo ponens
(eliminating "if. . . then"), and the rules of concept logic
which determine deductions from "he ran" to "he
moved," from "the glass is red" to "the glass is coloured,"
or from (4a) to (4b). The encyclopaedic entry of a concept
contains information about the objects, events, or proper-
ties that instantiate it. The lexical entry contains informa-
tion about the word or phrase of natural language that
expresses the concept. The address of a concept, when it
appears in the logical structure of an assumption, gives
access to these three types of entry.
We show how the deductive device, drawing on elim-
ination rules attached to concepts, will, from a finite set of
premises, automatically deduce a finite set of nontrivial
conclusions. We distinguish not only trivial from non-
trivial implications, but also analytic from synthetic im-
plications, and discuss their respective role in com-
prehension. We are particularly concerned with the
effect of deductions in which the initial set of assumptions
placed in the memory of the deductive device can be
partitioned into two subsets, corresponding respectively
to some item of new information and to the context in
which the new information is processed. Such a deduc-
tion may yield conclusions not derivable from either the
new information or the context alone. These we call the
contextual implications of the new information in the
context. A contextual implication is thus a synthesis of old
and new information. We see it as a central function of the
deductive device to derive, spontaneously, automatically
and unconsciously, the contextual implications of any
newly presented information in a context of old informa-
tion.
The information processed by the deductive device,
whether new and derived from input systems or old and
derived from memory, comes in the form of assumptions
with variable strength. We discuss in detail how conclu-
sions inherit their strength from premises. This allows us
to characterise three types of contextual effects that the
processing of new information in a context may bring
about: the first, already considered, is the derivation of
new assumptions as contextual implications; the second is
the strengthening of old assumptions; and the third is the
elimination of old assumptions in favour of stronger new
assumptions which contradict them. The notion of a
contextual effect is essential to a characterisation of
relevance.
3. Relevance
3.1. Degrees of relevance: Effect and effort. It should be
clear that we are not trying to define the ordinary and
rather fuzzy English word relevance. We believe,
though, that there is an important psychological property
- a property involved in mental processes - which the
ordinary notion of relevance roughly approximates, and
which it is therefore appropriate to call by that name,
using it in a technical sense.
As we show in the book, the notion of a contextual effect
can be used to state a necessary and sufficient condition
for relevance: An assumption is relevant in a context if,
and only if, it has some contextual effect in that context.
This captures the intuition that, to be relevant in a
context, an assumption must connect with that context in
some way; and it clarifies this intuition by specifying the
nature of the connection required. Such a definition,
however, is insufficient for at least two reasons: the first is
that relevance is a matter of degree and the definition says
nothing about how degrees of relevance are determined;
the second reason is that it defines relevance as a relation
between an assumption and a context, whereas we might
want to be able to describe the relevance of any kind of
information to any kind of information-processing device,
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and more particularly to an individual. At the moment,
then, we have simply defined a formal property, leaving
its relation to psychological reality undescribed.
Consider first the question of degrees of relevance.
What we propose is a kind of cost/benefit analysis. We
argue that the contextual effects of an assumption in a
given context are only one of two factors to be taken into
account. Contextual effects are brought about by mental
processes; mental processes, like all biological processes,
involve a certain effort. This processing effort is the
second factor involved. We then define:
Relevance:
Extent condition 1: An assumption is relevant in a context to
the extent that its contextual effects in that context are large.
Extent condition 2: An assumption is relevant in a context to
the extent that the effort required to process it in that context is
small.
This definition of relevance is comparative rather than
quantitative. It makes clear comparisons possible only in
some cases: Other things being equal, an assumption with
greater contextual effects is more relevant; and, other
things being equal, an assumption requiring a smaller
processing effort is more relevant. When effect and effort
vary in the same direction, comparison may be impossi-
ble.
Relevance could be defined not just as a comparative
but as a quantitative concept, which might be of some
interest to logicians and AI specialists. However, the
notion needed by psychologists is the comparative one. It
is highly implausible that individuals compute the size of
cognitive effects and mental efforts. We assume rather
that the mind assesses its own efforts and their effects by
monitoring physico-chemical changes in the brain. We
argue then that effect and effort are nonrepresentational
dimensions of mental processes: That is, they exist
whether or not they are represented; and when they are
represented, it is in the form of intuitive comparative
judgments. The same holds for relevance, which is a
function of effect and effort.
3.2. The relevance of a phenomenon to an individual. In
much of the pragmatic literature, relevance is seen as a
variable to be assessed in a predetermined context. This
is psychologically unrealistic. As we amply illustrate, the
context is not given but chosen. Moreover, humans are
not in the business of simply assessing the relevance of
new information. They try to process information as
relevantly as possible; that is, they try to obtain from each
new item of information as great a contextual effect as
possible for as small as possible a processing effort. For
this, they choose a context which will maximise rele-
vance. In verbal communication in particular, relevance
is more or less treated as given and context is treated as a
variable.
At any moment, an individual has at his disposal a
particular set of accessible contexts. There is first an
initial context consisting of the assumptions used or
derived in the last deduction performed. This initial
context can be expanded in three directions: by adding to
it assumptions used or derived in preceding deductions,
by adding to it chunks of information taken from the
encylopaedic entries of concepts already present in the
context or in the assumption being processed, and by
adding input information about the perceptual environ-
ment. Thus each context except the initial one includes
other contexts: The set of accessible contexts is partly
ordered by the inclusion relation. This formal relation has
a psychological counterpart: Order of inclusion corre-
sponds to order of accessibility.
Treating relevance as a property of propositions or
assumptions (as is often done in the pragmatic literature)
involves a considerable abstraction: Individuals do not
directly pick up an assumption from an utterance, or,
more generally, from perceptible phenomena in their
environment. Each phenomenon may give rise to a wide
range of assumptions or be left unattended. If relevance
theory is to explain ostensive-inferential communica-
tion, it must explain how attention is directed to a
particular phenomenon, and which assumption is likely
to be constructed to describe it. For this, we need to
define not just the relevance of an assumption, but more
generally the relevance of a phenomenon.
Note that the choice, or construction, of an adequate
context by expanding the initial context requires some
effort, and so does the construction of an assumption
about a phenomenon on the basis of the sensory stimula-
tion it provides. To convert our definition of the relevance
of an assumption in a context into a definition of the
relevance of a phenomenon to an individual, all we have
to do, then, is add on the effort side the effort required to
arrive at an assumption and a context:
Relevance of a phenomenon to an individual:
Extent condition 1: A phenomenon is relevant to an individual
to the extent that the contextual effects achieved in processing it
are large.
Extent condition 2: A phenomenon is relevant to an individual
to the extent that the effort required to process it is small.
One could leave this definition as it stands and take the
relevance of a phenomenon to vary according to how it is
actually processed. We propose instead to take the rele-
vance of a phenomenon to an individual to be the rele-
vance achieved when it is optimally processed: that is,
when the best possible representation and context are
constructed, and by the most economical method. In
Relevance, we suggest that this proposal, together with
the assumption that human cognition is relevance-ori-
ented, yields new insight into the focusing of attention,
the choice of a particular representation for a given
phenomenon, and the organisation of memory.
3.3. The principle of relevance. When paying attention to
an ordinary phenomenon, the individual may have hopes
of relevance. What makes these hopes reasonable is that
humans have a number of heuristics, some of them
innate, others developed through experience, aimed at
picking out relevant phenomena. Even so, hopes of
relevance sometimes turn out to be unjustified; and when
they are justified, they are justified to a greater or lesser
extent: There can be no general expectation of a steady
and satisfactory level of relevance in individual experi-
ence.
With an ostensive stimulus, however, the addressee
can have not only hopes but also fairly precise expecta-
tions of relevance. It is manifest that an act of ostensive
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communication cannot succeed unless the addressee pays
attention to the ostensive stimulus. It is also manifest that
people wall pay attention to a phenomenon only if it seems
relevant to them. It is manifest, then - mutually manifest
in normal conditions - that a communicator must intend
to make it manifest to the addressee that the ostensive
stimulus is relevant to him. In other words, an act of
ostensive communication automatically communicates a
presumption of relevance. We argue that the presump-
tion of relevance is different on the effect and effort sides.
On the effect side, the presumption is that the level of
achievable effects is never lower than is needed to make
the stimulus worth processing; on the effort side, it is that
the level of effort required is never gratuitously higher
than is needed to achieve these effects.
The level of relevance thus presumed to exist takes into
account the interests of both communicator and au-
dience. Let us call it a level of optimal relevance. We can
now spell out the presumption of optimal relevance
communicated by every act of ostensive communication:
Presumption of optimal relevance:
(a) The set of assumptions / that the communicator intends to
make manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it
worth the addressee's while to process the ostensive stimulus.
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the
communicator could have used to communicate I.
What we call the principle of relevance is the thesis that
every act of ostensive communication communicates the
presumption of its own optimal relevance. We argue that
the principle of relevance explains how the production of
an ostensive stimulus can make the communicator's infor-
mative intention mutually manifest, thus leading to the
fulfilment of the communicative intention. Several in-
ferential steps are involved. In Relevance, we discuss how
the stimulus can be recognised as ostensive, and how its
structure, in the case of both coded and noncoded stim-
uli, makes accessible a range of hypotheses about the
communicator's informative intention. Here we consider
only how the principle of relevance provides a sufficient
criterion for selecting one of these hypotheses.
Once the ostensive nature of a stimulus is manifest, it is
also manifest that the communicator has the informative
intention of making manifest to the addressee some set of
assumptions 7. What the principle of relevance does is
identify one member of 7: namely, the presumption of
relevance. The presumption of relevance is not just a
member of 7, it is also about 7. As a result, it can be
confirmed or disconfirmed by the contents of 7. A rational
communicator (who genuinely intends to communicate
rather than, say, distract an audience) must expect the
identification of 7 to confirm the presumption of rele-
vance. To recognise the communicator's informative in-
tention, the addressee must then discover for which set 7
the communicator had reason to expect that 7 would
confirm the presumption of relevance. We argue that this
is all he has to do.
Let us say that an interpretation is consistent with the
principle of relevance if and only if a rational commu-
nicator might expect it to be optimally relevant to the
addressee. Imagine an addressee who tests hypotheses
about the contents of 7 in order of accessibility. Suppose
he arrives at a hypothesis that is consistent with the
principle of relevance. Should he stop there, or go on and
test the next hypothesis on the ground that it too may be
consistent with the principle of relevance? Suppose he
does go on, and finds another hypothesis that verifies the
first part of the presumption of relevance: The putative
set 7 is relevant enough. In these circumstances, the
second part of the presumption of relevance is almost
invariably falsified: The communicator should have used
a stimulus that would have saved the addressee the effort
of first accessing two hypotheses consistent with the
principle of relevance, and then having to choose be-
tween them. Thus, the principle of relevance warrants
the selection of the first accessible interpretation con-
sistent with the principle. If there is such an interpreta-
tion and it is the one intended, communication succeeds.
Otherwise it fails.
The principle of relevance does, with much greater
explicitness, all the explanatory work of Grice's maxims,
and more. There is, however, a radical difference be-
tween the principle of relevance and Grice's maxims.
Grice's cooperative principle and maxims are norms
which communicators and audience must know in order
to communicate adequately. Although communicators
generally keep to the norms, they may also violate them
to achieve particular effects; and the audience uses its
(presumably learned) knowledge of the norms in in-
terpreting communicative behaviour.
The principle of relevance, by contrast, is a generalisa-
tion about ostensive-inferential communication. Com-
municators and audience need no more know the principle
of relevance to communicate than they need to know the
principles of genetics to reproduce. It is not the general
principle but the fact that a particular presumption of
relevance has been communicated, by and about a particu-
lar act of communication, that the audience uses in
inferential comprehension. Communicators do not "fol-
low" the principle of relevance; and they could not violate
it even if they wanted to. The principle of relevance applies
without exception: Every act of ostensive communication
communicates a presumption of relevance. Note, though,
that the presumption of relevance carried by a particular
act of communication does not have to be true or accepted
as true: The communicator may fail to be relevant. It is
enough that the presumption of relevance should be
communicated - and it always is - to fulfil its most
important role: determining the interpretation of the
ostensive stimulus.
4. Aspects of verbal communication
Verbal communication, we argue, involves two types of
communication process: one based on coding and decod-
ing, the other on ostension and inference. The coded
communication is of course linguistic: A linguistic stim-
ulus triggers an automatic process of decoding. The
semantic representations recovered by decoding are log-
ical forms which, like the logician's open sentences, but
in more ways, fall short of determining a single proposi-
tion. These logical forms, we claim, never surface to
consciousness. Instead, they act as assumption schemas
which can be inferentially completed into fully proposi-
tional forms, each determining a single proposition and
serving as a tentative identification of the intended ex-
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has contextual effects and is therefore worthy of conscious
attention.
The coded communication process, then, serves as a
source of hypotheses and evidence for the second com-
munication process, the inferential one. If comprehen-
sion is defined as a process of identifying the speaker's
informative intention, linguistic decoding is better seen
not as part of comprehension proper, but rather as
providing the main input to the comprehension process.
Unlike most pragmaticians, who see the inferential tier of
comprehension as governed by a variety of specialised
rules constituting a kind of pragmatic "module," we argue
that it involves only the application of nonspecialised
inference rules - rules that apply as well to all concep-
tually represented information. We see pragmatics as the
study, not of a distinct mental device, but of the interac-
tion between a linguistic input module and central in-
ferential abilities.8
4.1. The identification of explicit content. The first task in
inferential comprehension is to complete the logical form
recovered by decoding and identify the explicit content of
the utterance.9 This in turn involves three subtasks:
disambiguation (when, as is usual, the decoding yields a
choice of logical forms); identification of the referents of
referring expressions; and enrichment of the schema
selected — a subtask less often considered, of which we
analyse several examples.
These subtasks could in principle yield a variety of
outcomes. By what criterion does the hearer recognise
the right explicit content, that is, the one he was intended
to choose? Although there is a considerable literature on
disambiguation and reference assignment, this question
has not been seriously addressed. The aims of psycho-
linguists lie elsewhere: They want to describe not the
criteria used in disambiguation, but the procedure by
which it is achieved. The only criterion generally consid-
ered, and apparently confirmed by much experimental
evidence, is one of economy, something like a principle of
least effort.
Could the answer simply be that the right explicit
content is the one obtained by going through some effort-
saving procedure? The existence of so-called garden-path
utterances (e.g., "I saw that gasoline can explode. And a
brand new can it was too") strongly suggests that what-
ever regular procedures are available for disambiguation,
reference assignment, and enrichment yield at best a
tentative identification, one that will be rejected if it turns
out not to meet some as yet unspecified criterion. We
show, with examples, that the correct criterion is con-
sistency with the principle of relevance. This answer does
not eliminate considerations of effort; on the contrary, it
integrates them by suggesting that the least effort-con-
suming, and therefore potentially the most relevant in-
terpretation, should be considered first (although it
should be abandoned if it fails to yield the expected
effect).
4.2. The identification of implicatures. We introduce a
distinction between two kinds of implicatures: implicated
premises and implicated conclusions. Implicated conclu-
sions are deduced from the explicit content of an utter-
ance and its context. What makes it possible to identify
Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
such conclusions as implicatures is that the speaker must
have expected the hearer to derive them, or some of
them, given that she intended her utterance to be man-
ifestly relevant to the hearer. Implicated premises are
added to the context by the hearer, who either retrieves
them from memory or constructs them ad hoc. What
makes it possible to identify such premises as im-
plicatures is that the speaker must have expected the
hearer to supply them, or some of them, in order to be
able to deduce the implicated conclusions and thereby
arrive at an interpretation consistent with the principle of
relevance.
To illustrate, consider dialogue (6):
(6) (a) Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes?
(b) Mary: I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car.
The explicit content of Mary's reply does not directly
answer Peter's question. However, processed in a context
containing (7), (6b) yields the contextual implication (8):
(7) A Mercedes is an expensive car.
(8) Mary would not drive a Mercedes.
We have a situation, then, in which Mary, in producing
(6b), has not directly and explicitly answered Peter's
question, but has made manifest a contextually implied
answer, that is, (8). Given that she could not expect her
utterance to be relevant unless it made manifest such an
answer, this implied answer is manifestly intentional: It is
an implicated conclusion of her utterance. Since it is
manifest that Peter would not have deduced this conclu-
sion without adding (7) to the context, (7) is an implicated
premise of Mary's utterance.
Implicatures (7) and (8) have two properties which
many pragmaticians think of as shared by all implicatures.
In the first place, they are fully determinate. Mary
expects Peter to supply not merely something like prem-
ise (7) and conclusion (8), but a premise and conclusion
with just this logical content. Second, Mary guarantees
their truth. Suppose that before (6b) was produced, Peter
had not known that Mercedes cars were expensive; then
(6b) would give him as much reason to think they are as if
Mary had explicitly asserted it. There has been a tenden-
cy in modern pragmatics to treat all implicatures as fully
determinate assumptions for which the speaker is just as
responsible as if she had asserted them directly. Accord-
ing to this approach, utterance comprehension consists in
the recovery of an enumerable set of assumptions, some
explicitly expressed, others implicitly conveyed, but all
individually intended by the speaker. We argue that this
is a mistake, or, at best, a counterproductive idealization.
Consider, for instance, the exchange in (9):
(9) Peter: What do you intend to do today?
Mary: I have a terrible headache.
What does Mary implicate? That she will not do any-
thing? That she will do as little as possible? That she will
do as much as she can? That she does not yet know what
she will do? There is no precise assumption, apart from
the one explicitly expressed, which she can be said to
intend Peter to share. Yet there is more to her utterance
than its explicit content; she manifestly intends Peter to
draw some conclusions from what she said, and not just
any conclusions. Quite ordinary cases such as (9) are
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never discussed in the pragmatic literature. Moreover,
even in cases such as (6)-(8), the implicit import of the
utterance is usually not exhausted by clear implicatures
such as (7) and (8). Mary's reply (6b) suggests, but only in a
vaguer way, that she would not drive, say, a Jaguar, that
she finds driving an expensive car objectionable, and so
on. What pragmatics needs - and relevance theory pro-
vides - is a precise account of these vaguer effects.
In our framework, the greater the mutual manifestness
of the informative intention to make manifest some par-
ticular assumption, the more strongly this assumption is
communicated. Using this approach, the indeterminacy
of implicatures presents no particular formal problem. An
utterance that forces the hearer to supply a very specific
premise or conclusion to arrive at an interpretation con-
sistent with the principle of relevance has a very strong
implicature. An utterance that can be given an interpreta-
tion consistent with the principle of relevance on the basis
of different - though of course related - sets of premises
and conclusions has a wide range of weak implicatures.
Clearly, the weaker the implicatures, the less confidence
the hearer can have that the particular premises or
conclusions he supplies closely reflect the speaker's
thoughts, and this is where the indeterminacy lies. How-
ever, people may entertain different thoughts and come
to have different beliefs on the basis of the same cognitive
environment. The aim of communication in general, we
claim, is to increase the mutuality of cognitive environ-
ments and thereby the similarity of thoughts, rather than
to guarantee a (generally unreachable) strict duplication
of thoughts.
4.3. Explicit content and style: Presuppositional effects.
It might seem that two utterances with the same lin-
guistically determined truth-conditions must have identi-
cal implicatures. We argue that this is not so: They may
differ in the processing effort they require, which, given
the principle of relevance, can lead to different effects.
This, we claim, is the key to an explanatory theory of
style. In Relevance, we discuss two classes of stylistic
effects: presuppositional effects at some length and poetic
effects more briefly. Here we will merely indicate the
relevance of relevance theory to these two aspects of
style.
Presuppositional effects result from the fact that a
sentence is not decoded as a single symbol, in one go, but
in steps, as a structured string of constituents (some of
which may be highlighted by stress - an important aspect
left out of this precis). Each constituent provides some
information by allowing analytic implications to be de-
duced. Among these, we distinguish foreground implica-
tions, which contribute to relevance by having contextual
effects, and background implications, which contribute
to relevance by saving effort. Background implications
save effort in particular by making more accessible the
context in which foreground implications will produce
contextual effects. In general (and we show that excep-
tions are predicted by relevance theory), an optimally
relevant utterance will have its effort-saving background
implications made available by initial constituents, and its
effect-carrying foreground implications made available
by its final constituents: Thus the construction of the
context will be well under way, or even over, when the
last word is uttered, and effect can be achieved at the
smallest processing cost.
Processing an utterance as economically as possible,
the hearer normally treats the implications made avail-
able by the initial constituents as background, the im-
plications made available by the last constituents as fore-
ground, and expects the foreground implications to carry
their effects in the context made accessible by the back-
ground implications. Thus two utterances with the same
truth-conditions but different word order lead to the
construction of different contexts and the search for
different effects. Compare for instance:
(10) Leo sold Peter a painting.
(11) Peter bought a painting from Leo.
In (10) the hearer's expectation is that the utterance will
be relevant in a context of information about Leo. If it
were mutually manifest, for instance, that Leo desper-
ately needed money, a key implicature would be that he
has just made some. In (11), the hearer's expectation is
that the utterance will be relevant in a context of informa-
tion about Peter; for instance, if it were mutually manifest
that Peter did not care for Leo's painting but knew he
needed money, (11) would implicate that Peter behaved
generously. In other words, even though (10) and (11)
have the same truth-conditions and the hearer could in
principle draw the same contextual implications from
either, not all of the implications are implicated, or
implicated to the same degree, by both utterances. This is
because the two utterances organise the hearer's efforts
differently.
We argue in Relevance that all the stylistic effects
discussed in the literature in terms of presupposition and
focus, presupposition and assertion, topic and comment,
given and new, theme and rheme, and so on,10 can be
explained with greater generality, simplicity, and predic-
tive power in terms of background and foreground. Un-
like these other distinctions, which purport to describe
linguistic or pragmatic properties registered by a compe-
tent speaker, the foreground/background distinction is
not something that speakers need to have built into either
their grammar or their inferential abilities. Given that
utterances have constituent structure, internal order,
and focal stress and are processed over time, background-
ing and foregrounding arise as automatic effects of the
hearer's tendency to maximise relevance and the speak-
er's exploitation of that tendency.
4.4 Implicatures and style: Poetic effects. Style arises, we
maintain, in the pursuit of relevance. In allocating the
information she wants to communicate between the ex-
plicit content and the implicatures of her utterance, in
relying on stronger or weaker implicatures, the speaker
makes manifest her assessment of the tenor and quality of
mutual understanding between her audience and herself.
She thereby gives her utterance its particular style.
Here we will briefly illustrate this point with an exam-
ple of the simplest of all the classical figures of speech:
epizeuxis or repetition. Compare the interpretation of
(12) and (13):
(12) My childhood days are gone.
(13) My childhood days are gone, gone.
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Both have the same truth-conditions and therefore poten-
tially the same contextual implications. What (13) has is
more implicatures than (12): that is, more contextual
assumptions and implications that receive some degree of
backing from the speaker. The repetition of "gone"
causes some extra processing effort. Given the principle
of relevance, this extra effort should be justified by some
extra effect. Having thought of all the implicatures that
the speaker could reasonably have expected him to derive
from the first occurrence of "gone," the hearer may
assume that there is a whole range of still further premises
and conclusions which the speaker wants to implicate.
For this, he must expand the context. Thus (13) may
encourage the hearer to compare the speaker's childhood
and her present condition, to assume that she herself is
reminiscing and making a similar comparison, and to
imagine the feelings this may evoke in her. What the
repetition produces, then, is many very weak implica-
tures.
We suggest that the peculiar effect of an utterance that
achieves most of its relevance through a wide array of
weak implicatures is properly called a poetic effect. How
do poetic effects affect the mutual cognitive environment
of speaker and hearer? They do not add entirely new
assumptions which are strongly manifest in this environ-
ment. Instead, they marginally increase the manifestness
of a great many weakly manifest assumptions. In other
words, poetic effects create common impressions rather
than common knowledge. Utterances with poetic effects
can be used precisely to create this sense of apparently
affective rather than cognitive mutuality. What we are
suggesting is that, if you look at these affective effects
through the microscope of relevance theory, you see a
wide array of minute cognitive effects.
4.5. Descriptive and interpretive dimensions of language
use. There is a considerable literature on illocutionary
force and speech acts, and an even more considerable one
on tropes. There is very little overlap between the two, as
if it went without saying that these are two essentially
different aspects of language use. In both cases, the
literature is centrally concerned with problems of classifi-
cation and offers little in the way of explanation. We
propose a new, more integrated and more explanatory
approach, based on a fundamental distinction between
interpretation and description.11
The relationship between a representation and the
object it represents can be of two kinds: It can be based on
resemblance or on truth. Any object in the world can,
under appropriate conditions, be used as a representation
of some other object that it resembles. You ask me what is
the shape of Brazil, and by way of reply, I point to an
appropriately shaped cloud in the sky. Resemblance
raises well-known philosophical and psychological prob-
lems: How are the pertinent features of the representa-
tion identified? How are degrees of resemblance as-
sessed? That is, how can the representation inform one
about the object it resembles? At least when resemblance
is used ostensively, relevance theory provides the key to
an answer: Consider hypotheses in their order of ac-
cessibility (salient features first, etc.) and select the first
hypothesis that the producer of the representation may
have thought would be relevant enough.
An object with a propositional content - an utterance,
for example - can be used to represent in two quite
different ways. It can represent some state of affairs by
virtue of being true of that state of affairs; in this case we
will say that the representation is a description, or that it
is used descriptively. Or, like any object, it can represent
something it resembles, and in particular some other
representation with a similar propositional content; in
this case we will say that the first representation is an
interpretation of the second one, or that it is used in-
terpretively. Two representations resemble one another
interpretively when they share analytic and contextual
implications.12
The only generally acknowledged interpretive use of
utterances is in the reporting of speech or thought, as in
quotations and summaries. However, there are others.
Utterances can be used interpretively to represent utter-
ance-types, or thoughts worth considering for their in-
trinsic properties, rather than because they can be at-
tributed to Peter, Mary, or public opinion. We argue that
there is an even more essential interpretive use of utter-
ances: On a more fundamental level, every utterance is
used interpretively to represent a thought of the speak-
er's. One of the assumptions a speaker intends to make
manifest is that she is entertaining a thought with some
particular attitude: It is on this ground that the hearer
may be led to entertain a similar thought with a similar
attitude. You may well tell me that you will come tomor-
row, but you will not make me believe it unless you first
make me believe that you believe it too. This much is
hardly controversial. In our terms, it means that an
utterance is, or purports to be, in the first instance, an
interpretation of a thought of the speaker.
Actually, an even stronger claim is generally made.
Most pragmaticians and philosophers of language take for
granted that there is a convention, principle, or presump-
tion to the effect that the propositional content of the
utterance must be a literal expression - that is, a strictly
faithful interpretation - of a thought of the speaker's.13
We argue that this claim is too strong. How close the
interpretation is, and in particular when it is literal, can
be inferentially determined by the hearer.
What does the thought interpretively represented by
an utterance itself represent, and how? A mental repre-
sentation, like any representation, can be used descrip-
tively or interpretively. When it is used descriptively, it
can be a description of an actual state of affairs, or it can be
a description of a desirable state of affairs. When it is used
interpretively, it can be an interpretation of an attributed
thought or utterance, or it can be an interpretation of a
relevant, hence desirable thought. There may be other
possibilities, and one might consider what the thoughts
interpreted by thoughts might represent in their turn and
how; but let us leave it at that, and use the following
diagram to show the representations and relationships
considered so far.
Any utterance involves at least two levels of represen-
tation: It interpretively represents a thought of the speak-
er's, which itself descriptively represents some state of
affairs, or interpretively represents some further repre-
sentation. All the basic relationships involved in tropes
and illocutionary forces are represented in Figure 1:
Metaphor involves an interpretive relation between the
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Figure 1. Descriptive and interpretive dimensions of lan-
guage use.
propositional form of an utterance and the thought it
represents; irony involves an interpretive relation be-
tween the speaker's thought and attributed thoughts or
utterances; assertion involves a descriptive relation be-
tween the speaker's thought and a state of affairs in the
world; requesting or advising involves a descriptive rela-
tion between the speaker's thought and a desirable state
of affairs; interrogatives and exclamatives involve an in-
terpretive relation between the speaker's thought and a
relevant — that is, desirable - thought. Our book devel-
ops all of these ideas; here we shall briefly consider only
the potentially more controversial interpretive cases:
those of metaphor, irony, interrogatives, and exclama-
tives.
4.6. Literalness, looseness, and metaphor. An utterance,
we claim, is an interpretation of one of the speaker's
thoughts, that is, both share a number of implications.
This means that, in order to communicate a set of assump-
tions / which are the essential implications of some
thought of hers, the speaker must produce an utterance
whose explicit content logically or contextually implies 7.
An utterance that implies exactly 7 and nothing else may
not be available, or it may be available but not eco-
nomical. However, the speaker may freely use an utter-
ance that implies many other assumptions she does not
want to endorse, as long as the hearer has some way of
recognising the intended implications which are mem-
bers of 7. In our framework, all the hearer has to do is start
computing, in order of accessibility, those implications
which are, or which the speaker would consider to be,
relevant to him, and continue to add them to the overall
interpretation of the utterance until it is, or might have
seemed to the speaker, relevant enough to be consistent
with the principle of relevance. At this point, the sorting
will have been accomplished as a byproduct of the search
for relevance: It will require no specific effort of its own.
The comprehension of every utterance involves such a
process of identifying relevant implications. When the
proposition expressed is itself among the implications on
which optimal relevance depends, the result is a literal
interpretation. According to this view, literalness is sim-
ply maximal resemblance, and enjoys no privileged sta-
tus. In general, though, some looseness of expression is to
be expected. For example, the speaker may spare the
hearer some processing effort, and thereby optimize
relevance, by saying "It's half-past five" rather than "It's
twenty-eight minutes past five" (even though she knows
that the latter is true) when the relevance-producing
effects of her utterance do not depend on a strictly literal
reading. Similarly, if the speaker says "I'm exhausted,"
no one will stop to wonder whether exhausted is exactly
what she is, as long as there is an acceptable range of
implications which makes her utterance relevant enough.
This is again true if the speaker says, in the same circum-
stances, "I'm dead" - a clear metaphor this time.
In Relevance 14 we show that there is no discontinuity
between literal uses, loose uses, and metaphors. Accord-
ing to this approach, metaphor (like a variety of related
tropes such as hyperbole, metonymy, and synecdoche)
requires no special interpretive abilities or procedures:
The fact that some utterances are interpreted meta-
phorically, just as others are interpreted literally, results
from the same standard process of comprehension.
4.7. Echoic utterances and irony. We argue that irony and
a variety of related tropes such as meiosis and litotes fall
together with a range of cases not normally regarded as
figurative at all. What unites these cases is the fact that
the thought of the speaker, which is interpreted by the
utterance, is itself an interpretation. What it interprets is
a thought of someone (or some group) other than the
speaker - or of the speaker in the past. That is, these
utterances are second-degree interpretations of someone
else's thought, as illustrated by path (a) in Figure 1 above.
How do interpretations of someone else's thought
achieve relevance? In the best-known case, that of "re-
ported speech," they achieve relevance by informing the
hearer of the fact that so-and-so has said something or
thinks something. In other cases, these interpretations
achieve relevance by informing the hearer of the fact that
the speaker has in mind what some individual or indi-
viduals say or think and has a certain attitude to it. When
interpretations achieve relevance in this way, we say that
they are echoic.
By representing a thought that is not her own in a
manifestly sceptical, amused, surprised, triumphant, ap-
proving, or reproving way, the speaker can express her
own attitude to it. There is no limit to the attitudes that a
speaker can express to an opinion echoed. In particular,
she may indicate her agreement or disagreement. Com-
pare (14) and (15):
(14) (a) He: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
(They go for a picnic and the sun shines.)
(b) She (happily): A lovely day for a picnic, indeed!
(15) (a) He: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
(They go for a picnic and it rains.)
(b) She (sarcastically): A lovely day for a picnic, indeed!
In both (14b) and (15b) there is an echoic allusion to be
picked up. In the circumstances described, it is clear that
the speaker of (14b) endorses the opinion echoed, where-
as the speaker of (15b) rejects it with scorn. These
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utterances are interpreted on exactly similar patterns, the
only difference being in the attitudes they express: (14b)
has not been thought by rhetoricians to be worthy of
special attention; (15b) is, of course, a case of verbal irony.
An ironical attitude is of the disapproving kind. From
the display of such an attitude, the hearer can infer, if it
was not already obvious to him, that the speaker believes
the opposite of the opinion echoed: Thus the speaker of
(15b) manifestly believes that it is not a lovely day for a
picnic. However, against classical approaches to irony,
we argue that this is not the "figurative meaning" of the
ironical utterance. At most, it is one of its implicatures:
More relevant implicatures might be that her compan-
ion's judgment has been unsound, that they should never
have set out, that it was his fault that their day has been
ruined, and so on. The recovery of these implicatures
depends, first, on a recognition of the utterance as echoic,
second, on an identification of the source of the opinion
echoed, and third, on a recognition that the speaker's
attitude to the opinion echoed is one of disapproval. We
argue that these are the key factors in the interpretation of
all ironical utterances.15
We are arguing on the one hand that metaphors and
ironies are not essentially different from other types of
utterances but that, on the other hand, they are not
essentially similar to one another. Metaphor plays on the
relationship between the propositional form of an utter-
ance and that of the speaker's thought; irony plays on the
relationship between the speaker's thought and a thought
it interprets. This suggests that the classical notion of a
trope, which covers metaphor and irony and distingui-
shes both from "nonfigurative" utterances, should be
abandoned altogether: It groups together phenomena
which are not closely related and fails to group together
phenomena which are.
4.8. Speech acts: Interrogatives and exclamatives. Our
book questions some of the basic assumptions of current
speech-act theory, and sketches an alternative approach
which puts a much greater load on inference than on
decoding in the identification of illocutionary force.
Given the principle of relevance, we argue that illocu-
tionary-force indicators such as declarative or imperative
mood or interrogative word order have to make manifest
only a rather abstract property of the speaker's infor-
mative intention: the direction in which the relevance of
the utterance is to be sought. Here, we will take the case
of interrogatives and exclamatives as an illustration of this
general approach.
Speech-act theorists tend to analyse interrogative ut-
terances as a special subtype of directive speech act:
specifically, as requests for information (see Bach &
Harnish 1979, p. 48; Searle 1969, p. 69). As a result,
rhetorical questions such as (16), expository questions
such as (17), and self-addressed questions such as (18), all
require ad hoc separate treatment:
(16) When did you say you were going to give up smoking?
(17) What are the main objections to this approach? First. . .
(18) Why do we have to die?
We argue that what the interrogative word order sig-
nals is a much more abstract property than that of being a
request for information. It signals that the utterance
represents (not descriptively but interpretively, of
course) an assumption which would be relevant if true. In
other words, a question is an interpretation of a desirable
thought - the piece of knowledge which would answer it;
it follows path (b) on Figure 1. In the case of a yes-no
interrogative, the propositional form of the utterance is
like a quotation of the relevant-if-true assumption. In the
case of a wh-question (who-which-what-why and so on),
the logical form of the utterance is not fully propositional;
it is an incomplete interpretive representation of the
relevant-if-true assumption.
On this account, this is all the interrogative word order
signals. Decisions about who would find the assumption
represented relevant, and about whether the speaker
expects an answer, are left to the hearer to infer on the
basis of the principle of relevance. For example, rhet-
orical questions such as (16) are often reminders, de-
signed to prompt the retrieval of an assumption the
speaker regards as relevant to the hearer. Expository
questions such as (17) are analysable as questions whose
answers the speaker not only regards as relevant to the
hearer but is about to provide herself. Regular requests
for information, by contrast, are analysable as questions
whose answers the speaker regards as relevant to her and,
moreover, expects the hearer to supply. In pure specula-
tions such as (18), the suggestion is that the answer would
be relevant to the speaker, or to both speaker and hearer,
but there is no expectation that anyone will be in a
position to supply it. There is thus no need to analyse all
questions as requests for information, no need to set up
special speech-act categories to handle offers of informa-
tion, rhetorical questions, expository questions, and
so on.
One advantage of this approach is that it suggests a way
of explaining the striking syntactic parallels between
interrogative and exclamative sentences such as (19) and
(20):
(19) How clever is Jane?
(20) How clever Jane is!
In traditional speech-act terms, since interrogatives
are requests for information and exclamatives are em-
phatic assertions, it is hard to account for the consistent
cross-linguistic parallelisms (see Grimshaw 1979, Sadock
& Zwicky 1985) between these two utterance types. On
our approach, exclamatives, like interrogatives and un-
like declaratives, are specialised for interpretive rather
than descriptive use, and also follow path (b) of Figure 1.
Whereas a speaker who asks a question such as (19)
indicates that some true completion of the incomplete
thought represented by her utterance is relevant, a
speaker who produces an exclamation such as (20) indi-
cates that some relevant completion of the incomplete
thought represented by her utterance is true. In other
words, the speaker of (20) indicates that Jane is high
enough on the scale of cleverness for this to be worth
drawing attention to. Thus, the intuition that exclama-
tives are like emphatic assertions and the striking paral-
lelisms between exclamative and interrogative form are
simultaneously explained.
5. Concluding remark
We are well aware that the view developed in Relevance
and summarised here is very speculative and, as it stands,
too general to determine directly either specific experi-
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mental tests or computer simulations. In assessing a new
approach to human communication, however, the follow-
ing questions should be kept in mind. How does it
compare with other current approaches in terms of ex-
plicitness, plausibility, generality, and explanatory
power? Does it throw new light both on the very rich and
diverse data available to all of us as individuals involved in
communication and on the narrower but more reliable
data gathered by scholars? Does it suggest new empirical
research? Is it relevant to more than one of the many
disciplines involved in the study of human communica-
tion - linguistics, pragmatics, philosophy, cognitive psy-
chology, artificial intelligence, social psychology, literary
studies, anthropology, and sociology - and could it foster
fruitful interactions among them?
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Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College, City University of New York,
Brooklyn, N.Y. 11210
It is convenient for me to raise questions for Sperber & Wilson
(S&W) by pressing comparisons with Grice s (1975b) original
account. Their explication of relevance in terms of the extent of
contextual effects seems to be a simplification of the maxims
under three of Grice s Categories: Quality, Quantity, and Rela-
tion. (See, for example, S&W's illustrations and discussion, pp.
120-22). The other pillar of their theory - effort or processing
costs - renders explicit expectations that fall under the category
of Manner, as well as the basic presumption of obedience to the
Cooperative Principle (CP).
In explicitly distinguishing between truthfulness, infor-
mativeness, and relevance, Grice allows for priorities among
these qualities. Let me assume, following a number of philoso-
phers of language, that truthfulness should have the highest
priority. If the assumption is correct, how will S&W capture it,
given that they do not treat truth separately?
An illustration of this priority involves a speaker, S, who in the
appropriate context responds to someone's question "Do you
believe that the Mets will win the Series?" by simply saying no.
There is a common tendency to construe such assertions as
implying the "opposite": S disbelieves that the Mets will win or
S believes that the Mets will not win. Whereas what S has
strictly said carries no such implication: He denies holding a
belief; he does not assert that he believes anything else. (His
denial has large scope.) Giving a priority to truthfulness or
holding the (consonant) presumption of literalness, which S&W
reject (p. 230), supports S's denial of responsibility for the
listener's drawing the stronger conclusion. However, the
stronger conclusion is more relevant in S&W's sense because it
has more contextual effects and, given how readily the conclu-
sion is drawn, it appears to be even less of a processing burden
than the stricter reading.
In their discussion of responsibility (chap. 4, sect. 4), S&W
rightly note that questions of responsibility are matters of
degree. Should the speaker have given his answer with the
purpose of deliberately misleading the audience, knowing its
tendency to overinfer, we might be less sympathetic. However,
if his reply was an indirect consequence of S's wanting to speak
the precise, appropriate, simplest truth, then, even if S under-
stood this tendency, I do not see that he can be faulted for the
implications that others draw, however common. Perhaps this is
too legalistic: I do not want to generalize from this case except to
claim that, as we move from conversation to public speaking
(hearing) to writing (reading), speakers take less responsibility
for implications drawn beyond what is literally said. S&W's
explicit introduction of processing costs nicely explains this
result, since each step in the chain represents diminished
demands of cognitive economy. I am puzzled about why they do
not appeal to such differences in communicative settings in their
discussions of figurative language.
Irony is a case in which speakers clearly are exploiting, not
just involving, the hearer's tendency to vacillate between op-
posites. On p. 240, S&W criticize Grice and others for leaving it
unclear why an ironical utterance should be used in the first
place. If someone utters to the driver "There's something
coming" when no car is coming, the driver slams on the brakes
rather than take the utterance as ironic for "There's nothing
coming." What was said is not ironic, S&W insist, but irrational.
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However, on Grice's view too, the foul-up is the speaker's fault.
The falsity of the utterance cannot be exploited for ironic
purposes because it just is not mutually obvious that it is false,
especially given the special demands for caution and rapid
judgment by the hearer-driver. The violation of the maxim is not
conspicuous.
S&W might wonder, as they do in a related context (pp. 200-
201), why, even when a maxim is flaunted, the speaker impli-
cates the opposite. The obvious, perhaps facile answer is: Given
mutual knowledge of the practice of ironical usage, and pre-
sumed obedience to the CP, assuming that the opposite is what
the speaker intended is the best explanation of why the speaker
said what he did.
In claiming that the order of accessing hypotheses matters to
their selection for interpretation, S&W's relevance theory
seems to have a determinateness that Grice's theory lacks. At
best, Grice has the idea that a speaker obeying the CP will try to
formulate his contribution so that the proper hypothesis to
interpret it is the easiest; among all appropriate and available
ones, that an audience is expected to have. S&W declare that it
should be the first hypothesis consistent with relevance.
S&W contrast their aim of optimization with Grice's of max-
imation: "It is possible to be optimally relevant without being 'as
informative as is required' by the current purposes of the
exchange " (p. 162). But just as we have to understand the CP as
implicitly requiring that speakers make the least processing
demands on hearers, only ceteris paribus, so too there must be a
ceteris paribus clause attached to each of the maxims. This is
clear, for example, when Grice discusses a "clash" of maxims
(Grice 1975b, pp. 69-71) in which the solution involves optimiz-
ing maxims under Quantity and Quality.
Contrasting optimizing with maximizing rules, maxims, or
directives typically encourages an illusion of determinateness.
Thus, Simon's (1979) idea that real information-processing sys-
tems must be "satisficers,' not maximizers, has been viewed as a
hypothesis that is highly specific, an empirical conjecture, and a
(nonrational) rationalization for predictable weaknesses in
human reasoning. Both the satisficing model and S&W's rele-
vance theory insist that we select the first hypothesis that offers
a solution to the problem at hand. This appears highly specific or
determinate, as well as empirically bold, because we contrast it
with the range of alternatives specifying either that we should
choose the second, third, and so forth, hypothesis or that we
should examine all the hypotheses to choose the best or "max-
imizing" solution. For any particular, narrowly circumscribed
problem, this contrast can make sense. But it makes no sense
when we are speaking of the rational adoption of rules, maxims,
or directives to be widely applied to a large range of problems
under the weakest of finiteness constraints. The proper contrast
is between any such satisficing rule and one demanding that we
continue to search for solutions even if there is nothing worth-
while that the extra effort promises. This last alternative we can
reject a priori relative to the simplest demands of rationality,
namely, that we not continue our effortful search once we have
reached our goal. The specificity of choosing the first hypothesis
derives from the vague and indeterminate demand that efforts
should be undertaken only if they are worthwhile: The first
hypothesis is just that hypothesis, whatever it happens to be,
beyond which we are not rationally justified in going. For if we
were so rationally justified, it would no longer be the first
appropriate hypothesis.
Relevant questions
Kent Bacha and Robert M. Harnisht>
"Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, San Francisco,
Calif. 94132 and "Department of Philosophy and Department of Linguistics,
Program in Cognitive Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz. 85721
Sperber & Wilson (S&W) find fault with "Gricean" theories of
communication and propose a theory of their own. Both their
criticisms and their proposals are interesting and provocative,
but not entirely clear. In the space available, we can only raise
some questions about their theory and make some brief com-
ments on their criticisms.
The principle of relevance
1. How do speakers and hearers follow the principle of
relevance (PR)? According to S&W the PR applies to every act
of ostensive communication (e.g., p. 158), but the definition of
relevance "makes clear comparisons possible only in some
cases" (p. 125). Also, since measuring effort is required for
determining comparative relevance, how is effort to be mea-
sured? All we are told is that "the mind assesses its own efforts
and their effects by monitoring these [physico-chemical]
changes" (p. 130). If that is possible somehow, then the hearer
can assess his own effort. But how does a communicator antici-
pate the effort expended by the hearer? S&W assert, for exam-
ple, that the "communicator should have used a stimulus which
would have saved the addressee the effort of first accessing two
hypotheses consistent with the principle of relevance, and then
having to choose between them" (p. 168); but they do not
explain how he is to accomplish this.
2. Where do candidate [/]s (sets of assumptions made man-
ifest by informative intentions) come from, beyond those de-
ducible from the meaning of the utterance? S&W say that "the
plausibility of some hypotheses may already be manifest in the
environment" (p. 167), but just how this occurs and how man-
ifest hypotheses actually come to mind is not explained. S&W
accuse us Griceans of "whistling in the dark" (p. 20) on such
questions, but they themselves do likewise, as they eventually
acknowledge (p. 170).
3. According to the PR, every act of ostensive communica-
tion communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance,
and according to that presumption the ostensive stimulus is the
most relevant one the communicator could have used to com-
municate [/]. There is no requirement on the relevance of what
is communicated, however. Rather, S&W argue that "it is the
first interpretation to occur to the addressee that is the one the
communicator intended to convey" (p. 169). This raises a diffi-
cult question for S&W: How are (nonstandardized) indirect
speech acts possible? How can a speaker communicate one thing
by way of communicating another if the addressee stops infer-
ring after the first thing occurs to him? More generally, how do
S&W explain how the addressee can modify, supplement, or
replace the first assumption that comes to mind, even if it is
consistent with the PR?
Ostensive communication
1. Every act of ostensive communication is supposed to
communicate a presumption of its own optimal relevance. But
how does one identify a stimulus as an instance of ostensive
communication in the first place, so that its optimal relevance
can be presumed?
2. Does ostensive communication require a communicative
intention? First S&W say that it does, when they define commu-
nicative intentions (pp. 60-61), and then, when they define
ostensive-inferential communication (p. 63), they say that it
does not.
3. Moreover, does ostensive communication require uptake
on the part of the hearer? S&W's definition does not require
uptake, since it specifies only that the speaker's informative
intention (if he even has one) be made mutually manifest, not
that the hearer actually recognize this intention. For S&W an
assumption is manifest to someone merely because he is capable
of representing it and of accepting its representation as true (p.
39); but then the thought of it might never occur to him and
might never play a role in his thinking.
Gricean theories
1. Communicative intentions. S&W agree with Griceans that
communicative intentions are overt in a way that distinguishes
them from other intentions, but they object that Gricean analy-
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1987) 10:4 711
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00055539
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:52:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
ses of such intentions are psychologically implausible. On such
analyses these intentions either involve infinitely many subin-
tentions or, if construed as reflexive, are, according to S&W,
infinitely long. S&W neglect to mention an analysis which
avoids this problem and which, in an article they cite, Grice
(1969) himself suggests. On this account, what is required is not
the presence of intentions at higher and higher levels but the
absence of any "sneaky" intentions anywhere up the line.
Moreover, S&W's argument (pp. 256-57) that reflexive (or self-
referential) intentions are infinitely long requires the premise
that to refer to itself an intention (or any representation) must
spell itself out, that is, include a mention of itself within itself
(hence within itself within itself . . .). But consider the sentence
T, "This sentence contains five words." Its referent (itself) can
be identified without even once substituting T for "This
sentence."
2. Mutual knowledge /belief and the code model. S&W as-
sume that the only reason for "pragmatic" theories to impose a
mutual knowledge/belief requirement on communication is
adherence to the "code model." In fact, pragmatic theories such
as our own (Bach & Harnish 1979) are inferential, at least
beyond the level of language comprehension (which is a matter
of decoding). Indeed, we explicitly disavow the code model in
our Introduction. Whereas for us the point of this requirement
is to limit the speaker's intention and the hearer's inference to
information that each can expect the other to rely on, S&W
suppose that its point is to guarantee successful communication
(p. 17). S&W rightly insist that there is no such guarantee, but
we pragmatists don't claim that there is. Our theory points out
that attempted communication can and often does fail; indeed,
successful communication does not entail mutual knowledge of,
or even mutual belief in, its success (1979, p. 87).
3. Ex post facto explanations. S&W assert that Grieean
accounts fail to exclude the possibility of several equally justified
ways of taking a given utterance in a given context (p. 37).
However, S&W do not show that Grieean accounts allow this
possibility when communication succeeds. Of course, because
communication can and often does fail, no theory should ex-
clude this possibility altogether. After all, there are cases in
which an audience reasonably takes an utterance the wrong way
or doesn't know which of several equally plausible ways to take
it. That is why the very same model used for successful commu-
nication can be applied to unsuccessful communication. Our
speech act schema (1979, chap. 4), which gives the general form
of inference an audience is intended to make, provides a
number of different places where things can go wrong. Among
them are places for mutual contextual beliefs; for when the
speaker and his audience are wrong about each other's beliefs,
communication is likely to fail.
4. Linguistic communication. S&W do not acknowledge any
fundamental difference between linguistic communication and
"ostensive" communication in general. It is our position (1979,
p. 14) that in the linguistic case there prevails a communicative
presumption, to the effect that when someone says something to
somebody he does so with a certain identifiable communicative
intention. The audience relies on this presumption and, as a
result, need not ascertain that the speaker intends to be commu-
nicating. In nonlinguistic cases, however, one must generally
infer that there is a communicative intention to be identified, as
well as identify it.
5. Speech acts and what is communicated. S&W complain
that, according to speech act theory, "the assignment of every
utterance to a particular speech-act type is part of what is
communicated and plays a necessary role in comprehension" (p.
244). Of course a theory's taxonomy need not be used in practice
by communicators, but, speaking for ourselves, we don't claim
that it does. Although we describe the hearer's task as identify-
ing the speech act being performed by the speaker, we also
provide a taxonomy of speech-act types in terms of types of
propositional attitudes being expressed. For example, to make a
request is to express a desire that the hearer perform a certain
action; for the hearer to understand a request, accordingly, is for
him to recognize the utterance as expressing such a desire.
Curiously, this seems to be S&W's view as well, for they
remark, quite rightly, that a prediction can be understood
without being explicitly classified by its hearers as a prediction,
provided they take it as communicating an assumption (express-
ing a belief) "about a future event at least partly beyond [the
speaker's] control" (p. 245). Note that in our view a speaker can
express an attitude without actually possessing it. This dif-
ference forms the basis for our distinction between commu-
nicative and other intentions. A communicative intention is a
reflexive intention, in particular, one whose fulfillment consists
in its recognition, and to recognize such an intention is to
identify the attitude being expressed.
Linguistic constraints on pragmatic
interpretation: A reassessment of linguistic
semantics
Diane Blakemore
Department of French (Linguistics), University of Southampton,
Southampton SO9 5NH, England
The fact that some aspects of linguistic form do not contribute to
the truth-conditional content of utterances is frequently ac-
knowledged but very rarely explained. This is not, perhaps,
surprising, given the range of expressions and constructions that
convey nontruth-conditional meaning and the variety of effects
to which they give rise. Moreover, until very recently one could
camouflage the lack of progress by designating all such phe-
nomena as "pragmatic," the assumption being that someone
would eventually provide a pragmatic theory.
And now, indeed, we do have a pragmatic theory that sheds
light on the problem of nontruth-conditional meaning. This is
not to say that the domain of this theory is the nontruth-
conditional. For Sperber & Wilson (S&W) the fundamental
distinction is between those aspects of meaning that are de-
coded according to linguistic rules and those worked out on the
basis of the context and the assumption that the utterance is
consistent with a general principle of communication. As they
emphasize, the linguistically encoded meaning of an utterance
underspecifies its truth-conditional content: It provides only a
"blueprint" for a proposition, or, as S&W call it, a "logical
form." A complete proposition can be obtained only on the basis
of contextual information and the assumption that the speaker
has aimed at optimal relevance.1
Because linguistic meaning is not directly truth conditional,
there is no reason to think that every aspect of linguistic
meaning is definable in truth-conditional terms - and hence that
the differences between the (a) and the (b) utterances in the
following should not be specified in a theory of linguistic
semantics:
(1) (a) She's well meaning but indiscriminate.
(b) She's well meaning and indiscriminate.
(2) (a) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave (Grice
1975a).
(b) He is an Englishman; he is, after all, brave.
(3) (a) It was Susan who read the article,
(b) It was the article that Susan read.
This is not to say that the contribution made by but, therefore,
after all, and the cleft construction can be explained in linguistic
terms. Stalnaker (1974, p. 212) suggested that the function of
certain linguistic constructions is to impose constraints on the
contexts in which utterances containing them can occur. How-
ever, without an adequate account of the selection and role of
the context in utterance interpretation, it is hard to see why
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there should be such arbitary links between linguistic form and
pragmatic interpretation.
According to S&W, interpreting an utterance is not just a
matter of identifying the proposition it expresses. Hearers are
expected to integrate that proposition with their existing as-
sumptions for the recovery of contextual effects. Indeed, the
very act of communication gives hearers a guarantee that they
will be able to derive adequate contextual effects. But accessing
and using contextual assumptions involves a cost, and the
hearer's aim of obtaining contextual effects is offset by the aim of
minimizing processing costs. This means that it is in the in-
terests of speakers who wish their communication to succeed
that the required contextual assumptions be easily accessible to
hearers. In some cases the speaker may have grounds for
thinking that the necessary assumptions are already accessible
to hearers, and hence that they will recover the optimally
relevant interpretation of their own accord. In other cases,
however, speakers may feel that they need to constrain the
hearer's interpretation by making certain contextual assump-
tions accessible, thus ensuring correct context selection at
minimal processing cost. That is, given the hearer's aim of
optimizing relevance, the existence of structures and ex-
pressions that constrain the choice of context is to be expected.
To illustrate, consider the sequence in (4):
(4) A: Susan's not coming today.
B: Tom's in town.
Although A's utterance provides the hearer with an immediately
accessible context for the interpretation of B's, it is not clear
where exactly the relevance of B's remark lies. It could be
relevant as an explanation for the fact that Susan is not coming; it
could be evidence for A's claim; it could be relevant as the
specification of the implication of A's remark; it could be rele-
vant as something that contrasts with the fact of Susan's not
coming; or it could be an attempt to dismiss A's remark as
irrelevant. In real conversation, however, the connection be-
tween the two remarks would not be left unspecified, and B
would make his intentions clear, either by intonation or by the
use of such "discourse connectives" as you see, after all, so,
however, and anyway.
In S&W's framework computing the effect of a newly present-
ed proposition crucially involves inference. The role of con-
textual assumptions is to act as premises which combine with the
new information to enable hearers to add to or improve their
evidence for existing assumptions. This means that an ex-
pression which imposes a constraint on the relevance of the
proposition it introduces is a constraint on the inferential com-
putations that proposition may enter into. For example, there-
fore (utterance 2a) specifies that the proposition it introduces
must be interpreted as a conclusion, whereas after all (utterance
2b) indicates that the proposition it introduces is a premise. In
both cases hearers are expected to supply the contextual as-
sumptions that allow them to establish the prescribed connec-
tion. Words like anyway do not express inferential connections,
but rather specify the property of the set of contextual assump-
tions which must be combined with the proposition expressed
for the deduction of contextual effects.2
Notice that according to this account, the meanings of these
expressions do not themselves contribute to the prepositional
representation whose relevance is being assessed. If this is
right, then they cannot be part of the level of semantic represen-
tation that S&W call "logical form." This suggests a nonunitary
theory of linguistic semantics. On the one hand, there is the
study of logical form - that essentially conceptual theory which
deals with the way in which elements of linguistic structure map
onto constituents of prepositional representations. On the other
hand, there is the study of linguistic constraints on relevance -
that essentially procedural theory which deals with the way in
which elements of linguistic structure affect pragmatic computa-
tions. Given the foundation provided by relevance theory, both
promise to be fruitful areas for future research.
NOTES
1. For further discussion see the accompanying commentary by
Carston.




Department of Linguistics, University College London, London WC1E 6BT,
England
It is a truism that verbal communication is one of the primary
bases for human beings' understanding of each other and for
their establishing relationships with each other. As participants
in this practice we accumulate a range of common experiences.
For example, most of us find exchange with some people
dreadfully tedious, whereas with others we feel stimulated,
challenged, or drawn closer. We find some conversationalists
witty or amusing, others long-winded or patronising. Some-
times the act of uttering is much more important than the actual
content of the utterance, just as in other contexts the fact of
silence is highly significant. Speakers may betray assumptions
and attitudes they haven't intended to convey; hearers may
experience a nagging uncertainty about whether a speaker is
making some insinuation or whether they are themselves re-
sponsible for projecting it into the interpretation. One could
multiply this list of familiar observations. With the advent of
relevance theory, however, we need not merely note these facts
and vaguely wonder what they indicate about human psychol-
ogy. Sperber & Wilson's (S&W's) Relevance presents a theory
that enables a systematic and explanatory account of such
experiences and sets up a programme for sustained research into
these and many other interpretative issues. It is important to
keep in mind that what underlies the relevance-theoretic treat-
ment of verbal communication is a theory of communication in
general that is based in turn on a theory of human cognition. As
such, relevance theory is the first account of pragmatics which is
grounded in psychology.
In discussing the meaning of utterances Grice (1975a; 1978)
distinguished what is said from what is implicated. He took what
is said (that is, the explicit content of the utterance) to be the
proposition determined by three factors: the conventional
meaning of the linguistic form of the utterance, the assignment
of referents to referring expressions, and the resolution of any
ambiguities of sense. However, in demonstrating his various
pragmatic maxims at work, he ignored explicit content and
concentrated entirely on implicitly conveyed propositions, im-
plicatures. These do show very clearly how the utterance of a
certain linguistic form in a particular context can convey much
more than that form itself literally does. For example:
(1) A: Will Mary come to the movie with us?
B: She has an exam in the morning.
Assuming that some maxim of rational communication is in
operation, in the context of A's question B's utterance implies
that Mary will not or should not go to the movie. But of course
the speaker hasn't actually said this: The meaning of the lin-
guistic form used does not include anything about movie-going,
and the truth or falsity of B's utterance is independent of
whether or not Mary goes to the movie.
Now linguists such as Gazdar (1979), Horn (1984), and Levin-
son (1983), who took up Grice's principles, have followed his
example and been almost entirely concerned to use Gricean
principles to account for the generation of these sorts of implica-
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tions. They have written as if any meaning not derived by
linguistic decoding must be implicated. However, this can not
be right, since it would entail that the results of reference
assignment and disambiguation are also implicatures. In fact, as
soon as one considers actual utterances it is obvious that prag-
matic principles must play a large role in determining explicit
content because utterances are frequently fragmentary or vague
and may be ungrammatical or contain slips of the tongue.
Interpretation involves deriving the framework or schema (a
logical form) provided by linguistic content but it is seldom, if
ever, exhausted by it.
S&W define the explicit content of an utterance: "An assump-
tion communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is
a development of a logical form encoded by U" (p. 182). Any
assumptions explicitly communicated are a combination of lin-
guistically encoded and contextually inferred features. There is
always a linguistic contribution, but its role varies along a
continuum from near total determination of the explicit content
to the merest indication, as shown by the following examples of
possible utterances:
2. The sun will rise at 5:25 am on May 15, 1989.
3. Susan's playing is good enough.
4. He admitted it.
5. At home.
6. Soon.
Understanding these requires various amounts of disambigua-
tion, reference assignment, enrichment (e.g., in (3) "good
enough" for what?), and completion. These processes involve an
interaction of the linguistically derived meaning with contextual
assumptions and are driven by the bid for maximal relevance
and constrained by the principle of relevance.
Philosophers of language have a longstanding interest in the
truth-conditional content of sentences and utterances. So they
have not confined their interest to linguistic content alone but,
like Grice, have assumed that determining explicit content
involves the fixing of certain indexical expressions by the context
so as to arrive at a prepositional form, that is, a form capable of
being true or false. However, this does not conform to the
reality of psychological processes either, as S&W show in the
following example:
7. Repairing this watch is going to take some time (p. 189).
The interpretation recoverable from this utterance by decoding
the linguistic content and assigning reference to "this watch"
will give a complete proposition expressing the simple truism
that the repairing of the watch will be an activity taking place
over time. This is truth-evaluable; it will be true in almost every
situation one can conceive of. However, recall that according to
the principle of relevance the interpretation chosen is the most
accessible interpretation (the one requiring least effort) which
gives sufficient cognitive or contextual effects. On this basis, the
truism is rejected as the explicit prepositional content the
speaker wished to convey because it is not sufficiently relevant:
It does not interact with contextual assumptions to yield an
adequate range of contextual effects. It must be enriched in
some way in order to do so; the most probable enrichment, in
the sort of context likely to prevail for the customer wanting her
watch repaired, is that the time period involved will be longer
than she might have expected, an assumption bound to have a
range of implications for her. It seems that the formal philosoph-
ical requirement of minimal truth evaluability is an arbitrary
principle with no force in a psychologically adequate account of
communication.
The relevance-theoretic account of explicit content opens the
way for a solution to a number of problem cases that motivated
Grice's original postulation of pragmatic maxims, including the
apparent ambiguity of logical connectives such as and (truth-
functional conjunction with possible temporal and/or causal
connotations) and or (inclusive and exclusive), and of the num-
bers (an "at least" sense and an "exactly" sense). I argue
(Carston, forthcoming) that although none of these involves
linguistic ambiguity of the word itself, the correct level for the
incorporation of these pragmatically derived aspects of meaning
is the level of explicit content rather than that of implicature. So,
for example, the causal connection between the conjuncts of (8)
is part of the assumption explicitly communicated, even though
it is neither given by linguistic content nor required for the
derivation of a truth-evaluable proposition.
8. He was hit by a bus and died instantly.
This analysis follows directly from the principle of relevance
which directs the recovery of assumptions, whether explicit or
implicit, that have a satisfactory range of effects for the least
effort in deriving the effects.
Pragmatics has been taken up by linguists and philosophers
and generally suffers from the preoccupations of their disci-
plines. Relevance theory, on the other hand, gives a cognitive
psychological basis to what surely is a psychological phe-
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The achievement of relevance by people in conversation is an
extraordinary feat and well worth studying. So is the achieve-
ment of Relevance by traditional adversaries from opposite
shores of the English Channel. Sperber & Wilson (S&W),
burying their Gallic and Celtic hatchets, have offered us a
provocative account of communication and cognition. They are
to be congratulated on it. Not that the account isn't flawed, but
what account isn't? In two earlier papers (Clark 1982; Clark &
Gerrig 1984), Gerrig and I have argued against S&W's earlier
views on mutual belief and irony and, despite their protesta-
tions, our arguments still stand. Here I will look at two more
general features of their enterprise.
Collective Action. The centerpiece of Relevance is, of course,
relevance. According to the OED, relevant means "bearing
upon, connected with, pertinent to, the matter in hand. "But for
S&W, what is the matter in hand? To what purpose is a
communicative act relevant? For all their talk about relevance,
they never really say. That, I suggest, jeopardizes their entire
enterprise.
It was Grice's (1975a; 1978) and Austin's (1962) insight that
communication must be viewed as part of a theory of action - of
what people do. At first, S&W appear to follow suit as they
discuss informative and communicative intentions and osten-
sive-inferential communication. But they stop short of embrac-
ing Grice's and Austin's full insight. They are satisfied in claim-
ing that "The aim of communication in general . . . is to
increase the mutuality of cognitive environments and thereby
the similarity of thoughts" (Pre'cis, sect. 4.2, para. 5). Grice and
Austin might accept this as the means of communication, but
surely not its aim.
People talk, Grice (1975a) and Austin (1962) tacitly assumed,
as a means of doing things they can only do collectively -
arguing, instructing, negotiating business, performing rituals,
telling stories, gossiping, planning. This is really the point of
Grice's observation that talk exchanges "are characteristically,
to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant
recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of
purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction" (Grice
1975a, p. 45). For Grice, this evolving common purpose is the
basis for all conversational implicatures. In hindsight, we can
see that it was a mistake for him not to develop the notion any
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further. What he offered instead were rules of thumb, or
maxims, by which one could determine the effects of common
purpose. But these rules of thumb are no more than that. They
are proxies, promissory notes, for a theory of collective action
that is yet to be developed.
S&W, however, spurn Grice's observation and decline to
develop any notion of "matter in hand" or "common purpose."
When they characterize relevance, it is always divorced from
what the participants in a discourse are really doing. "For us,"
say S&W (p. 161), "the only purpose that a genuine commu-
nicator and a willing audience necessarily have in common
is . . . to have the communicator's informative intention recog-
nised by the audience." Perhaps. But even that intention cannot
be recognized without seeing the potential common purposes to
which the communicator's action is to contribute. S&W's posi-
tion is like claiming that the only purpose I need in stepping on
the car's accelerator is to put more gasoline into the carburetor. I
do feed the carburetor, but that hardly accounts for why I
usually take that action. I do it to speed up the engine, to turn
the wheels faster, to speed up the car, to get me to my
destination quicker, and so on. The "matter in hand," the main
purpose for an action, is often quite remote from its immediate
effects. Likewise in communication. That was Grice's and Aus-
tin's shared insight. So what S&W leave us with is a peculiarly
empty notion of relevance. It almost belies the title of the book.
As a result, S&W pass off onto "cognitive psychology," with-
out further explication, what for many scholars are the central
issues of pragmatics. Consider their idea that addressees take
the decoded content of an utterance along with what is "mutu-
ally manifest," weigh its "contextual effects" against its "pro-
cessing effort," and select the interpretation that is "optimally
relevant - that is, "the first accessible interpretation consistent
with the principle [of relevance]" (Pre'cis, sect. 3.3, para. 6). But
what exactly are "accessibility" and "processing effort"? Do we
really select interpretations, as they presuppose? How are
contextual effects weighed against processing effort? And so on.
Paradoxically, to answer these questions, we would need just
the notions of collective action and evolving purpose that S&W
are unwilling to provide.
Notions like these are already under investigation in the
literature on conversation and other types of discourse, but
S&W pass them over. In the end, however, they will not be able
to duck the question "relevant to what?"
Layers of communication. Many types of discourse have more
than one distinct layer of action or communication (Bruce 1981;
Clark 1987; Goffman 1974). S&W, however, presuppose that all
communication is flat - that it has only one layer, one type of
relevance. That, I suggest, leads to a misrepresentation of many
important phenomena in communication.
Layering is easiest to recognize in fiction - novels, plays,
short stories, jokes, films - though it is common elsewhere too.
In Herman Melville's novel Moby Dick, the narrator Ishmael is
telling some landsmen, perhaps in a Nantucket tavern, about his
whaling adventures. Call this domain 1. Yet everything in
domain 1 - Ishmael, his audience, his adventures, and his
narrative - are Melville's inventions, and in writing the novel,
he "communicated" that narrative to us readers. Call this
domain 2. (One can argue for another domain between 1 and 2,
but it is not needed to make the point.) Likewise, in Hamlet,
Hamlet talks with Ophelia in a fictional domain 1, but Shake-
speare "communicates" that conversation to us playgoers in
domain 2 (via actors in yet another domain pretending to be
Hamlet and Ophelia). All fiction has at least two domains, two
layers.
How does relevence theory apply? In domain 1, the theory
might claim that, fictionally, when Ishmael says, "Call me
Ishmael," he has "informative" and "communicative inten-
tions" toward his Nantucket audience, and they in turn presume
that his utterance is relevant to them. The theory might also
apply when Hamlet tells Ophelia, "Get thee to a nunnery."
What about domain 2? When Melville writes for us, "Call me
Ishmael," we aren't to call him Ishmael. Nor is Shakespeare
asking us (or Ophelia or the actress playing Ophelia) to hie off to
some "nunnery" - some brothel. Domain 2 is somehow very
different from domain 1.
Relevance theory doesn't go beyond the surface layer. It has
nothing to say about domain 2, even if we avail ourselves of
S&W's notion of "interpretation" or "interpretive representa-
tion." Here is why. Melville and Shakespeare have intentions
toward us, but these are not "informative" or "communicative
intentions" - they do not constitute the Gricean speaker's
meaning (Clark 1987) - and the principle of relevance does not
apply. So when Melville and Shakespeare "communicate" with
us, it is communication of a fundamentally different type. This
has a surprising but demonstrable consequence. Even if rele-
vance theory could explain how the Nantucket landsmen under-
stood Ishmael, and how Ophelia understood Hamlet, it would
not explain how we do. Relevance theory simply does not apply
to a great deal of our most cherished communication.
Relevance theory has a long way to go to become a full theory
of communication and cognition. It cannot work, I suggest,
without well-developed notions of collective action and layer-
ing. But can it accommodate these without being stretched
beyond the breaking point? That may be the next test of the
trans-Channel alliance.
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The task of the speaker and the task of the
hearer
Anne Cutler
MRC Applied Psychology Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge CB2 2EK,
England
These brief remarks will be addressed to Sperber & Wilson's
(S&W's) view of verbal communication. First, S&W draw a
distinction between two separate processes of comprehension: a
decoding process and an inferential process. They are prin-
cipally concerned with the operation of the latter; the former
they dismiss as automatic and therefore "not so much a part of
the comprehension process as something that precedes the real
work of understanding" (p. 177). Second, they imply that the
work of understanding (though "real") is less than the work of
speaking; the brunt of the work in communication is borne by
the speaker. "It is left to the communicator to make correct
assumptions about the codes and contextual information that the
audience will have. . . . The responsibility for avoiding misun-
derstandings also lies with the speaker" (p. 43). "If the speaker
has done her job properly, the end of the utterance should
confirm all the provisional choices . . . that have been made
along the route" (p. 208).
This picture is distinctly unfair to the hard-pressed hearer.
Hearers are presented with signals which are for the most part
semantically, syntactically, lexically, and phonologically unpre-
dictable; moreover, the signals arrive in a noisy channel and are
frequently subject to considerable distortion and attenuation.
Speakers, on the other hand, have in principle a free hand in
what they choose to say and how they choose to say it. S&W's
principle of relevance is based on the observation that speakers
do not take advantage of this freedom; in contrast, they constrain
their utterances quite severely in order to make life easier for
hearers.
In fact, S&W have here revealed only the tip of an iceberg.
Speakers construct their speech output so as to cater to listeners'
needs in a far more detailed fashion than is captured by the
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guarantee of relevance or by Grice's injunctions to speakers not
to bore, puzzle, offend, or deceive audiences. In particular,
there is abundant evidence that speakers adjust their output to
assist the listener at those levels which S&W claim are the
subject of "automatic" processing - even at the level of segment
production, as the following examples will show.
On the one hand, consider the inhibition of certain pho-
nological rules of elision and assimilation. The application of
such rules can result in a distortion, in casual speech, of phonetic
segments which would be clearly articulated in more formal
speech (Cooper & Paccia-Cooper 1980; Kaisse 1985); for exam-
ple, the sequence [tj] can become the affricated segment [t5].
This palatalisation rule can apply across word boundaries, as in
"Meetcha after work?" Cooper and Paccia-Cooper investigated
the applicability of such palatalisation as a function of the
informativeness of words preceding and following the bound-
ary. For example, they varied word frequency of occurrence,
comparing relatively common words ("rode your horse"; "had
utensils") with much less frequent ones ("goad your horse";
"had euglena"). Varying the frequency of the word preceding
the boundary had no effect on the frequency of palatalisation
across the boundary; but varying the frequency of the word after
the boundary had a strong effect - palatalisation was used
significantly less often before rare words. Cooper and Paccia-
Cooper also looked at the effect of contrastively stressing each
word; again, stressing preceding words had no significant effect
on the applicability of palatalisation, but stressing following
words almost completely inhibited it.
In other words, distorting the ends of words is something
speakers are fairly happy to do; but they are reluctant to distort
word beginnings if the words are either rare or contrastively
stressed, that is, if their information value is high. The begin-
ning is the most important part of a word for the listener -
distortion of word onsets disrupts word recognition far more
than distortion of later segments (Bagley 1900; Cole 1973;
Marslen-Wilson & Welsh 1978). So the speakers in Cooper and
Paccia-Cooper's studies were clearly making phonological
choices in such a way as to minimise disruption to the listener.
The same kind of motivation can be discerned in a pattern
observed by Cutler (1983) in the correction of slips of the
tongue. Eirors of lexical stress occur quite frequently - synTAX
for SYNtax, origin for Origin. Mostly such errors remain uncor-
rected by the speaker. This should cause the hearer little
problem, since prosodic stress plays no role in word recognition
(Cutler 1986); the hearer will probably notice a mismatch
between spoken form and canonical lexical form, but will be
readily able to discount it (cf. p. 23). What does disrupt word
recognition, though, is getting vowel quality wrong - substitut-
ing a full for a reduced vowel or vice versa (Bond & Small 1983).
So it is not surprising to find that precisely those stress errors
which result in a change of vowel quality are the stress errors
most likely to be corrected. Thus origin, in which a full vowel in
the initial syllable has been replaced by a reduced vowel, and a
reduced vowel in the second syllable has been replaced by a full
vowel, is much more likely to be corrected by the speaker than
synTAX, in which both vowels are full in both target and error.
These segment-level instances of perceptually driven speak-
ing are striking; but one could easily add many instances at the
lexical level (such as the tendency for nonce formations not to
distort the real words on which they are based; Cutler 1980) or at
the prosodic level (such as the fact that the greater the semantic
contrast between a lexical slip of the tongue and the intended
word, the more likely it is that the speaker will draw hearers'
attention to a correction of that slip by stressing it; Levelt &
Cutler 1983). Seen in this light, speakers' attention to ensuring
relevance is merely one end of a continuum of hearer-coddling;
there is certainly nothing special about it, and nothing that
makes attention to hearers' inference processes qualitatively
different from attention to hearers' decoding processes.
Thus, there is a sense in which the task of the speaker extends
beyond the translation of a message into a spoken output;
speakers take upon themselves some responsibility for ensuring
that hearers successfully accomplish understanding. But they
do this purely out of self-interest, to ensure that their message
gets across, and they do it precisely because the task of the
listener is intrinsically so much harder than the task of the
speaker. Particularly, it is harder at exactly those levels which
Sperber & Wilson dismiss as the province of automatic and
reflex processing. At these levels speakers strive to ensure
reception of their message by hearers. Decoding is part of the
work of understanding too.
Relevance and mutual knowledge
Martin Davies
Philosophy Department, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet
Street, London WC1E 7HX, England
It is common for philosophers of language to abstract from
considerations of context dependence. The resulting picture of
language is an idealised one; but the assumption behind much
work over the last twenty years is that the idealisation does no
serious theoretical damage. This assumption is, in turn, nour-
ished by the idea that context dependence in general can be
treated on the model of the indexicality exhibited by the word
"I". The meaning of "I" specifies a very simple rule for assigning
a reference relative to a context. Give or take "I," "here,"
"now," and a few other expressions to be treated on the same
lines, the linguistic meaning of a sentence will determine a
proposition expressed and, in particular, will determine truth
conditions.
One of the major virtues of Sperber & Wilson's (S&W's)
Relevance is its stress upon the fact that the common picture is
not just idealised but mythological; truth conditions are radi-
cally underdetermined by linguistic meaning.
Whether or not the bold claims for relevance theory can be
sustained at every point, the treatment of metaphor in Rele-
vance and the subsequent paper (Sperber & Wilson 1986b) is a
real advance. It shows that the apparent dichotomy between
speaker-meaning accounts of metaphor following Searle (1979)
and "seeing as" accounts following Davidson (1978) is spurious,
thus correcting an impression given, for example, by Davies
(1983). And it gives some determinate theoretical substance to
the suggestion of Blackburn (1984, pp. 171-79) that a metaphor
is an "invitation to explore" a comparison or image.
The radical underdetermination of truth conditions by lin-
guistic meaning is enough to show that something is seriously
wrong with the code model of communication: Even in the case
in which there is only a single determinate thought to be
communicated, the content of the thought is not fully encoded
in the sentence uttered. But there is something else wrong with
the code model as a model of human communication - that is,
communication amongst creatures for whom there is a dif-
ference between entertaining a proposition, or having a proposi-
tion presented as a candidate for belief, on the one hand, and
actually going forward in judgement and believing the proposi-
tion, on the other.
If propositions really were encoded in sentences, and I were
equipped with a mechanism for decoding, then upon hearing an
utterance of a sentence I would be presented with a proposition
as a candidate for belief. This would be similar to the way in
which, if I have a perceptual experience of the world as being a
certain way, then the proposition that the world is that way is
presented as a candidate for belief. In the case of perception, if I
take my experience at face value, then I believe that the world is
indeed that way. What is more, I usually do take my experience
at face value. I do not require a justification for doing that;
rather, I should need a reason not to take it so (cf. pp. 257-58, n.
28). But still, the difference between perception and belief
remains. In the case of communication on the code model, it
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may also be that I usually take what I hear at face value and
would require a reason not to do so. Yet the difference between
decoding and belief remains.
As a theory of human communication, the code model cannot
be adequate by itself. In order even to be a candidate, it would
need to be augmented by a component reflecting the sensitivity
of beliefs to reasons. One kind of augmented code model would
make use of the notion of mutual knowledge. Communication
would be characterised as depending upon a shared code plus
mutual knowledge between speaker and hearer that the code is
shared - along with assumptions on the hearer's part about the
sincerity and reliability of the speaker.
Many philosophers object to this kind of augmented code
model on the grounds that it represents the ordinary commu-
nicative use of language as far more reflective, calculating, and
psychologically convoluted than it actually is. Sometimes
(McDowell 1980) this line of objection manifests itself in the
suggestion that human communication is a mode of instilling
information importantly similar to animal communication.
However - as Strawson (1980) in effect points out - to assimilate
human communication to animal communication would be to
ignore the crucial sensitivity of beliefs to reasons. If the hearer
doubts that the speaker is sincere and reliable, or - more
important here - doubts that the speaker and the hearer share a
common code, then the rational hearer will refrain from taking
what he hears at face value, just as the rational perceiver may
sometimes refrain from taking his experience at face value.
What is needed in an augmented code model is, apparently, a
condition about the absence of certain undermining doubts
rather than about the presence of certain justifying beliefs. This
prompts the idea that the philosophical work which was to be
done by the notion of mutual knowledge should instead be
assigned to a negatively characterised notion: mutual absence of
doubt. For example, neither speaker nor hearer doubts that
they share a code, neither party thinks that either party doubts
that they share a code, neither party thinks that either party
thinks that either party doubts that they share a code, and so on.
Rather than the psychologically implausible claim that in com-
munication indefinitely many beliefs must be present, we have
here the psychologically harmless claim that indefinitely many
doubts must be absent.
S&W have their own replacement for mutual knowledge in
the notion of mutual manifestness (p. 42), though they do not, of
course, use that notion to rehabilitate the code model. A claim of
mutual manifestness unfolds into an infinite series of man-
ifestness claims, each of which is a claim that an individual is
capable of mentally representing a state of affairs. The truth of an
infinite list of manifestness claims does not, of course, require
that anyone should be capable of simultaneously mentally rep-
resenting infinitely many states of affairs. So mutual man-
ifestness escapes a claim of psychological implausibility analo-
gous to that leveled against mutual knowledge.
One might wonder whether it is really true that subjects are
capable of each of the very complex pieces of mental representa-
tion assumed by the theory. But that is a minor quibble. A more
interesting question is this: To what extent could mutual ab-
sence of doubt do the various pieces of work for which mutual
manifestness is cast in the theory of relevance?
It may appear bizarre that I have introduced this question via
augmentation of the code model, given that the code model is
clearly wrong on other grounds. But it is certainly a part of
S&W's view that human communication often exploits the code
of language. Now if a speaker exploits a code, then his intentions
towards his hearer are rationally sensitive to the absence of
certain doubts. The speaker does not think that he fails to share a
code with the hearer. The speaker does not think that the hearer
thinks that they fail to share a code. And so on. Consequently,
my second question is this: Can we give an account of what it is
for a speaker to exploit a code without invoking some notion like
mutual absence of doubt?
Sperber & Wilson say this: In discussing relevance and
ostension (p. 50), "Ostensive behaviour provides evidence of
one's thoughts. It succeeds in doing so because it implies a
guarantee of relevance. It implies such a guarantee because
humans automatically turn their attention to what seems most
relevant to them. ' The argument is very compressed. It begins
from a general claim about humans as information-processing
systems: namely, that the system is geared for efficiency. In
particular, the natural mechanisms for directing attention gen-
erally subserve the efficient gathering of information. It is quite
consistent with this general claim that, on specific occasions,
attention may be attracted to what is in fact not a source of useful
information.
From the general claim about the natural order it is said to
follow that drawing someone's attention to a phenomenon "im-
plies a guarantee of relevance." How exactly does this argument
go? Suppose that the natural function of attention is to provide
useful information, and that I intentionally seize or direct
someone's attention. Then, we might say, the natural normative
ideal would be that the person will gain some useful informa-
tion. There is, in that sense, a natural guarantee of relevance.
But this natural guarantee of relevance is not clearly the right
sort of thing to support the conclusion of the argument -
namely, that my intentional direction of a person's attention
provides that person with evidence about my intentions. One
thing that would mediate the provision of such evidence would
be a standing presumption that the social order measures up to
the natural order in respect of the connection between attention
and information.
The principle of relevance says that each act of ostensive
communication communicates the presumption of its own op-
timal relevance. I am not questioning that principle. What I am
asking, as my third question, is this: Can the principle of
relevance be explained in terms of the claim that human beings
are naturally efficient processors of information?
Relevance theory, mutual knowledge, and
accidental irrelevance
Richard J. Gerrig
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 06520
If Sperber & Wilson (S&W) wish to banish mutual knowledge
from accounts of language processing, they must demonstrate
that relevance theory can accommodate the range of phe-
nomena for which mutual knowledge has traditionally been
invoked. Consider, for example, their brief treatment of the
ambiguous referring word "Jennifer" in the utterance, "Jennifer
admitted stealing" (Relevance, p. 206). They create a situation in
which the (male) addressee "knows a Jennifer Smith and a
Jennifer O'Hara," and they hypothesize that the addressee
"proceeds to make a tentative assignment of reference to the
expression 'Jennifer' by considering whether the information
that Jennifer Smith did something or the information that
Jennifer O'Hara did something might be relevant to him in some
context he currently has accessible." Absent in this analysis is
any consideration of the importance of the speaker's identity in
disambiguating this type of referring phrase. For example, if the
sentence "Jennifer admitted stealing" were uttered by Tim
O'Hara, whom the addressee knew to be Jennifer O'Hara's
husband, we would expect that in most contexts relevance
would have little effect on the interpretation of "Jennifer." This
expectation of relevance's limited role - which extends to all
situations in which some uniquely salient "Jennifer" is mutually
known to a speaker and addressee - is bolstered by cases of
accidental irrelevance.
To achieve accidental irrelevance, we must manipulate the
knowledge states of the speaker and addressee. Suppose, for
example, that Tim O'Hara had uttered "Jennifer admitted
stealing" to his uncle, Martin. Suppose, further, that Martin
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knew with great certainty that Jennifer had admitted to stealing
even before Tim's utterance, a fact of which Tim was unaware.
According to S&W, an utterance that replicates information
already known with certainty by an individual has no contextual
effects and, consequently, no relevance. Because the in-
terpretation of Jennifer as "Jennifer O'Hara" would thus make
the utterance irrelevant, Martin would have to seek another
interpretation: If S&W are right, the search for relevance would
inevitably cause Martin to attribute the admission of stealing to
some inappropriate Jennifer. Uncle Martin might, for example,
infer that Jennifer Smith was the confessed criminal, then
proceed to deduce whatever contextual implications would
follow from that assumption. This is not an isolated example.
Relevance theory appears to predict that addressees would be
led astray on any occasion in which a speaker (accidentally)
uttered information of which the addressee was previously
certain.
If S&W will allow mutual knowledge back into their formula-
tion, this difficulty can be eliminated. Note again that in my
scenario Tim spoke with no intention of violating Martin's
presumption of optimal relevance: He simply did not know that
he and Martin already shared the information about Jennifer.
Thus, although Tim's utterance is irrelevant relative to the
entire universe of contexts Martin might have accessible, it is
fully relevant within the context defined by the information that
is mutually known. My suggestion is that S&W must precede
their statement of the principle of relevance with something
like, "Based on the communicator's assessment of mutual
knowledge." What this addition acknowledges is that we cannot
assure relevance in any absolute sense - because our addressees
will have acquired a great deal of information outside our
purview. We can only assure relevance relative to our mutual
knowledge base.
S&W are right to argue that the requirements for mutual
knowledge as set forth in philosophy are psychologically unre-
alizable: As finite devices we are incapable of assuring ourselves
of the truth of an infinite series of assumptions. Fortunately,
Clark and Marshall (1981; see also Gibbs 1987) have suggested a
heuristic approach to the assessment of mutual knowledge that
is psychologically plausible. From Lewis (1969), they adapt the
Mutual knowledge induction schema:
A and B mutually know that p if and only if some state of affairs
C holds such that:
1. A and B have reason to believe that G holds.
2. G indicates to A and B that each has reason to believe that
G holds.
3. G indicates to A and B that p. (Clark & Marshall 1981, p.
33).
As Clark & Marshall put it, "the point of this schema is that [A]
and [B] don't have to confirm any of the infinity of conditions in
mutual knowledge at all. They need only be confident that they
have a proper basis G, grounds that satisfy all three require-
ments of the induction schema" (pp. 33-34). Clark and Marshall
go on to describe a series of heuristics oicopresence that enables
speakers and listeners to be certain that such grounds exist.
Without an acknowledgement that speakers can be only as
relevant as their mutual knowledge allows, relevance theory
makes the counterintuitive prediction that addressees will make
highly inappropriate inferences in (at least) the situations in
which speakers have accidentally reported old information.
Clark and Marshall's psychologically plausible account of mutu-
al knowledge should encourage Sperber & Wilson to remedy
this aspect of their theory.
The relevance of Relevance for
psychological theory
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr.
Program in Experimental Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz,
Calif. 95064
Sperber & Wilson (S&W) have provided a rich set of hypotheses
for a pragmatic theory of utterance interpretation. Their main
thesis - that utterance interpretation can work without an
appeal to some notion of mutual knowledge - is an interesting
departure from most contemporary pragmatic theories which, if
true, would impose significant constraints on psychological
theories of language processing. My contention is that there are
serious difficulties with any psychological theory of utterance
interpretation which does not include an evaluation of speakers'
and listeners' mutual beliefs as part of the process of recognizing
what speakers mean. I will restrict my comments here to three
points which, I believe, are problematic for S&W's account of
utterance interpretation (see Gibbs, 1987, for an elaboration of
these remarks).
Mutually known versus mutually manifest. The suggestion that
utterance interpretation can be explained without mutual
knowledge, but via some appeal to the idea of mutual cognitive
environments along with the principle of relevance might, at
first glance, seem to be a reasonable one. S&W argue that
problems inherent in establishing mutual knowledge between
speaker and listener may be so great as to be practically insolu-
ble. However, their approach suffers from some of the same
difficulties they wish to remedy. After all, if there is a problem
establishing some knowledge or beliefs as being mutually
known, then there are likely to be similar problems in recogniz-
ing that some cognitive environments are mutually manifest.
S&W argue, nonetheless, that the notion of what is manifest to
an individual is weaker than the idea of something that is
actually known or assumed and that therefore, something can be
manifest without really being known.
The issue of what kinds of experience constitute "knowing " or
"assuming" as opposed to merely "being manifest" is a delicate
one. Yet making a distinction between something being
"known" and other things being "manifest" may artificially
create a difference where none exists. Speakers and listeners
possess tacit knowledge which is difficult to access consciously,
as in our knowledge of grammar. But we still think of our
knowledge of grammar as "knowledge," no matter how tacit it
may seem. Even though this knowledge is difficult to specify as a
set of mutually held propositions, this does not imply that
speakers and listeners are unable to mutually recognize the
existence of the shared knowledge. Listeners do not have to
access a relevant assumption consciously before a speaker can
say something that makes it possible to comprehend an utter-
ance, as long as it is mutually known to both parties that the
listener is capable of using this tacitly shared information at the
right moment. It appears that S&W are "sneaking" mutual
knowledge in the back-door of their theory and have adopted a
framework for describing verbal communication which depends
crucially on the very concept they wish to abandon.
The necessity of mutual knowledge. There are many instances
of language in which the speaker and listener must share certain
knowledge and beliefs if an utterance is to be correctly under-
stood. Consider the following exchange:
Rick: Are you going to the party tonight?
Alice: I hear Jack's coming.
Successful interpretation of Alice's response demands that
the listener make an inference about what she means. But
recognition of the speaker's intention is of a special kind, what
Grice (1968) called an m-intention. An m-intention is a speaker's
intention to produce an effect in the listener by means of the
hearer's recognition of that intention. Thus, Alice wants Rick to
recognize her intention in part by means of Rick's recognition of
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it. This requires that Rick have not only some knowledge about
Alice's attitudes toward Jack, but also some idea that Alice
believes that Rick knows this about her. The reason Alice says
what she does, and does not make a more direct response to the
question, is that she intends Rick to base his inference not just
on any knowledge of beliefs he has, but on their mutual knowl-
edge and beliefs. If Rick successfully recognizes this intention,
he will draw the "authorized" inference (Clark 1977a). S&W's
proposal that understanding Alice's response requires the lis-
tener, Rick, to find a context which makes Alice's assertion most
relevant does not sufficiently constrain the interpretation pro-
cess and would lead to the generation of both "authorized" and
"unauthorized' inferences.
A similar difficulty lies in the interpretation of irony. Consider
the following conversation.
Bob: It's a lovely day for a picnic.
(Thex go for a picnic and it rains.)
Mary: It's a lovely day for a picnic, indeed.
S&W propose that Mary's utterance will be seen as ironic
because it echoes Bob's previous statement, a fact that Bob must
recognize if he is to understand what Mary means. To do this,
however, listeners such as Bob must share enough information
to be able to recover the source of what is echoed. A speaker
such as Mary would not produce an echo unless she assumed
that Bob shared the right knowledge to locate the source of the
echo and thus to see her utterance as ironic. In fact, it is the
speakers' knowledge of who does and who does not share certain
information that makes it possible to have "victims' of sarcasm
or irony. A speaker at a social gathering might overtly compli-
ment an addressee by saying "Your dress is just perfect," yet
intend overhearers to recognize the remark as sarcastic because
they share the particular belief with the speaker that the ad-
dressee's attire is inappropriate for the occasion, unbeknown to
the "victim." It is precisely because speakers and listeners
mutually know certain beliefs that sarcasm has its special bite.
What speakers and listeners presuppose about each other's
knowledge and beliefs permits the successful use of sarcasm in
conversation.
Relevance theory as process model. S&W suggest that a trade-
off exists during utterance interpretation between maximizing
contextual implications and minimizing processing effort. Pre-
sumably listeners derive the literal, context-free proposition of
an utterance before they choose a context in which that proposi-
tion is viewed as most relevant. The listener relies on back-
ground knowledge, but there need be no assumption that this
knowledge is mutually known beforehand. This kind of process
model would predict that understanding utterances whose liter-
al meanings differ from their intended interpretations requires
additional processing effort. The psycholinguistic evidence
strongly indicates, however, that this is not the case. Much
research has shown that listeners need not analyze the literal
meanings of many types of figurative utterances, such as indirect
speech acts, metaphor, sarcasm, and idioms (see Gibbs 1984;
1986 for reviews), before determining their conveyed in-
terpretations. If people do not automatically analyze the literal
meanings of utterances, then S&W are wrong in assuming that
conversational inferences (conveyed meanings) can be deter-
mined by finding a contextual assumption which makes some
proposition (or "literal meaning") most relevant.
These brief comments highlight some of the difficulties I see
for S&W's theory. They have written an interesting, courageous
book, but it would be premature to accept their theory as a
psychological model of linguistic processing.
Commentary/Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
Relevance theory and the scope of the
grammar
Liliane Haegeman
Department of English, University of Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland
Apart from the obvious significance of Sperber & Wilson's
(S&W's) book for domains traditionally called "pragmatics,'
"discourse analysis," "text grammar," and so forth, research in
syntax too will be profoundly affected by the implications of
relevance theory. My commentary focuses solely on this aspect
of their work.
Anyone familiar with work in theoretical syntax must at times
be disappointed by the cavalier way in which "pragmatics" is
treated by syntacticians who otherwise insist on and apply the
most rigorous principles in their research.
Until recently, syntacticians might have answered this crit-
icism by arguing that it is nowhere near obvious that there exists
a coherent theory of utterance interpretation anyway. S&W's
book puts an end to this argument. Failure to admit to the
existence of a theory such as S&W's may entail that the syntacti-
cian include in his syntactic analysis phenomena which would
far better be treated in terms of utterance processing. I shall
illustrate this point with an example from the literature.
Recently some authors have discussed in more or less detail
the phenomenon of indefinite object drop in English as ex-
emplified in (1):
(1) John is eating.
In her discussion of such examples Zubizarreta (1985, p. 250)
says:
It is possible to say both The baby is eating cereal and The baby is
eating a marble but the intransitive sentence The baby is eating
necessarily implies that the baby is eating some sort of food, not a
marble. The intransitive verb eat therefore takes as an "inherent
object" the constant semantic argument "food. "
Similarly, Rizzi (1986, n. 5) argues that the missing object in (1)
is somehow interpreted as canonical or prototypical. He sug-
gests that this is a lexical property of the nontransitive eat.
Both authors cited assume that the obvious interpretation of
(1) - that is, John is eating food or a meal - ought to be made part
of the semantic, grammar-based representation of (1). Howev-
er, assuming a theory of utterance interpretation such as that
proposed by S&W, this is by no means the only possible
analysis. I shall sketch an alternative way of handling the data
here.
In the unmarked case (1) will be taken to mean that John is
eating a meal; but note that in a context in which John has been
unable to eat for a certain time, (1) may merely refer to John's
taking any food at all.
In more exotic contexts the interpretation of the implicit
object may even be extended. For example, a researcher in a
medical context who is trying to study the result of eating
marbles might well refer to a subject of his experiments who is
finally complying with the imposed test with (1). It is the specific
context outlined here that will trigger the rather less obvious
interpretation. This observation makes it plausible that the
"normal interpretation" of (1) is likewise a matter of con-
textualization rather than of grammar-internal or lexical
principles.
Using relevance theory we can account for the interpretation
of (1) as follows. Consider (2):
(2a) John is eating marbles.
(2b) John is eating (=1).
Adopting Rizzi's proposal and modifying it slightly, let us as-
sume that there is a grammar-internal lexically governed in-
terpretative rule applicable to (2b) which spells out the implicit
object of eat as an argument in the semantic representation
(2b'):
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(2b') John is eating x.
Unlike Rizzi, let us assume that x is a variable and can be
interpreted freely as, for example:
(i) marbles
(ii) food
(iii) . . .
Potentially, (l/2b) has at least two readings with distinct truth-
conditions. The principle of relevance predicts that the more
relevant of the two readings will be selected. Relevance is a
function of the contextual effect of the proposition expressed in
the utterance and the processing cost. Under interpretation (i),
x = marbles, and (l/2b) will therefore have the same contextual
implications as (2a), for example:
(3a) He must be starving.
(3b) Stop him.
(3c) The child-minder is careless.
(3d) . . .
Under interpretation (ii), x = food, and (l/2b) will, for example,
have the contextual implications (4):
(4a) Do not call the child-minder now.
(4b) His mother is busy.
(4c) Do not distract him.
(4d) . . .
Although both interpretations have some contextual effect, the
contextual effect to be derived from the propositions in (3) will
be larger than that obtained from the propositions in (4). This,
however, does not mean that interpretation (i) (x = marbles) will
be selected and that (ii) (x = food) will be discarded. On the
contrary, in spite of its dramatic contextual effect, relevance
theory predicts that the marbles interpretation (i) will be dis-
carded and that the food reading (ii) will be selected. The
argument will run roughly as follows: If the speaker had wanted
to convey that John is eating marbles, he would not have been
observing the principle of relevance in uttering (l/2b). Since x is
a variable. (l/2b) is subject to several readings. To recover the
full proposition, the reader has to assign an interpretation to x.
To attain the food reading, all the hearer needs to do is to access
the stereotypical encyclopedic information stored under the
concept "eat," where he will find connections with the concepts
"food," "meal," and so on. In order to obtain the marbles
reading, the hearer has to create a novel connection. He cannot
trade on the encyclopedic information directly available. Thus
(i) becomes more costly to access.
Given first that the food interpretation of (l/2b) in a "normal"
context will have a contextual effect (cf. (4)), there will be no
need to access alternative and more costly interpretations. The
food interpretation is the first interpretation in accordance with
the principle of relevance.
Second, (2a) would be a manifestly more relevant stimulus to
convey the "eat marbles" proposition. The specification of the
object in (2a) saves the hearer the effort of disambiguation and
directs him straightforwardly to establishing a (novel) link: "eat"
- "marbles."
This account predicts that (l/2b) John is eating will "nor-
mally" be given the interpretation of "eating food" without
there being any need to derive the interpretation on the basis of
grammatical principles. Only in exceptional circumstances
would the marbles reading be less costly than the food reading.
On the basis of my discussion of indefinite object drop, I hope
I have shown that the emergence of a very precise and coherent
theory of utterance interpretation means that one needs to
reconsider the division of labor between grammatical principles
of interpretation and the general principles of utterance in-
terpretation located outside the grammar proper. In this way
Sperber & Wilson's work is a challenge to syntacticians as well as
pragmaticians.
Relevance: Computation and coherence
Elizabeth Hinkelman
Computer Science Department, University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y.
14627
Computational linguistics challenges students of language to
provide precise and detailed theories but, unsurprisingly, few
succeed. Though Relevance presents pragmatic phenomena in
refreshing range and nuance and is concerned with computa-
tional issues, it solves no computational linguistic problems and
describes a theory that suffers more from flaws and inconsisten-
cies than from "abstractness."
Sperber & Wilson (S&W) want a pragmatics engine that is
more general and plausible and less rigid than Grice's maxims.
The term ostension (really Grice's communicative act) adver-
tises that the concept is grounded in the individual's inherited or
learned ability to recognize important stimuli, including inten-
tions. But this pleasant promise is unfulfilled and may have to
remain so, especially because intention recognition rather re-
sembles general cognition. Likewise, manifestness claims to
replace belief by grounding it in sensation and deduction, trying
thus to eliminate the infamous regress of mutual belief. S&W
implement mutual manifestness by propositions having some
associated rule to identify who has access to them. This doesn't
suffice: Persons with access must still infer or assume that others
have the rule and use it, that the others observe these things
about the rest, and so on for multiagent planning and discourse
(Rule manifestness does not guarantee rule use). Mutual man-
ifestness does not prevent regress: default formulations of mutu-
al belief are more satisfactory (Perrault 1987).
Now consider relevance, S&W's technical term describing
the usefulness of a proposition or perception as the effect it has
on the strength of other propositions (informativeness) and the
effort expended in computing the effect. The particular com-
parative algebra given for relevance has snags. Values may be
compared just when either effort or effect is already equal (pp.
125,132). (Formally, if A and B are totally ordered sets with aeA
and beB standing for levels of effort and effect respectively, a
relevance value is the ordered pair (a,b). (a,b) > (c,d) iff (a = c,
b < d) OR (b = d, a > c).) There is no clause favoring values
having both lower effort and larger effect (a<c,b>d), although
it is clearly needed (see p. 168). These limits on comparison
make each value incomparable with nearly all others. Hence
acts of communication having multiple interpretations can easi-
ly have no most relevant interpretation, despite the claim of a
unique solution (p. 168; also implicit in the Principle of Rele-
vance, which refers to optimality).
The principal claim is that our brains are optimized to com-
pute the most relevant implicatures first: Thus S&W's Deduc-
tive Device proceeds by making inferences in order of efficien-
cy. But thisls circular. The fact that an inference is the first one
computed makes it relevant via efficiency, even though it may
not be informative at all. S&W use efficiency (pp. 167-68) to
impose a total order on interpretations found, as if this ordered
them by relevance; but this guarantees that their relevances are
incomparable (except among equally informative interpreta-
tions, when the Device stops with the most efficient one). The
algebra of relevance cannot be patched by optimizing efficiency
with respect to itself. One should optimize efficiency with
respect to informativeness, and then rewrite the algebra to allow
requisite comparisons. Note that optimality, informativeness,
and relevance have an implicit teleology, here apparently con-
flating evolution, individual survival, the individual's long- and
short-term goals, and impulses.
Another problem appears when we consider computing im-
plications in context. My attempt to diagram S&W's "system"
(Figure 1), shows the Deductive Device taking as input an
utterance and a context, determined by the context selector.
The context selector chooses that context yielding optimal
relevance, in an unspecified manner: rounded boxes are mod-
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Figure 1 (Hinkelman). A relevance computer.
ules without specified workings. Since it has no access to any
strength, manifestness, or relevance values (they are "non-
representational"), nor to the utterance, it has almost no basis
for decisions.
S&W might make some progress here by trying to be clear
about the different levels of representation in their system.
There seem to be three: a "hardware" level, the inference level
on top of it, and the level of consciousness. Some "nonrepresen-
tational" quantities are available as chemical or electrical quan-
tities at the hardware level and are thus able to guide inference
without ever reaching consciousness. (I suggest that noncom-
parativeness is an artifact of conscious introspection about the
hardware level.) If strength appeared chemically at the hard-
ware level, then context selection might be understood simply
as the existence at the inference level of a pattern of hardware
electrical activations: The partial order of augmentations could
be activated by the inference process. S&W could profitably
look at connectionist models as a starting point for specifying
their demands on the hardware level (Waltz 1987). The in-
ference level could be compared against such work as Frisch
(1985), which describes an inferential memory model. It could
also be improved by detailing the contents (or at least the
interfaces) of the rounded boxes in my diagram. When S&W
sort their desired properties by level and specify the interfaces,
they will improve their model immensely. Sometimes circular
arguments are put right in this way.
Most of the unconscious inference operations are performed
in S&W's model by the Deductive Device. It uses only elimina-
tion rules to guarantee that from a finite set of propositions (and a
finite set of rules) it will eventually perform all possible in-
ferences and stop. However, it can still fail to terminate: Any
logic with modus ponens and function terms can regress infinite-
ly (consider: She is a citizen if her mother was a citizen).
Fortunately, if processing time is bounded, the worst that will
happen is that no interpretation will be found. The Deductive
Device updates the strengths (not probabilities or truth values)
of propositions nonmonotonically, although strengths are "not
represented." The relationships among strength, manifestness,
and relevance remain unclear.
Some general considerations that motivate alternative sys-
tems are not discussed in Relevance. The interplay of lexical,
syntactic, and pragmatic processing prompted Charniak's so-
called neat theory of marker-passing (Charniak 1986). The
massive fine-grained parallelism of the brain motivates connec-
tionist models (Cottrell 1985; Dell 1986), as does the im-
plausibility of passing around entire parse trees. Anaphora,
reference, ambiguity, and error correction are addressed by the
plan-based approach (Grosz & Sidner 1986; Allen 1987). The
Relevance model may also fail to generalize readily to language
generation or general cognition as claimed.
Relevance, then, serves computational linguistics best as a
reminder that the range and subtlety of pragmatic phenomena
are not yet covered smoothly by one theory; we must consider
the slippery substrate of human intelligence when modeling its
performance. S&W's theory does not improve on Grice for
consistency or technical detail.
Grammars as input systems
Ruth Kempson
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London
WC1E 7HP, England
It may surprise many that a theory of communication and
cognition can have consequences for the logically prior concern
of articulating the language specific knowledge a speaker brings
to general cognitive processes. Yet Relevance Theory (RT)
imposes precise requirements on the input to the process of
utterance interpretation provided by the grammar. Indeed, the
hallmark of RT is the wealth of specific predictions that emerge
as consequences of its central tenets, despite their own gener-
ality. I give four consequences:
1. The concept of content articulated in the grammar is
representational (being a representation in the language of
thought (Fodor 1983) - hereafter LT). This claim is compatible
with Chomsky's (1981) theory of Universal Grammar (UG), but
in conflict with all truth-theoretic theories of content (cf. Dowty
et al. 1981 and references cited there).
2. The logical-form representations associated with sen-
tences of a language as part of its grammar are not syntactic
constructs of the same system as the natural language itself but
are syntactic constructs of LT (as a consequence of viewing
grammars as input systems).
3. Truth-theoretic content is assigned to propositional forms,
expressions in LT completed by a pragmatic process, and not to
natural language expressions directly (this a consequence of
logical forms underdetermining their propositional content).
4. Any aspect of interpretation that is pragmatic will involve
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structural representations as values and will be subject to the
principle of relevance - hence likely to have values which vary
across limits set by the requirement of minimal processing cost.
Each of these consequences is strongly confirmed. It is well
known that the ascription of truth-theoretic content to sen-
tences is not compositional as defined over linguistic ex-
pressions, but involves a pervasive dependence on contextual
factors (Partee 1984). If we assume that the articulation of such
content is not part of the speaker's language faculty but is
provided only for LT propositions, then the dependence of
truth-theoretic content on contextual parameters is predicted.
(Ascribing content to expressions of LT is no less a problem, but
it is one that has to be faced anyway.)
Prediction (4) is confirmed by such anaphoric processes as
using pronouns. These display a heterogeneity which has to be
stipulated on truth-theoretic assumptions of linguistic content,
their values ranging over any represented information accessi-
ble at minimal processing cost to the hearer. On the assumption
that truth-theoretic interpretation is fixed pragmatically, con-
strained by the principle of relevance, we can provide a unitary
account of the relatively weak linguistic content intrinsic to
anaphoric expressions and we can directly predict the range of
truth-theoretic values they display (Kempson 1986).
Predictions (2) and (1) jointly provide a rich vein of auxiliary
predictions and confirmation. Recent studies in phonology,
morphology, and syntax have provided increasing evidence that
if a unitary explanation of the interpretation of natural language
structures is to be given, it must assume at least one level of
structure distinct from PF structure, s-structure, and LF (as
defined in government/binding theory; Chomsky 1981). Guss-
enhoven (1983) has provided evidence that, though stress as-
signment interacts with hierarchical structure to determine
interpretation, the level of structure required is some "seman-
tic" one involving concepts such as predicate, argument, and
focus domain, rather than that provided by syntax. In mor-
phology there are many cases across widely varying languages in
which the morphological structure does not provide the re-
quired basis for interpretation of the structure (Pesetsky 1983;
Sadock 1985; Williams 1981). A simple example is generative
grammarian, which requires the compounding of generative
and grammar prior to interpreting the affix -ian, thus assuming
for purposes of interpretation the structure: [[generative gram-
mar] -ian].
And there are the problematic "Reconstruction" phenomena
in which the Binding Principles (Chomsky 1981) constraining
the interpretation of reflexives and pronouns apply not to LF
structures but to the output of an "interpretation" process which
in effect reverses Move WH (Williams 1986) - exemplified by
Which of each other's pictures do you think that Bill and Mary
deliberately ruined? None of these problems has been seen as
related to the others, and the solutions proposed postulate
various arrays of double-structure assignment. Yet each of the
phenomena is predicted from Relevance assumptions, and for
the same reason. In order for the claim that grammars are input
systems to a central LT to be nontrivial, the mapping from
phonological/morphological/syntactic structure onto logical
form must carry the natural language structure onto a discrete
structure in at least some cases. The cases which have emerged
in these different areas are those in which the LT structure
specified as the logical form of the expression is not identical to
that provided by the natural language structure. The prediction
of their existence is thus an immediate consequence of viewing
grammars as input systems to a central device with its own LT
(Kempson, forthcoming b). Furthermore, RT predicts the prop-
erty of Reconstruction (embarrassing to GB) of not being subject
to well-formedness conditions imposed on Move a. A process-
mapping natural-language structures nontrivially onto struc-
tures of a discrete LT is by definition not restricted to the well-
formedness conditions associated with processes internal to
natural language.
The explanatory power of RT also extends to the functional
motivation for properties of UG. Properties of UG such as the
principle of Full Interpretation (that no expression at LF is
contentless - Chomsky 1986) and the Theta criterion (providing
a unique association between syntactic and logical arguments)
can be seen as motivated by the constraint of maximizing
relevance (Kempson, forthcoming a). This is not to deny their
status as properties of UG, but rather to provide an explanation
of their existence, the language faculty being hardwired to
provide analyses of linguistic strings with no wasted processing
effort.
Thus RT provides new and precise solutions to a whole range
of old problems. In each case these solutions are not piecemeal
devices but a coherent part of an overall explanation. There is
now the need for a new linguistic theory articulating the map-
ping from phonological/morphological forms via syntactic struc-
ture onto LT expressions in order to give these putative solu-
tions detailed empirical substance. But the general message is
clear enough: RT opens up new avenues of research not merely
in its own domains of philosophy of language, pragmatics, and
psychology, but in semantics, syntax, and even morphology and
phonology. In so doing, it proves itself to be a theory which
offers considerable intellectual rewards.
Implicature explicated?
Stephen C. Levinson
Department of Linguistics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 9DA,
England; Department of Linguistics, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
94305
Sperber & Wilson (S&W) claim that a single principle of rele-
vance (R) can account for all pragmatic inference; but they fail to
define R clearly enough to make this an empirical claim. R is a
function of (measuring) contextual effects (E) balanced by pro-
cessing costs (C) - related, say, as R = E/C (though not thus
subjectively assessed).1 This allegedly yields determinate in-
terpretations. Yet how the equation is solved varies: Sometimes
R has a predetermined value (V), requiring contexts to be
expanded until V is satisfied (p. 142); sometimes R is a com-
parative measure, selecting the best interpretation (pp. 144,
153); sometimes C has a threshold value such that the first
accessible E-yielding context is automatically selected (p. 178).
But if only R is fixed there is no determinate solution; if C is fixed
too, then comparing interpretations may exhaust C without
producing any solution. (A puzzle: If C = n and E = m for
interpretation 1, but C = n + 1 and E = m + 1 for interpretation
2, then the cost of each will be the cost of comparing them, viz.
2n + 1, leading to the conclusion that one should always pick
maximum E regardless of C.)2 Finally, without an objective
measure of C, how can R be empirically tested?
There are further unclarities: Is R a measure applied to
surface structures (p. 204), semantic representations (SRs), or
explicated logical forms (LFs) - or even recursively to LFs plus
implicatures, or to all of these? If the answer is to more than one
of these, then the claim that a speaker should optimize R makes
no clear prediction about how the speaker should distribute
"meaning" between the "encoded" and "implicated," and thus
how a recipient can best interpret the utterance.
Turning to implicature: S&W's prototype cases are those
corresponding to Grice's (1975a) relevance implicatures. S&W
admit that their cases mostly involve implicated premises; they
also assert (p. 83) that deduction is the key to understanding
nondemonstrative inference, including implicature. But be-
cause implicated premises cannot be deduced, the very pro-
totype relevance-implicatures cannot be accounted for. Nor will
"accessibility" provide heuristics (see p. 201) in cases in which
the implicated premise is, as often happens, not a recipient's
(e.g. A's) assumption (cf. p. 194):
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A: "Would you drive a Zordia?"
B: "I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car."
Implicated premise: "A Zordia is an expensive car."
This failure is played down by introducing implicated premises
as if they were contextual assumptions (e.g., counterfactual
premise [5]e, p. 122). "Real" (pretheoretical) relevance is
largely about guessing the speakers goals (see Allen 1983;
Dascal 1977; Holdcroft 1987), not maximizing information for R.
Turning to explicatures: These include all those generalized
conversational implicatures (GCIs) whose understanding is the
signal achievement of neo-Gricean pragmatics. GCIs are default
pragmatic inferences which may be canceled by specific as-
sumptions, but otherwise go through. S&W hardly engage this
work (except on p. 262, note 4); yet they imply that R automati-
cally accounts for GCIs as explicatures. The onus is on them of
course. S&W consider that the neo-Gricean theory of GCIs
(Atlas & Levinson 1981; Gazdar 1979; Horn 1972, 1984; Levin-
son 1983) is a result of brainwashing by the "code-model" of
communication (pp. 36ff). But they make an important mistake
in equating default but defeasible inferences with automatic
decoding. Indeed, any theory of inference that takes processing
cost into account must surely employ default inferencing -
witness its almost universal use in computer models of language
use.
The theory of GCIs makes clear predictions. If R also made
clear predictions, they would almost certainly be different. The
following may be a case:
A: "If it's possible that the spy has more than two passports, he
may yet escape."
B: "He has two passports. '
GCI theory holds that two means "at least 2" (allowing the
possibility of more) but also has GCI "at most 2"; the theory thus
predicts that B implicates "He has only two passports," thus
suggesting that A's fears are groundless, and (perhaps) that the
spy will not escape. If "two" means "at least two," R theory
would presumably predict that there would be no explicature
"at most two" because that would rule out the low-cost con-
textual implication "he may escape," thereby lowering R. Thus
B's utterance should implicate "He may escape." My intuitions
favour the GCI predictions.
S&W may complain that this argument allows implicatures to
effect explicatures, whereas in fact explicatures form a prior
independent level (see Kempson & Cormack 1981 and the
effective rebuttal in Horn 1985). The explicature/implicature
distinction is salutory as a means of emphasizing the pragmatic
determination of LF, but it is not clear. The only criterion
offered is that explicatures must contain the encoded SR or LF
as a proper subpart (p. 181); but many implicatures meet that
condition:
A: "If Thatcher has won the election, she'll have won three
times."
B: "Thatcher has won."
Implicature: "Thatcher has won three times."
Nor can explicature-calculation always precede implicature-
calculation (cf. p. 179); for example, disambiguation must be
guided by contextual effects.
S&W are to be congratulated for emphasizing the role of
pragmatic inference in communication in general, and in propo-
sitional determination in particular. But other pragmaticists are
unlikely to agree with monadic R theory (Sadock 1986). R is an
informational measure; but Atlas and Levinson (1981), Horn
(1984), and others have argued for the necessity of two counter-
balancing informational measures. And, as noted, pretheoreti-
cal relevance is largely about satisfying the goals of others,
whereas Quality (pace S&W) remains unreduced. For R to
encompass all these other principles is to stretch it too thin.
Meanwhile, to compare R to, say, GCI theory, the newer
formulation needs much clarification: Since R is a processing
theory, how about a computer implementation?3
NOTES
1. This paragraph is not meant just to recycle the critique by Gazdar
and Good (1982) (although to my mind S&W still haven't dealt fully with
that), but rather to ask for clarification about how R can be computed.
2. S&W (p. 131) suggest that heuristics will allow estimation without
computation. We need detailed hypotheses, however. Without them
the puzzle looms large; with them, predictions might be made about
specific kinds of misintepretation.
3. One attempt at computer implementation is being made by R.
Poznanski under K. Spark Jones of the Computer Laboratory, Univer-
sity of Cambridge.
The multidimensionality of pragmatics
James D. McCawley
Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago, Chicago, III. 60637
Sperber & Wilson (S&W) fairly quickly dismiss the notion of
"mutual knowledge," for reasons that relate to problems created
by the specific conception of mutual knowledge that they con-
sider: one which is defined in terms of ordinary knowledge and
thus requires reference to propositions of the form "A knows
that B knows that A knows that B knows that . . ."ad infinitum.
Suppose, however, that one takes mutual knowledge to be
something really mutual - that is, that one speaks of knowledge
on the part of a group of two or more persons as a whole and does
not attempt to reduce such knowledge to knowledge on the part
of each of those persons individually. Mutual knowledge, thus
understood, is not knowledge that the participants in a conver-
sation hold individually about one another but rather knowledge
they possess jointly. The identification of propositions as mutual
knowledge does not, then, require the "infinite series of checks"
that S&W speak of (p. 18). The following are unproblematic
sources of mutual knowledge: (i) propositions that a participant
has asserted during the conversation, unless a proposition has
been either retracted by the speaker or challenged by another
participant; (ii) information that is "manifest" (in the sense of
S&W, p. 39) to the participants jointly, including information
about what has been said so far in the conversation (e.g., the
proposition that John said that pigs have wings is mutual knowl-
edge, even though the proposition that pigs have wings isn't, if
Mary challenged John's statement to that effect), and (iii) infor-
mation commonly regarded as manifest to the members of a
group in which the participants share membership. This last
source of mutual knowledge is discussed insightfully by Prince
(1978), who notes as an example that the identity of the mayor of
Philadelphia is mutual knowledge if the participants in a conver-
sation can reasonably assume that they all are residents of
Philadelphia, as when strangers strike up a conversation on a
Philadelphia bus. This last source of mutual knowledge is what
licenses the uttering of (1) even if the speaker does not know
whether the addressee has read Sense and Sensibility:
(1) It's the sort of scene that would have made Marianne
Dashwood swoon (Relevance, p. 44).
Sense and Sensibility has the status of a literary classic; and in
circles in which familiarity with the classics is presumed, the
identity and personality of their major characters is "manifest"
and thus will count as mutual knowledge, in the sense that a
person is entitled to utter (1) without first having to say who
Marianne Dashwood is. Note that on this understanding, a
proposition can be mutual knowledge in a given conversation
even if not all of the participants know the proposition and even
if the proposition is false: Many false propositions are manifest.
Despite S&W's dismissal of mutual knowledge, suggesting
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that they believe their approach to offer a viable alternative to
analyses that have recourse to the notion of mutual knowledge,
Relevance is surprisingly lacking in discussion of phenomena
that other authors have dealt with in terms of mutual knowl-
edge, such as pragmatic presupposition in the overlapping
accounts given in Karttunen (1976) and McCawley (1979; 1981),
which interpret a pragmatic presupposition as a requirement
that the presupposed proposition be mutual knowledge.1 One
particularly important area of pragmatics in which I consider
mutual knowledge an indispensable part of any analysis is the
assignment of referents to definite noun phrases. As Donnellan
(1966) has pointed out, a sentence containing an expression the
X need not be given an interpretation in which the referent of
the X is an X or even is believed by the speaker and the
addressee to be an X. For example, the man drinking the
martini may identify a person who is drinking water even if
another person is in fact drinking a martini. Similarly, in a
conversation between Daddy and Johnnie, the expression the
Easter Bunny can recur in the speech of both even if neither
believes that there is an Easter Bunny or that the other believes
there is an Easter Bunny. What licenses the use of such noun
phrases is that the mutual knowledge for the particular conver-
sation includes the proposition that the given person is drinking
a martini or the proposition that there is an Easter Bunny.2 I in
fact suspect that there is little overlap between the class of
problems that can plausibly be dealt with in terms of mutual
knowledge and the class that can plausibly be dealt with in terms
of S&W's relevance; my complaint with S&W is not that they
have failed to solve problems they should be expected to solve
but that they falsely claim to have discredited an approach to
which theirs is not even clearly an alternative.
Turning, finally, to S&W's notion of relevance (which should
be judged on its own merits and not as an alternative to mutual
knowledge), I remain unconvinced either that it is a unitary
notion (at most, in a technical sense have S&W reduced Grice's
maxims3 to one) or that their concept corresponds very closely to
intuitive notions of "relevance." Richness of inference and
complexity of processing remain independent dimensions, and
S&W do not even give any clear examples of a trade-off between
the two. The first of these two dimensions is a plausible first
approximation to the intuitive notion of "relevance," in that
one's most effective response to an objection that something is
not relevant is usually to cite inferences that it enables one to
draw. However, such objections are never about relevance
simpliciter, whatever that might be, but relevance to some-
thing, generally to either a question or a subject area. Proposi-
tions that add to the inferences one can draw can easily lead one
off on tangents (ad hominem arguments often license far more
inferences about their victim than about the point at issue).
S&W's brief discussion of the notion of "topic relevance" (pp.
216-17) dodges the issue by merely stating that "Topic-relevant
utterances are only a subset of relevant utterances" and that "It
is the notion of topic relevance which is derivative." The former
statement may well be correct (I give S&W the benefit of the
doubt about the fuzzy set theory that would need to be invoked
to reconcile "subset" with their notion of relevance) but is
beside the point, since it is the larger set whose significance is
more in need of justification; and their second statement is
dubious in view of the weakness of their attempt to derive "topic
relevance" from "relevance": "relevant (in our sense) in a
homogeneous context derivable from a single encyclopaedic
entry" p. 216; a single encyclopaedic entry isn't my idea of what
defines a "topic."
S&W's use of the word irrelevant is often at sharp odds with
its use in ordinary language, as when they describe blatantly
false propositions as irrelevant4 (p. 120) or when they speak of an
utterance expressing a proposition already known by the ad-
dressee as "irrelevant to him" (p. 160); "Nice day, isn't it?"
comes out as "irrelevant" in S&W's scheme. I am intrigued by
S&W's highly original idea that relevance is a matter of "new"
inferences that a proposition allows one to draw by means only of
"elimination" rules. However, I am disappointed that that
genuinely appealing idea gets lost fairly soon in their attempt
(misguided, in my opinion) to project onto a single dimension
the diverse factors that influence how persons interpret the
utterances that they hear and see.
NOTES
1. This is an oversimplification: Sentences are not interpreted rela-
tive to the mutual knowledge per se but relative to mutual knowledge
supplemented by other propositions supplied by the linguistic context.
Thus in understanding the sentence "If Reagan appointed Jesse Jackson
Secretary of State, he would regret that he had named a civil rights
leader to the Cabinet," one evaluates the main clause relatix 3 to the
mutual knowledge supplemented by the proposition expressed by the
ij-clause (i.e., the protasis of a conditional sentence provides "supple-
mentary context" for the apodosis).
2. For arguments against Russell's analysis of definite descriptions
and in favor of one that relies on mutual knowledge, see Lewis (1979)
and McCawley (1985).
3. A better comparison would be with Horn's (1984) revision of
Grice. Horn's two maxims are direct counterparts of the two parts of
S&W's single maxim (Relevance, p. 125).
4. Truth is a third dimension that S&W conflate under "relevance." I
doubt that there is any tradeoff between this dimension and the other
two. For example, in Bertrand Russell's (1905) ambiguous example, "I
thought your yacht was longer than it is," it is presumably easier to
compute the reading with the embedded contradiction than the reading
in which the than-phrase has wide scope; but ease of processing does not
lead one to settle on the obviously false reading.
Logical competence
John Macnamara
Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada H3A 1B1
Sperber & Wilson (S&W) succeed in conveying an impression of
the mind as an active processer of information designed to serve
practical aims. This correctly sets the mind apart from a logical
system that presents itself as already objective and complete
before logical inquiry begins. The problem is to be true to both
the practical purposes of information processing and to logical
intuition. I fear, however, that S&W are not true to logical
intuition. My remarks will be confined to Chapter 2, which
discusses "inference."
S&W have a somewhat odd idea that a concept in memory
stores three types of information: logical, encyclopedic, and
lexical (p. 86). They then go on to say "that the 'meaning' of a
word is provided by the associated concept" (p. 90). Their idea
seems to be that the meaning of giraffe, say, consists of (a) a set of
deduction rules in which giraffe can figure, (b) a set of beliefs
such as that giraffes have long necks, and (c) "information about
its syntactic category membership and co-occurrence pos-
sibilities, phonological structure, and so on" (p. 90).
S&W are skimpy on what "cooccurrence possibilities" are and
how they might be represented. Giraffes live on the moon is a
perfectly good sentence. Does it violate the cooccurrence rules
for giraffe? If not, those rules would seem to have little to do
with meaning, which surely has an intimate connection with the
truth conditions of sentences in which a word occurs. If the
sentence does violate the cooccurrence rules, we need to be told
very much more than S&W tell us about the nature of those
rules, including how they are learned and stored. The key
element in the meaning of the word giraffe has not really been
addressed.
Matters are worse. Inessential properties of giraffes have
been bundled into the meaning of giraffe through the en-
cyclopedic information; they thus become analytically true of
the creatures. For example, the relevant encyclopedic entry is
sure to contain the information that giraffes live in Africa. Yet it
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is not analytically true of giraffes that they live in Africa, as it is
analytically true of spinsters that they are unmarried. Things are
getting seriously muddled. I tried to straighten some of them
out in Macnamara (1982, Chap. 12).
S&W's great claim about the deductive component of a
concept is that it involves only elimination rules, no introduc-
tion rules. Here is an example of an introduction rule: Given
John is tall and Mary is small, the rule for anti-introduction
permits the inference of John is tall and Mary is small. Given the
latter sentence the rules of anti-elimination permit the in-
ference of John is tall. S&W, it should be noted, are not limiting
their claim to the logical component in a concept. They state
quite generally, "Our hypothesis is that the human deductive
device has access only to elimination rules" (p. 97).
This is profoundly puzzling. How could there be anything for
elimination rules to work on if there were no introduction rules?
There would be no sentences with and in them unless there
were some sort of and-introduction rule. So what might such a
rule be? Well, it might be a syntactic rule that says that if p and q
are well-formed sentences, so is p and q. The rule would need to
be supplemented by a semantic rule that specified the condi-
tions under which p and q is true. But together the syntactic and
semantic rules are tantamount to an anti-introduction rule.
What seems to have been worrying S&W was the problem of
shutting off the "human deductive device." The source of the
problem is that, granted the truth of p, conditions are satisfied
for deducing (p & p) and (p6c(p&c p)) and so on ad infinitum - a
series of pointless deductions. But the problem does not arise in
ordinary discourse with elimination rules: They quickly leave
themselves with nothing to eliminate. S&W's solution of elim-
inating anti-introduction, however, either fails because it mere-
ly shifts the dangerous generative capacity to the syntax or
succeeds by brute force. If there are no anti-introduction rules
of any sort, there is no danger of a pointless string of conjuncts;
but neither is there anything for the anti-elimination rule to
work on. S&W seem to be solving the problem in the steering by
taking out the spark plugs.
I believe, however, that the trouble is deeper — that what we
have seen are merely a few symptoms of a serious malady. S&W
proceed as though they have no obligation to account for the
existence of logic of the type one finds in the textbooks of formal
logic, as though formal logic bears no intimate relation to the
logic of everyday reasoning. Yet the only access a formal logician
has to the truths of logic is through those mental processes that
yield logical intuition. Formal logicians base themselves on
some of those intuitions, those they find most suitable for their
purposes. Everyday reasoning embraces everything that the
formal logician works with and much more besides: presupposi-
tions, Gricean implicatures, ambiguity, vagueness, and so forth.
So an account of everyday reasoning must at least give the
psychological grounding of all those basic intuitions upon which
formal logic rests.
In Macnamara (1986) I attempt to work out the implications of
what I have just said. I suggest that we take formal logic as
providing us with a (limited) statement of logical competence,
leaving room for logical error while being true to basic logical
intuitions. The trouble with formal logic is that it derives in
modern times from the study of arithmetic and thus treats a
domain of eternal and unchanging individuals. The number
three does not get fat or die. Most discourse, however, deals
with a domain of changing and transitory individuals. More than
anything else what psychology needs is a logic of such transitory
individuals. Though the subject of relevance is not a psychologi-
cally trivial one, S&W do not, I fear, provide the requisite logic
in Relevance.
Commentary I Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
What Peter thinks when he hears Mary speak
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Philosophy Department, University of Connecticut, Starrs, Conn. 06250
Relevance is a book very densely packed with ideas. Many of
them are novel and a good number are, in my opinion, correct.
But I find others highly puzzling. I offer a couple of examples
here. I intend them not so much in the spirit of criticism as in the
hope that Sperber & Wilson (S&W) will unpuzzle me - with a
bit of private tutoring. Thought number three, however, I urge
with more confidence: It is backed by Millikan (1984a, Chap. 3).
First, according to S&W, Peter (the hearer) determines
Mary's (the speaker's) meaning not by reference to some subset
of background assumptions mutually manifest to him and to
Mary, but by reference to all assumptions manifest to him in
their current degrees of manifestness. He does this by finding
the interpretation of Mary's speech that is most relevant to him.
Does Mary not have to anticipate what will be relevant to Peter
then? Yet what is relevant to Peter depends on what Peter
knows and on how his knowledge is organized. Possibly the
organization of Mary's mind is like that of Peter's, but will she
not also have to know everything that Peter knows and know
that he knows it? Also, do S&W intend to suggest that Peter
need not think at all about Mary's knowledge? Suppose that
Mary refers to the woman Peter was just with as "your girl-
friend. " In truth it was Peter's sister; moreover Peter does have
a girlfriend. Will Peter not better understand Mary by knowing
or inferring what Mary does and does not know?
Second, as S&W note, in most cases we tell what people's
intentions are by observing the effects of their behaviors. Yet a
person's behavior always has multiple effects, most of which are
not intended. For example, as I move to look in the refrigerator
it may be that, unintentionally, I advance three feet toward
London, make the floor squeak, and whistle Eisenhower's
favorite tune on John Adams's birthday. To isolate people's
intentional actions from among all the irrelevant things they do I
must first have an opinion about what it might be sensible for
them to do and how it might be sensible for them to go about
doing it. Now as S&W describe communication, Mary gets her
informative intention recognized by knowing how to manipulate
Peter's psyche, how to produce certain effects in it. She knows
what stimulus will produce a roughly determinate sort of
thought chain, one link of which will be a thought of the
proposition (p) she wants Peter to believe. To communicate that
p, Mary must first know how to make Peter think of p. Peter
then recognizes p, from among all the other things Mary's
stimulus also made him think of, by the fact that it is the first
thought in the chain that is relevant enough. So it seems that
Peter recognizes Mary's intention in the ordinary way, except
that he makes this assumption: The only effects it would be
sensible for Mary to try to produce on his beliefs are ones highly
relevant to him - relevant in S&W's technical sense of "rele-
vant" (and, of course, the only sensible way for Mary to go about
this is with as much processing efficiency as possible).
But why would Peter assume this? Certainly it is true that
Peter will not be in the habit of paying much attention to Mary's
remarks unless it often pays him to process them and pays more
than the processing cost - and that Mary will do well to make
enough of her remarks pay enough to keep Peter betting. But
are there not other ways for Mary to pay Peter than by telling
him something (technically) "relevant"? Like telling him some-
thing that pleases him or amuses him or is intrinsically interest-
ing to him, say - assuming that he loves Mary - telling him how
she feels today or that she loves him? (If these things are, by
some argument, automatically the most "relevant" in S&W's
sense, then I need to have it spelled out for me why.) I also want
to ask, might not Mary lapse occasionally and say something to
Peter for her own sake only, for example, "Please pass the salt"?
(Are another's requests automatically most "relevant"? Why?)
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In brief, why won't just the ordinary way of interpreting
people's intentions do for language interpretation too? Won't it
be enough for Peter to recognize Mary's informative intention if
he uncovers a proposition that it would be sensible for her to
want to impart in that context and to impart in that way?
Compare: Having asked for the salt, Peter readily interprets
Mary's outstretching arm as manifesting an intention to pass the
salt; having asked for some information, "Do you want coffee?"
Peter readily interprets "It would keep me awake" as manifest-
ing an intention to supply the information he requested - no,
she wouldn't like coffee.
Third, and finally, if the contemporary position is correct that
belief-desire talk expresses a folk theory of the mind instead of
expressing concepts and knowledge that originate as introspec-
tive epistemelogical "givens," is it really plausible that ex-
tremely young children represent to themselves that the speak-
er intends that they should believe that p in the process of
understanding their very first sentences? Notice that it won't
help to claim that very young children do not communicate in a
fully adult way. For it is not just the act of communicating that
requires Peter to think of Mary's intentions. According to S&W
(and they have lots of good company), the only way for Peter to
become informed via Mary's speech is, in the usual case, by
making an inference of this kind: Mary intends me to believe
that p, and I trust her, so p must be true. It seems unlikely that
tiny children have the requisite concepts to make this sort of
inference. But if it is possible for very young children to become
informed by speech without using belief-desire theory, should it
not be equally possible for adults? Perhaps there are some kinds
of sentences that, at least when used in some kinds of ways, can
be interpreted by Peter without his having to go through
inferences about Mary's intentions?
Indeed, S&W's theory of how Peter determines the "explica-
tures" of Mary's utterances seems perfectly tailored to explain
how Mary's informative intentions might get fulfilled without
Peter's thinking of them. Reference assignment and enrichment
of propositional content are both achieved without reference to
Mary's intentions. In most cases, all Peter needs to do to fulfill
Mary's informative intention is to believe whatever Mary's
utterance makes him think of first, and to move on from there by
inferences natural to him. Of course, it has been traditional to
hold that no adult would be so gullible as just to believe what he
was told without going through an inference that makes explicit
his evidence, including his trust in the speaker. But S&W are
not afraid to smash idols. We have all been deeply indoctrinated
into foundationalist epistemology, but psychologically speak-
ing, does it not seem likely that mistrust of a speaker inhibits the
mechanisms of normal belief transfer rather than that trust in a
speaker is used as a premise for each act of belief fixation that
results from interpreting speech? If Peter sometimes under-
stands without believing, perhaps this is merely the interrup-
tion of a normal process of belief fixation before completion, not
a separate act of belief fixation - that is, fixing the belief that
Mary intends him to believe that p. (For a discussion of how to
relieve Mary also of the onerous task of having to use belief-
desire theory every time she speaks, see Millikan [1984a]).
Incidental note: Regarding another way to use the (very
sensible, I think) notion that strength of assumption is functional
and determined by the psychological origins of assumptions, see
Millikan (1984b).
On the search for relevance
Jerry L. Morgan and Georgia M. Green
Department of Linguistics, University of Illinois, Urbana, III. 61801
This is a meaty book that provides much food for thought for
those people Sperber & Wilson (S&W) refer to as "pragmatists"
["pragmaticians" in the pre'cis]. But settling the debates it is
bound to stimulate will not be a simple matter, because what
S&W present is not really a theory of anything, but, in their own
words, "a new approach to the study of human communication."
Furthermore, their presentation is full of crucial uses ofunexpli-
cated concepts such as "attention," "information, ' "representa-
tion," and many others. Consequently, they are not able to offer
anything like the kind of rigor and explicitness that one is used to
seeing in the best work in formal syntax or semantics. But
precision is just what makes it possible occasionally to subject a
theory to empirical test. The weakness is hardly unique to this
book; it is probably inevitable, given the present primitive state
of this kind of study, indeed of cognitive psychology in general.
It is to cognitive psychology (or maybe to what cognitive
psychology may be some day) that S&W look for the conceptual
bricks upon which their approach is built. We are fully sym-
pathetic to this orientation, in that we think that the supposed
convergence of cognitive and philosophical approaches to lan-
guage understanding has been largely illusory, and that theories
constructed using criteria of adequacy that appeal to logicians
are likely to turn out in the long run to be irrelevant for empirical
cognitive purposes. We say this in full awareness of the fact that
philosophers are responsible for most of the fundamental in-
sights into meaning and communication on which both contem-
porary philosophical and empirical studies are based. The treat-
ment of deictic ("indexical") expressions by relativizing
reference and truth to sets of primitive "indices" comes to mind
as a good case of a theory that may well be logically impeccable,
but cognitively useless. Another case is the common assump-
tion, criticized by S&W, that there must be a single unified
theory of communication into which human linguistic commu-
nication must fit. Still another is the occasional attempt to
construe "context" in terms of the objective physical setting of
an utterance, rather than in terms of cognitive states of the
participants.
In sum, Relevance is a book with which we find it easy to agree
on a number of important points. Nonetheless, we have some
criticisms that bear on the notion of relevance that is the core of
the work. Since what is presented is more "approach" than
theory, we cannot be certain whether our objections result from
crucial flaws in S&W's approach or from vagueness in the
details.
To begin with, we have reservations about S&W's definition
of "relevance." They treat the concept in terms of "contextual
effects" having to do with the information conveyed by an
utterance and with the relation of that information to informa-
tion the hearer already has. (Space limitations prevent a fuller
explication here.) For our purposes, the critical aspects of their
characterization are these: It is information that has or lacks
relevance, not utterances; and relevance has to do with (grossly
simplified) the newness of the information, not with any non-
linguistic usefulness the information may have for the speaker or
hearer. But there is another way to look at relevance: as a
property of information (or of utterances that convey informa-
tion) that matters, that is useful for some nonlinguistic purpose
of the hearer or speaker. If in the middle of a lecture on syntactic
theory the lecturer says (truthfully), "I am allergic to chocolate,"
as far as we can see that information should count as relevant for
S&W, but would be irrelevant on the usefulness account, since
uttering it achieves no advance toward any current goal of the
interchange. Now as S&W point out, their goal is not to eluci-
date eommonsense usage of the word relevance, but to set out a
concept that has some scientific utility, whether or not it
matches the eommonsense notion. But at the same time they
explicitly appeal to evidence from intuitions of relevance. Our
intuition is that, in test cases like the one above, the usefulness
approach fits relevance intuitions better than S&W's approach,
which as we understand it is closer to a characterization of
"informative" than of "relevant."
S&W's view of the nature of ostensive communication simi-
larly involves stretching the usual understanding of communica-
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tion in such a way that its implications conflict with experience.
S&W view ostensive communication as communicating "its own
optimal relevance" - that is, as communicating
1. that the assumptions which the communicator intends to
be made manifest to the addressee are relevant enough to make
processing worthwhile (in that they are effectively informative -
in their words, "the contextual effects achieved when . . . op-
timally processed are large" [p. 153] - and the effort required to
process them is small) and
2. that the "ostensive stimulus" (the linguistic expression or
gesture) is the most relevant one the communicator could have
used to accomplish those effects.
This is a very Panglossian view in that it treats the fact that a
speaker has just uttered something communicatively as presup-
posing that it is the most relevant utterance he could have
uttered - everyone does the best he could possibly do in this
best of all possible worlds. At the same time, in taking pains to
contrast their view with Grice's,1 in which communicative
behavior is treated as rational and as governed and interpreted
by the same principles as other rational behavior (Grice 1975a,
p. 47), Sperber and Wilson treat communication as "an essen-
tially egotistic enterprise" wherein "the speaker tries to have
the maximum possible effect on the hearer's set of initial as-
sumptions" (Wilson & Sperber 1981, p. 175). "Communicators
and audience need no more know the principle of relevance to
communicate," they say, "than they need to know the principles
of genetics to reproduce," (1986a, p. 162) - not mentioning that
speaker and interpreter have to "know" the Presumption of
Optimal Relevance in order for their claims about how commu-
nication is accomplished (pp. 165-68) to be correct. The Pre-
sumption of Optimal Relevance appears to us to entail most of
the maxims that follow from Grice's Cooperative Principle,
subsuming Quantity and Manner as well as Relevance, rather
than replacing them with an altogether different principle, as
S&W seem to suggest.
Furthermore, the claims embodied in S&W's principles and
definitions seem to make false predictions about certain kinds of
implicatures common in ordinary discourse. It follows from
S&W"s Principle of Relevance and their definition of relevance
that "of all the interpretations of the stimulus that confirm the
presumption, it is the first interpretation to occur to the ad-
dressee that is the one the communicator intended to convey"
(pp. 168-69). (If it's not, then the communicator failed to choose
the most relevant stimulus - one which would have been
interpreted right the first time. It is only the hedges might and
expected in the explanation of what is "consistent with the
principle of relevance" (pp. 166-67)2 that keep this from being
circular.
In any case, it seems to follow that ambiguities should never
be perceived, and consequently it could never be rational
behavior consistent with the Presumption of Optimal Relevance
for a speaker to use an ambiguous utterance and expect the
ambiguity to be recognized (much less interpreted). Yet there
are classes of implicatures which depend on the addressee's
recognizing two (or more) distinct propositions which the speak-
er could rationally have intended to communicate in that situa-
tion with that utterance. On S&W's account, however, the
addressee can never get past the first one, so it is futile for
Mozart, in Amadeus, to intend (indifferently) to either compli-
ment, insult, or frustrate Salieri by responding to Salieri's
expectation of approbation by saying (1):
1. I never thought music like that was possible.
Except for the scope of the negative, irrelevant here, the
sentence is syntactically and semantically unambiguous. None-
theless, Salieri can never know whether Mozart intended to
convey that the music struck him as wonderful beyond all
imagination (likely in the hearer's context of expecting approba-
tion) or as terrible beyond all imagination (likely for Mozart, as
portrayed in the film). S&W say that "if two essentially different
interpretations seem to come simultaneously to the mind of the
addressee, and they are both consistent with the principle of
relevance . . . the addressee will be unable to decide what the
informative intention was, and communication will fail" (p. 169).
But if Salieri cannot tell whether Mozart meant his remark as
praise or insult, the communication succeeds rather than fails,
because Salieri does not conclude that Mozart has failed to
communicate: Either he believes that Mozart meant one or the
other (and he'll be hard put to find out which), or he infers that
Mozart meant for him not to be able to tell. Either way, Mozart
wins, by communicating ambiguously.
It also follows from S&W's account that silence cannot be an
ostensive stimulus for ostensive-inferential communication.
The definition of ostensive stimulus does not rule out silence as
an ostensive stimulus, however, because all it requires is that
the stimulus attract the audience's attention and focus it on the
communicators intentions (p. 153). Remaining silent when one
is expected to speak can be quite eloquent. Thus when David (in
the television program "Moonlighting") says (2) to Maddy, and
Maddy "responds" by saying nothing, David is so affected by
her communicating thereby that she does not believe in God,
that his response is to entreat her not to speak:
2. David: What about God? God defies explanation, and you
believe in Him.
3. Maddy:
4. David: Oh, no! Don't say itl
Similarly, when A says to B, "You believe me, don't you?" and
B, looking directly at A, says nothing, A knows from the fact that
B has not responded in the affirmative that the answer is "No."
Such silences are meaningful in the context of expected
behavior which they fail to satisfy. But how could remaining
silent be the most relevant ostensive stimulus Maddy or B could
have used? Surely B would know that it would be easier for A to
interpret "No" than to determine his attitude from his not
saying "Yes," and surely Maddy would know that it would be
easier for David to interpret the assertion "I don't believe in
God" directly than to infer it from her not saying, "All right, I
guess I can believe in something that defies explanation." Are
there contextual effects of implicating here which are so large
that they outweigh the presumably great effort required to make
the inference from silence? Silence here has contextual effects,
on the order of "I don't want to make you feel bad by saying this
in so many words," which the direct answer lacks; but do they
outweigh the processing effort required to harvest them? How
could you tell? Does an aardvark weigh more than a sonnet
rhymes?
NOTES
1. S&W's interpretation of Grice's views (pp. 161-62 and elsewhere)
strike us as unrepresentative. Whether their characterization of other
scholars' views is more accurate is impossible to tell because the views
are often attributed to unidentified "pragmatists. "
2. An interpretation is considered "consistent with the principle of
relevance if and only if a rational communicator might have expected it
to be optimally relevant to the addressee" (p. 167).
Inference and information
Philip Pettit
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University,
Canberra, Australia 2601
If we assume that the meanings of words can be treated as
something given, then it is useful to distinguish three levels in
the linguistic determination of further meaning:
1. The meaning of the words in combination determines the
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meaning of the type-sentence: the meaning, for example, of
"That is the largest cat," taken in abstraction from context.
2. The meaning of the type-sentence in context determines
the meaning of the token-sentence: the meaning of an occur-
rence of "That is the largest cat" when it is contextually clear that
the speaker is talking of caterpillar trucks, that he is, in fact,
referring to one in a shop window, and that the reference group
within which it is largest is that of the caterpillars on sale in the
shop.
3. The meaning of the token-sentence on the lips of the
communicator determines the meaning of the utterance: The
meaning in the case of our example might be that the caterpillar
identified is the one the speaker needs to buy.
The interpretation of meaning requires insight at each of
these three levels. The interpreter must be in a position to tell
the character of the type-sentence, the content of the token-
sentence, and the message of the utterance. The example given
has been chosen so that these come apart, but in other cases they
may not do so. We should be open to the possibility that the
meaning of a nonambiguous, nonindexical type-sentence may
yield the meaning of the token-sentence directly, as well as that
the meaning of the token-sentence may be nothing less than
what the speaker intends to communicate.
The demarcation of these levels of interpretation enables me
to voice a reservation about Sperber & Wilson's (S&W's) other-
wise admirable Relevance. The reservation is that they over-
emphasise the distinction between level-one interpretation and
interpretation at the other levels but underemphasise the dif-
ference between interpretation at level two and level three.
First the overemphasis. S&W see the difference between
level-one interpretation and interpretation at the other levels as
that between a decoding and an inferential process. As they put
it, "An inferential process starts from a set of premises and
results in a set of conclusions which follow logically from, or are
at least warranted by, the premises. A decoding process starts
from a signal and results in the recovery of a message which is
associated to the signal by an underlying code" (pp. 12-13).
This statement of the difference is not satisfactory, because a
decoding process, as described, can always be cast as inferential.
It starts from premises to the effect that a signal of a certain sort
has been emitted and that such and such rules of codification are
relevant, and it results in the conclusion that a particular
message is intended. The sort of conclusion offered at the first of
our three levels of linguistic interpretation is, in an example
offered by the authors themselves: "Mary has uttered the
sentence 'It will get cold'" (p. 177).
In relation to this consideration, it may be said that all that is
registered psychologically is a mode of perception: The au-
dience hears the sounds as an instance of the sentence-type "It
will get cold"; it does not record the conclusion "Mary has
uttered the sentence 'It will get cold. But that proves nothing.
It is equally true that the second level of interpretation may
generate only a mode of perceiving the remark and not a
conclusion of the appropriate sort. It may lead the audience to
hear the sentence-type as a way of making a certain remark
without inducing any explicit conclusion of the form "Mary says
that it will get cold."
The notion of inference is a tricky one that, I believe, causes
unnecessary problems for S&W. As it is used in cognitive
psychology it picks out a process that need not be conscious,
personally controlled, or explicitly represented. S&W are atten-
tive to the fact that inference need not be conscious or person-
ally controlled, admitting that it may have an "automatic,
unconscious, reflex quality" (p. 83). They do not advert to the
fact that it may not be explicitly represented: that is, that a
process may be interpretable as inferential even though it does
not explicitly represent inferential steps (Cummins 1983). [See
also Stabler: "How Are Grammars Represented?" BBS 6(3)
1983.] But S&W would surely find that fact congenial, because
they do not think that the probability attached to an assumption
is always explicitly represented (pp. 78-79). And yet they fail to
recognise that, once these qualifications are entered, then
decoding would seem to count as a clear instance of inference.
The difference between linguistic interpretation at the first
level in our schema and interpretation at the other levels is a
difference between types of inference. At the first level the
inference, we might say, is code-based; at the other levels it is
based on facts about the context or communicator. It may also
be, as S&W allege, that the first-level inference is conducted by
a peripheral processing system, the other sorts of inference by a
central one (p. 71). The point does not seem important at this
abstract level of analysis.
So much for the overemphasis with which I charge the
authors. The underemphasis that I discern appears in their
discussion of the second and third levels of linguistic interpreta-
tion. They suggest that although differences are involved, the
divide between these levels is not of any great import. That, I
believe, is a serious mistake.
The suggestion comes early on when S&W set up a contrast
between the case in which someone provides direct evidence of
an assumption that he wishes to make manifest to his audience
and the case in which he manifests the assumption by other
means. Peter leans back on the park bench, allowing Mary to see
directly that the unwelcome William is approaching and only
incidentally, if at all, to recognise that he intends her to see
William (p. 48). The case is designed to contrast with one in
which he says that William is coming rather than showing it in
this way.
The important question is how the contrast is supposed to go.
S&W seize on the fact that in the showing case direct evidence of
the assumption is provided; they suggest that in the saying case
the evidence must be indirect. "When a coded signal, or any
other arbitrary piece of behaviour, is used ostensively, the
evidence displayed bears directly on the individual's intention,
and only indirectly on the basic layer of information that she
intends to make manifest" (p. 53). The idea, familiar from the
work of Grice, is that by uttering a sentence like "William is
coming" the speaker manifests his intention to manifest the
assumed fact that William is coming and thereby hopes to
manifest that fact itself.
But an alternative picture is available. This is that, just as what
Mary sees directly presents the assumption which Peter wishes
to make manifest, so the sentence-token "William is coming" -
the sentence-type in context - directly presents or, better,
represents that assumption. It may not do so on the basis of
decoding alone; it may require both context-based and code-
based inference. But the important possibility to register is that
it conveys that assumption immediately and not by first present-
ing evidence of the speaker's intention to manifest the assump-
tion. As in the showing case, the communicator may indeed
present evidence of that intention; but that he does so is
incidental to the success of his basic communicative enterprise.
The alternative picture clearly needs to be developed to
account for a number of facts which I ignore here, as for example
that sentence-tokens may be nonassertoric (McDowell 1980).
There are a number of reasons why it is surprising that S&W do
not consider this picture. One is that they refer to McDowell's
book, which explicitly introduces it. Another is that, recognising
that bees communicate linguistically other than by identifying
one another's intentions, they ought to be open to the possibility
that humans can do so too (pp. 5, 174). And a third reason for
surprise is that, although bees may not have to exercise context-
based inference, that difference should not block the possibility
mentioned since, by S&W's own account, the relevant features
of context invoked in such inferences do not concern the speak-
er's intentions (pp. 183-93).
The alternative picture is phenomenologically and meth-
odologically attractive - phenomenologically because we do
seem to identify the meaning of sentence-tokens without any
reference, conscious or unconscious, to the intentions of speak-
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ers; methodologically because the picture puts us on a con-
tinuum with nonhuman animals. We can see the ability to
recognise sentence-token meaning as emerging prior to any
capacity for divining one another's intentions. [See also Den-
nett: "Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology" BBS 6(3)
1983.]
The picture, finally, has a number of more incidental attrac-
tions. It suggests a short line with the overtness problem:
Communication at this basic level will be overt just so long as the
speaker lacks any intentions to be covert; it does not require the
presence of positive intentions of transparency (Evans &
McDowell 1976). The picture also enables us to define a dis-
tinctively linguistic form of belief as the disposition to assent to
certain sentence-tokens; this supplements the more basic no-
tion of belief simply as a disposition to act as if certain things
were so. Lastly, the picture opens up the possibility that, if
context is understood broadly enough, then metaphorical con-
tent can be seen as determined at level two rather than level
three, so that there may be no literal way of thinking certain
metaphorically expressed thoughts (Goodman 1968).
Nothing would be lost to the basic thesis of Relevance if the
authors were to endorse this alternative picture; it would remain
the case that considerations of relevance determine meaning of
the sort that appears at level two. The only difference would be
that the relevant relevance would usually be the sort involved in
the cognitive processing of contextual phenomena, not the kind
associated distinctively with the divination of speaker's inten-
tions (pp. 151-55).
The relevance of Relevance for fiction
Anne Reboul
Department of French, University of Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland
I would like to outline briefly the way in which the framework
devised by Sperber & Wilson (S&W) can be helpful to students
of fiction in general, and especially to students of literary fiction.
There have been two main approaches to fiction. On the
logical side, as a response to the fact that fictional utterances are
false, the adoption of a possible-worlds semantics has been
proposed. On the pragmatic side, as a response to the loss of
normal illocutionary force in fictional utterances, the idea has
been advanced that there is a specific act (whose illocutionary
status is rather obscure) which would enable the speaker to
produce an utterance without intending to bring about any of its
usual illocutionary consequences. However, it seems that nei-
ther of these theories is entirely satisfactory. While possible-
worlds semantics offers a solution to certain types of fictional
discourse, it offers no solution to the kind of inconsistent or
paradoxical utterances which can appear in fictional discourse.
The pragmatic approach has been on the whole vague (little has
been said about how the act performed in fiction works), and at
best metaphorical.
Relevance theory offers a rather different approach. S&W are
interested not only in the sense of utterances, but in the overall
interpretation process by which contextual implications of utter-
ances can be recovered. There seems to be no special reason for
thinking that fictional utterances are interpreted in a fundamen-
tally different way from utterances taken to be true. Whether
true or false, any grammatical utterance encodes a logical form
enabling the hearer to construct a context against which the
utterance can be interpreted, as S&W's analysis of metaphor has
shown. And as they also show, in any utterance, fictional or
otherwise, the principle of relevance, with its twin factors of
contextual effects and processing effort, can shed interesting
new light on style.
This does not mean that no distinction should be drawn
between fictional and ordinary utterances. One specific prob-
lem raised by fictional utterances is that the objects to which
they purport to refer do not exist. This does not, of course,
prevent fictional names from being associated with mental
concepts in S&W's sense. It has been suggested in Reboul
(1986) that the concepts corresponding to definite descriptions
or proper names in fiction should contain in their encyclopedic
entries, apart from the information provided by the fictional
discourse itself, an additional item specifying their origin (i.e.,
for Hamlet, the play Hamlet), whereas the entry corresponding
to that origin (i.e., the concept attached to the drama Hamlet)
should contain information specifying that it has no extension.
Another question which any theory of fiction should answer is
why people are prepared to spend time reading or listening to
fiction, even though they know that it is false. Neither possible-
worlds semantics nor the traditional pragmatic approach consid-
ers this question. There is, however, an answer suggested by
S&W's framework and argued by Reboul (1986): it is that
fictional discourse should be looked on as very near to meta-
phor. On that view, fictional discourse would be an interpreta-
tion of a thought (or thoughts) of the speaker. Like metaphor, it
need not purport to represent an actual state of affairs as long as
it achieves optimal relevance: that is, as long as it gives rise to
sufficient effects which describe actual states of affairs (the
"message" of the work) for the minimum necessary processing
effort.
It could be argued against this view that one can find in
fictional discourse all kinds of utterances which, in "ordinary"
discourse, would be considered descriptive or interpretive in
the usual way. However, within S&W's framework, hearers or
readers need not rely only on the form of an utterance to
determine whether that utterance is an interpretation in the
same sense as metaphor, or whether it is an interpretation or a
description in the usual sense: As always they consider which of
these possibilities would yield an interpretation consistent with
the principle of relevance.
It appears, at least to me, that the approach the most likely to
enhance the relevance of fictional utterances might be to consid-
er them as interpretations of thoughts of the speaker in much the
same way as metaphor, and that this is the most productive way
of approaching fiction.
Literalness and other pragmatic principles
Frangois Recanati
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 75 qua; Anatole France,
75007 Pahs, France
Sperber & Wilson's (S&W's) achievements in Relevance are
most impressive. First, they offer a new picture of human
cognition, according to which the mind processes centrally
available information in such a way as to obtain the greatest
improvement of its representation of the world at the smallest
processing cost. Both the information the mind chooses to
process and the manner in which it is processed (with more or
less extensive appeal to background knowledge) are said to be
determined by this search for "relevance." Second, they show
that this view of human cognition provides the foundation for a
theory of human communication, both linguistic and non-
linguistic. Third, they suit the action to the word and give a
detailed theory of linguistic communication. This theory I find
very appealing. It is more explicit than most theories on the
market; it accounts for hitherto neglected phenomena such as
the communication of feelings and vague thoughts; above all, it
is the only theory that both properly acknowledges the linguistic
underdetermination of what is said and yet accounts for the
hearer's ability to select a unique interpretation. Nevertheless,
if we abstract from the unified, cognitively based framework
they provide for pragmatics, it seems to me that S&W's theory is
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not as different as they claim from those of other pragmaticians
in the Gricean tradition.
Consider, first, the alleged difference between the principle
of relevance and Grice's cooperative principle. According to
S&W:
There is . . . a radical difference between the principle of relevance
and Grice's maxims. Grice's cooperative principle and maxims are
norms. . . . Communicators generally keep to the norms, but may
also violate them. . . . The principle of relevance, by contrast, is a
generalisation. . . . The principle of relevance applies without excep-
tion: Every act of ostensive communication communicates a pre-
sumption of relevance. (Precis, sect. 3.3, para. 7—8)
I do not think there is so radical a difference. In the Gricean
framework as I interpret it, a communicator is expected not only
to conform to the cooperative principle but, by the very act of
communicating, presents himself as conforming to the cooper-
ative principle. (If this were not so, the conversational im-
plicatures - that is, the hypotheses that are needed to reconcile
the utterance with the presumption that the cooperative princi-
ple is respected - would not be communicated, as they are, but
simply induced in the hearer.) This is not very far from the
notion that every act of communication communicates that the
cooperative principle is being respected. As for the cooperative
principle itself, formulating it exclusively in terms of relevance
would not seriously affect the spirit of Grice's theory.
Another example of what is perhaps S&W's tendency to
overstress the difference between their view and those of other
pragmaticians is their statement to the effect that "most prag-
maticians . . . see the inferential tier of comprehension as gov-
erned by a variety of specialized rules constituting a kind of
pragmatic 'module'" (Precis, sect. 4, para. 2). This statement
may be true of (some) formal pragmaticians, but certainly is not
true of inferential pragmaticians in the Gricean tradition. Like
S&W, these theoreticians take pragmatics to be concerned with
the interaction oflinguistic competence with world-knowledge
and general intelligence. It is true that pragmaticians generally
do not refrain from positing pragmatic rules and principles; but
they do not believe that doing so is inconsistent with the view of
pragmatics as nonmodular. In general, the pragmatic principles
put forward in the literature are only more or less specific
applications of higher-level principles such as Grice's cooper-
ative principle, to which they ultimately reduce. Do S&W think
that a pragmatic theory that incorporates a version of Grice's
maxims is thereby committed to a modular view of pragmatics?
That would show misunderstanding of the function and status of
the maxims in a pragmatic theory.
Independent of Grice's maxims, it has often been assumed
that there is a "principle of literalness" at work in communica-
tion. With respect to such a principle, S&W's criticism may well
be justified. However, in this case as in others, what is relevant
to pragmaticians is not so much the principle itself as the
presumption that the principle is respected - that is, the
presumption that a speaker is speaking literally. Now, to say that
such a presumption plays a role in the comprehension process is
simply to say that the literal interpretation of an utterance is
considered first. This, of course, is consistent with the non-
modular view. What is to be criticized, therefore, should not be
the substance of the theory but the way it is formulated.
As far as the principle of literalness is concerned, S&W reject
not only the formulation but also the substance of the claim:
They do not believe that the literal interpretation comes first. If
they are right, this is an important result. However, S&W's
view is difficult to assess because, in discussing literalness, they
have recourse to an extra piece of theoretical machinery, ex-
pounded in section 4.5 (Precis). I do not understand why they do
not keep to the simple (unextended) relevance-theoretical
framework; accordingly, I suggest the following restatement of
their view concerning irony, metaphor, and speech acts:
(A) In verbal communication, S's utterance of a declarative sentence
manifests his intention to make manifest something that bears a
certain relation R* to a proposition coming under the semantic
potential of the sentence. This something - the communicatum -
may be a proposition expressible by the sentence (then R* is
identity, and the speech act performed is an ordinary assertion), or
an expansion of such a proposition (then R* is the relation of
embedding; this covers both irony and speech acts other than
ordinary assertions), or a proper subset of the entailments of such a
proposition (this covers metaphor and loose talk). The hearer's
inferential task is to identify the relevant communicatum R*(P*).
Starting with the meaning of the sentence, he searches for a
proposition P* such that (i) P* is expressible by the sentence and
(ii) there is a relation R* such that, if S intends to make R*(P*)
manifest, then his utterance is consistent with the presumption of
relevance.
The claim that there is a presumption of literalness is not
inconsistent with S&W's view thus stated. According to (A), to
test a candidate P for the status of "proposition expressed" is to
search for an R*(P) such that the hypothesis that R*(P) is
communicated is consistent with the principle of relevance. In
this framework, the claim that there is a presumption of liter-
alness says only this: The first candidate for the status of R*(P) to
be considered, the most accessible one given that one is testing a
definite proposition P, is the proposition P itself (i.e., R*(P) with
R* = identity). It is only when the hypothesis that P is being
communicated is not consistent with the principle of relevance
that H goes on and looks for a relation R* different from identity.
Rationality as an explanation of language?
Stuart J. Russell
Computer Science Division, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720
Sperber & Wilson (S&W) are to be congratulated for their
introduction to the problem of communication, and especially
for the eminent common sense of their position that the osten-
sive-inferential model provides a more acceptable general theo-
ry than does the code model. Their goal of explicating the
cognitive effects of an utterance on the hearer, as opposed to
isolating its "meaning," does away with a lot of pointless argu-
ments. As a researcher in artificial intelligence with a somewhat
formal bent, I began reading with some trepidation but was
thoroughly reassured by their criticism of existing pragmatic
theories for choosing interpretations (p. 37): "What they fail to
show is that . . . an equally convincing justification could not
have been given for some other interpretation that was not in
fact chosen."
In other words, S&W are looking for a generative theory of
pragmatics. Analysis of cognitive processes as rational be-
haviour, given sets of beliefs and desires, is often a reasonable
first-order approximation; the task is then to establish exactly
what are the goals of communicating agents and what knowledge
they have available or can assume in their processing, and finally
to show that these premises can reasonably be attributed to the
agents and are sufficient to generate the interpretive behaviours
that are actually found in humans. Unfortunately, the machine-
ry proposed in the theory of relevance falls well short of fulfilling
these goals, in several ways.
S&W's first contribution to a new theory is the idea of mutual
manifestness, intended to replace mutual knowledge as a means
of making inferences about the goals and beliefs of others.
Mutual knowledge, which is correctly pinpointed as a sine qua
non of error-free coded communication, is rejected on the basis
of being an unattainable idealization, requiring an infinity of
inferences. Pure coded communication is therefore rejected
also. This rejection, however, seems to be based on two false
premises: the assumption that knowledge has to be certain and
the assumption that mutual knowledge requires an infinite
chain of explicitly held assumptions. The formulation of Halpern
and Moses (1985) gives a definition of mutual knowledge Mp of
proposition p as
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According to this definition, everyone knows p and everyone
knows it is mutually known. Under normal communicative
circumstances it is reasonable to commit to a belief in mutual
knowledge of p, which can be done in finite time. Three things
make one suspicious of S&W's rejection of mutual knowledge:
First, coded communication does, of course, occur; second, it is
later admitted that communication need not, indeed cannot, be
guaranteed to succeed, even though this requirement was
imposed on coding; and third, since manifestness is only a
dispositional property, in S&W's definition, it is hard to see how
mutual manifestness allows the essential inferences to be made
about the actual cognitive states of others. The concept seems to
suffer the drawbacks of Hintikka's (1962) deductive-closure
model of knowledge without the benefits of an explicit model
such as that of Konolige (1986).
Fortunately, the detour via mutual manifestness can be
avoided without undue strain on the rest of the theory of
relevance. Perhaps a better reason to reject the code model is
simply that the distortions caused by reformulating the process
of contextual inference as a sign-message correspondence sys-
tem render the model practically useless as a generator of
insights into complex communication phenomena.
S&W propose two main constructs to flesh out their rational
approach: a model of human inference and a definition of
relevance, which plays the role of the human cognitive goals in
the rational communication process. These cognitive goals are
assumed, in some "trivial, speculative remarks," to be the
enlargment of the set of explicitly available facts known and the
minimization of processing effort. It might be more consistent
with a rationalist approach to include the hearer's goals as a
constraint on which new facts are inferred, as in much current
work in artificial intelligence.
A model of an inference mechanism is required to give
substance to claims about which facts become known as a result
of communication, and with how much effort. To a reader
familiar with artificial intelligence and logic, the proposals for
this mechanism put forward in Relevance seem somewhat
strange. Here are the problems associated with several claims:
Claim: Inference consists of unfettered forward chaining to
termination. This is absurdly impractical, as actual experience
demonstrates (Schank 1979). Control methods must be used to
ensure that only useful inference paths are explored.
Claim: All inference rules are explicitly represented. Such a
scheme cannot succeed, because whatever combines the in-
ference rules with their premises must also be an inference rule,
but procedurally represented; moreover, almost all actual in-
ference machines incorporate their inference rules by means of
procedures because this is far more efficient, and inference rules
never change.
Claim: All inference is eliminative. This would disallow the
use of commutativity laws and axioms defining inductive do-
mains, for example.
Claim: Assumption schemas are not complete propositions,
yet can be used in inference. A formal object without a truth
value cannot, for example, contradict anything. As admitted by
S&W (chap. 2, n. 10) these schemas are really just existential
propositions.
Claim: Assumption strengths, or degrees of confirmation, are
not explicitly computed, but are merely produced as the result of
nonlogical processing of assumptions; hence confirmation theo-
ry is irrelevant. This seems to be a confusion between the
specification of a logical confirmation process and its implemen-
tation. By the same token, one could say that a theorem prover
using inference procedures rather than explicit inference rules
is not a logical system. S&W's rejection of a computational
approach to confirmation is especially odd in light of the fairly
standard (although shaky in places) probabilistic inference pro-
cedure they advocate.
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Fortunately, again, these deficiencies can be repaired with-
out undue damage to the rest of Relevance. However, it seems
odd that little or no reference is made to the considerable work
in artificial intelligence on models of plausible inference, both
for problem-solving in general and for language understanding
in particular. (Kanal and Lemmer [1986] and Norvig [1987]
contain worthwhile discussions.) The procedures S&W propose
for memory access and context construction are woefully
underspecified.
The two principles (it seems there really are two) of relevance
and least effort are put to work to explain a large number of
comprehension phenomena. It is here that the work cries out for
a formal implementation, because in any number of cases we are
expected to sit idly by while yet another ad hoc rule for
estimating effort or for defining and accessing contexts is intro-
duced in order to rationalize a desired interpretation (see, for
example, pp. 187, 200, 219-20, 221). Effort, in particular, is far
too flexibly defined to be a theoretically adequate tool for a real
pragmatic system, and there seems to be no way to obtain more
than introspective evidence. Although I will leave it to the
linguists to assault with deadly example-sentences, it seems
unlikely that the minuscule amounts of effort required by
S&W's theory, their motivating picture of mental exhaustion
notwithstanding, would play a significant role except in highly
time-pressured situations. To place all the burden of selecting
correct interpretations on an effort principle, implemented as
an ordering on context accessibility, abdicates the responsibility
for a theory, passing it on to those studying memory organiza-
tion, who are already overloaded with ordering constraints
passed on by other theories such as the possible-worlds theory of
counterfactuals.
In general, one gets an uneasy feeling about the value of some
of the explanations proposed in Relevance, akin to the feeling
experienced when reading teleological explanations in evolu-
tion or functionalist explanations in sociology. Although, in
principle, one might be able to trace all aspects of language back
to their roots in cooperative advantage, the effort may be neither
practical nor useful. For example, Quine's (1960) model of how
words get their meaning is very interesting philosophically, but
it should not be part of an explanation of how language is
processed. S&W are apparently happy to accept the existence of
convention in the area of grammar and the lexicon, although
they reject all other uses of convention as ad hoc. Conventions of
all kinds are, however, self-justifying, since by their existence
they enable more effective cooperation. Even if some of the
pragmatic processes involved in communication have a rational
explanation, it would seem that our first task is to establish
exactly what the processes are, along with what conventions
they may rely on. The first job of an Englishman after a
transatlantic migration is not to find out the rationale behind a
society's choosing one side of the road to drive on rather than the
other, but to find out which side of the road to drive on.
How relevant?
Pieter A. M. Seuren
Philosophy Institute, Nijmegen University, 6500 UK Nijmegen, Holland
It is gratifying to see Sperber & Wilson (S&W), in their Precis of
Relevance, state openly, at the very end, that they are "well
aware that the view developed in Relevance and summarized
here is very speculative and, as it stands, too general directly to
determine specific experimental tests or computer simula-
tions." Nowhere earlier had this been said so explicitly. One is
now fully justified in concentrating on the internal logical
coherence of the view in question, for if a speculative view has
any force, it is mainly on account of its internal structure and
logical clarity. S&W's critics, including myself, have always
concentrated on precisely these issues, and, as it now appears,
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rightly so. In my (very negative) review of Relevance (Seuren,
1988) I raise a number of central issues having to do with the
coherence and consistency of S&W's speculations, to which
Wilson and Sperber (1988b) wrote a (rather piqued) reply. I
shall now take up some of the objections left unanswered, or
inadequately answered, in that reply.
The central theme in S&W's view of relevance is the fact that
"there is a gap between the semantic representations of sen-
tences and the thoughts actually communicated by utterances.
This gap is filled not by more coding, but by inference" (Precis,
sect. 1.1, para. 3). Thoughts are "conceptual representations"
(Relevance, p. 2). Among what are considered thoughts, as-
sumptions occupy an important place: They are "thoughts treat-
ed by the individual as representations of the actual world (as
opposed to fictions, desires, or representations of representa-
tions)" (p. 2).
The relevance of an assumption in a context is said to depend
on the extent of the contextual effects in that context, as well as
on the effort required to process it in that context: More
contextual effects and lesser processing effort lead to greater
relevance-in-that-context of the assumption in question. One
has to take it, therefore, that an utterance u, together with an
unknown quantity i of inferencing in a context C yields a set of
thoughts (assumptions) / actually communicated by u. I is
graded for relevance according to the wealth of contextual
effects and the minimality of the processing effort. This grading
is not absolute but relative to other possible assumptions com-
municated by u with other inferencings and/or with other
contexts. Each pairing of some u with some i in some C is called a
hypothesis (p. 165), let us say H. Each H thus determines some
set of assumptions /, with an associated relevance value R.
There is then a Presumption of optimal relevance, which makes
the hearer select the / with the highest R, at least in some cases
(p. 165): "In some cases, [the task of constructing and selecting a
hypothesis] is best carried out by listing all the possible hypoth-
eses, comparing them, and choosing the best one." In other
cases, however, "it is better carried out by searching for an
initial hypothesis, testing it to see if it meets some criterion,
accepting it and stopping there if it does, and otherwise repeat-
ing the process by searching for a second hypothesis, and so on."
One might now wonder what can be meant by "processing
effort," in that the processing of an utterance involves the
adequate selection of a context (pp. 137-38): What if w yields a
very high R (lots of contextual effects, at very little processing
cost) at hypothesis 358? Would not the processing cost needed
to get to H358 outweigh the saving at H358? Wilks (1986, p. 273)
observes that this seems to make nonsense of the condition of
minimal processing effort. S&W's answer (p. 167) is that, in fact,
the interpretation to be selected is "the first one tested and
found to be consistent with the principle [of relevance]. . . .
The important point is that, given the cognitive environment,
given the initial context, and given the stimulus, some hypoth-
eses are more accessible than others, and this means that they
require less processing effort." Had the communicator intended
the hearer to settle for a less accessible hypothesis, he should
have used an utterance that saves the addressee the effort of first
accessing more accessible hypotheses (p. 168).
All this raises a number of questions. First, S&W's account
requires that, given a context (including a "cognitive environ-
ment"), a given utterance « determines the order of accessibility
of possible interpretative hypotheses. Apart from the empirical
problem raised by this requirement (we have promised to let
that aspect rest), there is the fact that the function involved is left
totally unspecified, crucial though it is in the total framework.
Having said (p. 167) that u, in virtue of its grammatical and
lexical form, gives immediate access to a highly determinate set
of concepts, assembling them into a logical form directly usable
as an assumption schema, S&W content themselves with stat-
ing: "The context provides ways of completing these assumption
schemas into full hypotheses." This conclusion is presented as a
fact, and not as a serious white area on a map whose filling in is
doubtful. Unfortunately, this type of procedure is typical for
Relevance (and its Precis): Very often proper analysis and argu-
ment have to give way to rhetorical suggestions and demonstra-
tion by way of examples. Yet the result is put forward as solid
truth. The book would have gained a lot if it had been written
less apodictically.
It would also have gained a lot if it had been written more
clearly. What one finds is an almost inextricable maze of defini-
tions couched in often unnecessarily opaque and abstruse termi-
nology. One fails to find clear statements of the computational
aspects (functions) involved or invoked, or of the rules or
principles needed to make the less determinate parts of the
system work. This is perhaps best illustrated by holding up for
close inspection S&W's notion of contextual effect (CE). We
remember that without CEs there is no relevance. What, then,
is a CE? It is meant to be an alteration of a given context
resulting from the addition of a new utterance (not counting the
purely incremental effect of the utterance). The context C can
be modified in three possible ways (p. 117): Some assumption
may be removed from C, its "strength" may be modified, or C,
enriched with u, may now possess a richer set of entailments
than either C o r n alone. In the last case we have a so-called
contextual implication (pp. 107-8). Moreover, the strength of
any assumption depends on the evidence available for its truth
(p. 109); and the highest degree of strength, one infers from p.
113, is certainty. Strength adheres not only to the contents of
the speaker's message but also to the listener's recognition of the
speaker's intention as part of the set of assumptions transmitted.
When a conclusion is drawn, its strength will depend on the
relative strengths of the input assumptions (pp. 109-16). But
S&W's text is rather verbose but sketchy and imprecise on this
point: No precise procedures or formalisms are provided. More-
over, if strengthening helps comprehension (by raising R), how
can weakening do the same? According to S&W, if u is contra-
dictory with some element e in C, then the weaker of the two
will be erased from C (p. 115). If e is the weaker one and is
eliminated, we have a CE, but if u, the new utterance, has to be
kept out, there is no CE. Erasure of an e can be considered the
most extreme case of weakening, and this, too, helps com-
prehension! Would not some further clarification be in order
here?
All in all, this centrally important notion in S&W's framework
remains without a precise definition. In Wilson & Sperber
(1988b) it is claimed that Relevance (p. 260, n. 26) does offer a
formal definition. In this footnote a "more formal characterisa-
tion" is promised. What follows is my rephrasing of the relevant
text in more easily accessible terminology and symbolism. Let C
stand for context, P for newly added propositions ("assump-
tions"); Ec and Ep represent the set of conclusions derivable
from C and P, respectively. The contextualisation of P in C has
no CE just in case (i) £CC£CUP, and (ii) ECUP minus ECCEP. If
these two conditions are not both met, there is some CE. But
notice that condition (i) is trivially met in all possible cases, since
whatever follows from a set of propositions C also follows from C
enriched with any set of propositions. So the only condition is
(ii): For there to be a CE there must be a conclusion in ECOP
which is neither in Ec nor in EP. But this is precisely the
definition given for contextual implication (pp. 107-8), and
thus, what is defined in note 26 is an unnecessarily complex
rephrasing of what had already been given as a definition for
contextual implication, and does not define contextual effect.
The elements of "strength" and "erasure through contradiction"
are still undefined. It must be added that S&W also say in note
26: "Let two assumptions with the same content but with
different strengths count as two different assumptions." But is
one to understand that if only strengthening occurs (whatever
that may be), then, due to a mysterious change in identity of the
strengthened assumption set, there are suddenly also con-
textual implications which, without the strengthening, would
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not have been there? If so, the reader might expect considerably
more explanation.
This leads us to S&W's notion of contextual implication: A set
of assumptions P contextually implies an assumption q in the
context C if and only if (i) the union of P and C nontrivially
implies q and (ii) neither P nor C nontrivially implies q. This, as
we have seen, is identical with the definition of contextual effect
(p. 260), except for the specification that the deduction must be
"non-trivial." (I take it that "non-trivial implication" is also what
is meant in that definition. Otherwise I cannot understand what
is meant.) What, then, is "non-trivial implication"? For this we
must go to p. 97: A set of assumptions P logically and non-
trivially implies an assumption q if and only if, when P is the set
of initial theses in a derivation involving only elimination rules,
q belongs to the set of final theses. By "derivation" S&W mean a
formal, logically deductive procedure whereby logical conse-
quences (entailments) are computed. S&W maintain, no doubt
correctly, that standard first order logic is both too poor and too
rich for the proper analysis of natural language entailments: It is
too poor because it fails to capture many if not most intuitive
entailments, and it is too rich because some formal entailments
in logic are counterintuitive. In order to remedy the poverty,
S&W invoke a "concept logic," the details of which are not
provided. Against the excessive logical power they posit that in
language and cognition only elimination rules are used and
never introduction rules. This in itself has extremely awkward
consequences, since it rules out the conclusion that two people
came in if it is indicated that Henry and Jack came in - to
mention just one example. Moreover, the notion of elimination
rule is left opaque (for details see Seuren, 1988). The nonstan-
dard logic invoked by S&W thus seems not to exist in the sense
of being formally available. S&W further claim that, in their
logic, the set of entailments associated with any P is finite. No
evidence is offered for this bold thesis, yet S&W state that "The
process [of derivation or deduction] applies to all initial and
derived theses until no further deductions are possible" (p. 95).
Let us now turn back to the definition of nontrivial implication
as paraphrased above (from pp. 107-8). What is meant by "the
set of final theses"? Note that this term is simply used in this
definition but nowhere explained or defined. In Seuren (1988) I
took it that, in accordance with current terminology in the
theory of algorithms, it should refer to the set of ultimate
conclusions from which no further deductions are possible.
Wilson & Sperber (1988b), however, indicate that this is not the
intended interpretation: The term must be taken to refer to the
union of the initial and the derived theses (assumptions). Not
only does this terminology seem sloppy, but "the set of final
theses" is still not defined, and hencf neither are the notions of
nontrivial implication, contextual implication, and contextual
effect.
This is only one of many similar tangles in the book. What,
then, remains of S&W's speculative view? Very little, in my
opinion. I know of no other attempt of the same broad scope and
proportions to explain the complexities of linguistic and non-
linguistic comprehension of messages. Perusing both Relevance
and its BBS Pr6cis calls to mind why no alternative approaches
have been attempted: The enterprise seems altogether too
ambitious, for the time being, to be realistically undertaken. In
my view it is much more realistic and fruitful to let the wide and
general issue rest for a while, in order to concentrate on detailed
empirical analyses of more restricted problem areas. The em-
pirical knowledge thus gathered will prove highly relevant in
constraining and shaping speculative hypotheses about the
broad kinds of issues that S&W have the courage to tackle.
There is plenty of room within the bounds of the empirically
accessible for fruitful theory to develop.
The information needed for inference
Carlota S. Smith
Department of Linguistics, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Tex. 78712
Sperber & Wilson (S&W) argue that verbal communication
involves both code and inference. In making inferences people
use general abilities and knowledge rather than the specifics of a
code; and the fact that people revise and abandon interpreta-
tions is strong evidence in favor of S&W's position. Writers
often exploit this flexibility, for example, by using unreliable
narrators in fiction. Readers must gradually revise their in-
terpretation of a text as they lose faith in the narrator.
The many inferences in S&W's account of communication
require several types of information, principles, representa-
tions, and computations. The principle of relevance seeks an
optimal balance between effort and effect. As an essential first
step toward understanding how the principle might actually
operate, I wish to consider the information required for in-
ference at the various stages of understanding. The variety
makes it somewhat difficult to see how a single principle might
apply-
There are three main stages in understanding, according to
the programme of S&W: decoding an utterance, arriving at its
propositional form, and assessing its import. The last two stages
require inference. Consider utterance (b) below, uttered by B in
the context of A's uttering (a). As task is to understand (b).
A: (a) Susan has thalassemia.
B: (b) She is getting married to Bill.
Assume that A, having decoded (b), is in a position to infer its
propositional form, or explicatures. The explicatures are based
in part on the logical form of (b). To work them out in detail we
would need a representation of logical form that could be used in
inferences concerning ambiguity resolution, reference assign-
ment, completion or enrichment, and determination of proposi-
tional attitude.
Ambiguity: A must decide between the interpretations de-
coded for an ambiguous utterance, choosing the one most
compatible with the situation. Since (b) is not ambiguous, take
S&W's example The child left a straw in the glass. To resolve the
lexical ambiguity the receiver consults encyclopedic memory,
which contains stereotypical scenarios that chunk information
and are relatively accessible; such a scenario, once found, would
give the "drinking tube" interpretation. Memory also contains
the "piece of hay" interpretation, and presumably other infor-
mation about straw as well. But to work out the effort required to
consult encyclopedic memory, we need to know how it is
organized. Specifically, in what sense is a chunk accessible?
What steps are required? What choices are available? In addi-
tion, we need to know how situations are represented and how
they affect the search of memory. Note that if the sentence
above were uttered during a country picnic the second in-
terpretation might be preferred.
Reference assignment: A must determine the reference of the
pronoun she. Suppose that A finds no third person in the
environment and therefore discards the possibility of a deictic
interpretation; A then chooses the anaphoric and looks for an
antecedent, finding in (a) a noun phrase of the correct gender
and number. This information is quite different from that
required for ambiguity resolution, as are the calculations in-
volved. To determine the reference of Bill, A draws on knowl-
edge of people familiar to both A and B; such knowledge must be
represented and computed.
Completion: The present progressive in (b) is vague and must
be filled out by inference. It may refer to a marriage in progress
or a future marriage. Suppose that A, consulting the immediate
environment, fails to find a wedding in progress. But perhaps
the wedding is going on somewhere else: A must search memo-
ry, perhaps expanding the context, for information on this point.
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No ongoing wedding is found and A prefers the future in-
terpretation. To work out these inferences we need to know how
information about the environment and is represented and
stored in memory.
Propositional attitude: A must decide whether (b) is an ordi-
nary assertion. A does this by considering the manifest inten-
tions of B in uttering (b) and computing the implications in order
of accessibility. I do not know how A approaches this task; let us
assume that (b) is inferred to be an assertion.
The explicatures of (b) have now been worked out and A must
determine its implicatures. To do this A must choose the
context. Although S&W argue that this move is essential to limit
the domain of inference, they do not address it directly: In their
examples the context is already chosen. A may choose to expand
the context by considering the immediate physical environ-
ment, earlier utterances, or encyclopedic memory. Note that
each involves different types of information and different repre-
sentations. Suppose that A searches memory for getting married
and thalassemia and arrives at the assumptions (i) People who
are getting married should consult a doctor about hereditary
risks to children and (ii) Two people with thalassemia should be
warned against having children. These will provide the context
for determining the implicatures of (b). But how does A arrive at
them? Are they retrieved or constructed, for instance? There
may be several scenarios in memory for getting married. Is it
easier to construct (i) than to find it? Questions like this must be
answered in addition to the earlier questions raised about
memory. (The final stage of inference involves the processing of
assumptions; I must ignore this here, for lack of space.)
At various stages of understanding A searches memory, the
immediate environment, and the context for information. This
information is used to retrieve and construct assumptions that
are used in inference. S&W do not present detailed accounts of
memory, representation or logical form; they also decline to
engage in computation. This makes it quite impossible to work
out how information is accessed and how assumptions are
constructed; in short, to see- how the processes of inference
work. The principle of relevance may be a general guiding
principle that is realized differently in different areas; or it may
be a single principle that drives inference. One looks forward to
the presentation of detailed models that will allow these issues
to be addressed.
On interpreting "interpretive use"
N. V. Smith
Department of Phonetics and Linguistics, University College London,
London WC1E 6BT, England
One major achievement of Sperber & Wilson's (S&W's) theory
of relevance is that it provides conceptual categories and distinc-
tions that bear fruit in areas distinct from those for which they
were devised. Once one has absorbed Relevance it is hard not to
see its relevance ubiquitously: from language acquisition (cf.
Smith 1987) to art appreciation. For lack of space, I want here to
focus on one subpart of the theory (the contrast between "de-
scriptive" and "interpretive" use), illustrating its application in a
number of areas and suggesting that the diagram offered as
Figure 1 in the Precis (fig. 3, p. 232) encapsulates their claims
about how the distinction should be both modified and ex-
tended.
It should first be noted that "Interpretation" is used in two
distinct, if related, senses. S&W are, indeed, at pains to make
this explicit; but it would have been helpful if the interpretive
relation between the propositional form of an utterance and a
thought of the speaker (the relation between the top two boxes
in fig. 1) could have been labelled something like "(partial)
characterization" or, as on p. 192, "incompletely represented."
(The partial nature of this relation is a function of the aniso-
morphism between sentences of natural language and sentences
in the language of thought: an important point in its own right
and one that S&W make with characteristic clarity and empha-
sis). This terminological quibble is prompted by the observation
that their characterization of tropes comes to the illuminating
conclusion that the classical figures do not form a natural class,
but are distinct, at least in part: Metaphor, for instance, is an
interpretive relation of the kind just mentioned, whereas irony
is an interpretive relation of the kind indicated in the lower left-
hand corner of the diagram: namely, an interpretation of an
attributed thought. More specifically, "interpretive use" refers
to the case in which "the thought of the speaker which is
interpreted by the utterance is itself an interpretation . . . of a
thought of someone other than the speaker" p. 238.
This contrast is important and original, but I have two wor-
ries. Prototypical exemplifications of the four categories at the
bottom of the diagram are provided (see p. 231) by irony (a),
interrogatives (b), assertions (c), and requests (d), with (a) and (b)
being interpretive and (c) and (d) descriptive. There is a tempta-
tion to infer that these categories are typically mutually ex-
clusive; but while this may be close to true of (b), (c) and (d), it is
clear that irony cross-classifies each of the other categories. Thus
we can have - as S&W are aware - ironical assertions, ironical
requests, ironical questions, and so on. This suggests that the
class of ironic (and perhaps "echoic" uses more generally) should
be orthogonal to the interpretive/descriptive dichotomy. The
category "interpretation of an attributed thought" is better
exemplified by the kind of interpretive utterance characterised
in some languages by so-called "hearsay" particles. These are
particles (as, e.g., (ha)ti in Hixkaryana - cf. Derbyshire 1985; p.
127) appended to sentences to indicate that the speaker is
disclaiming responsibility for the reliability of the utterance
concerned and is attributing this responsibility to some other
person (specified or not). In an interesting paper couched within
the relevance-theoretic framework, Blass (1987) has argued that
the hearsay particle re in Sissala "might be more explanatorily
described as a marker of interpretive use" in that it characterises
sentences involving "free indirect style," the attribution of
thoughts to other people, and, significantly, irony. It is clear
that her suggestion would generalise to the Hixkaryana exam-
ples and to such cases as the Turkish "evidential" expressed by
the particle -mi§ which, according to Slobin and Aksu (1982),
"carries modal functions of inference and hearsay, and is prag-
matically extended to expressions of surprise, irony and compli-
ments" (p. 185; cf. also p. 195). It is clear that ironical utterances
are interpretive; it seems equally clear that they are not in-
terpretive in the same sense as either of the other uses of this
term, and should perhaps be characterised not as "second-
degree interpretations" (p. 238) but as third-degree interpreta-
tions: a stage at which terminological problems border on the
substantive.
The diagram summarising descriptive and interpretive di-
mensions of language use seems to me to be defective in another
respect. There is one class of sentences which is strikingly
absent: namely, those which purport to describe not an actual or
a desirable state of affairs, but a possible state of affairs. That is,
no provision exists for modality in the framework as described.
In a forthcoming article (Wilson & Sperber, 1988a) the authors
lump together "actual, potential or possible" attributed
thoughts. It is not obvious that the same identification is appro-
priate in the characterisation of states of affairs, if only because of
the problem of adequately defining the truth-conditional dif-
ferences among the three. However, there seems to be no
reason in principle why provision should not be made for a third
branch on the bottom right of the diagram to account precisely
for such a category. The main natural language realisation of
such a category would then be conditional sentences of the kind:
"If giraffes had wings, they would lay eggs" (p. 229). This is
characterised as "interpretive" (ibid); but this classification
seems no more appropriate than the characterisation of desir-
able states of affairs. The existence of a third branch would of
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course suggest that there should be a congeneric equivalent on
the interpretive side; and indeed in Smith and Smith (1988) it is
essentially suggested that counterfactual conditionals (of the
kind "If giraffes hadn't had wings, they wouldn't have been able
to fly so well") filled precisely this alternative box. I now think
that this conjecture (in line with remarks made earlier by S&W)
was misguided, despite its initial appeal and the syntactic
evidence available, and that conditionals, both indicative and
counterfactual, should be characterised as descriptive, with the
difference between them residing partly in the explicature of
falseness associated with counterfactuals and partly in the de-
gree of commitment to the plausibility of the particular condi-
tional that the speaker is prepared to make, especially when this
scale of commitment is morphosyntactically marked.
I think that the contrast between descriptive and interpretive
use is one of the more important and insightful ones that S&W
have come up with. I also think that there is room both for
modification and extension along the lines indicated to provide
an account which is more consistent, more transparent, and
more comprehensive.
Relevance must be to someone
Yorick Wilks
Rio Grande Research Corridor, Computing Research Laboratory, New
Mexico State University, Las Cruces, N. Mex. 88003
From an artifical intelligence perspective, Sperber & Wilson's
(S&W's) Relevance deals with many familiar issues in an odd
way, particularly in that S&W remain determinedly unfamiliar
with information-processing literature, even though they use
the phrase and related ones a great deal. Because the pr6cis of
the book leaves out all their more precise claims and examples, I
shall need to quote from the book directly. My general point,
that their claims about processing are false, cannot be made,
along with the quotation it requires, in the space available, but
can be found in Wilks and Cunningham (1986). Here I shall
restrict myself to the discussion of one example and the princi-
ple S&W use it to illustrate, arguing that no account of relevance
in terms of beliefs and their consequences can ignore the need
for processing models of the beliefs of others - or, as my title
puts it, relevance is always to someone. This is a truism in
artificial intelligence, at least since the pioneering work of
Perrault and Allen (1980), but S&W's work remains within the
process-free linguistic paradigm where one can consider the
consequences of beliefs for communication without considering
whose they are.
We shall refer to the excerpt from Relevance that follows as
the mad-passerby example. One piece of cultural knowledge
may prove necessary for understanding it: A flag-seller is a
volunteer for a charity who stands on the pavement/sidewalk
asking passersby to donate money; they receive a small paper
flag in return.
(4)
Flag-seller: Would you like to buy a flag for the Royal National
Lifeboat Institution?
Passer-by: No thanks, I always spend my holidays with my sister in
Birmingham.
To see the relevance of the passer-by's response, the hearer must be
able to supply something like the premises in (5), and derive some-
thing like the contextual implication in (6):
(5)
(a) Birmingham is inland.
(b) The Royal National Lifeboat Institution is a charity.
(c) Buying a flag is one way of subscribing to a charity.
(d) Someone who spends his holidays inland has no need of the
services of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution.
(e) Someone who has no need of the services of a charity cannot be
expected to subscribe to that charity.
(6)
The passer-by cannot be expected to subscribe to the Royal National
Lifeboat Institution.
What is interesting about the passerby's reply is the very close
connection that exists between seeing its relevance (or, more pre-
cisely, the relevance the speaker intended it to have) and being able to
derive some contextual implication from it. It seems clear that
someone who is unable to supply something like the context in (5) and
derive something like the contextual implication in (6) will be unable
to see the intended relevance of this reply. . . . (p. 121)
So far, the reader should be in a not wholly unfamiliar world:
A restatement of the notion of enthymeme, or incomplete
argument, well known to such individuals as Bochenski (1947) of
the Polish School, who argued that understanding is a matter of
finding propositions that make what a speaker says true; and
Peirce's (1955) "abduction," the inference scheme in which the
premise is established by the truth of the conclusions.
One might reply initially to the above excerpt, not as a
fundamental criticism but as a form of mind-clearing, that what
is interesting about it is the degree to which matters need not be
at all as S&W describe them. There are two related issues here:
(i) the point-of-view problem, or "Whose inferences are the
ones characterised above?' and (ii) the alternative-hypotheses
problem.
As to (i), the passage strongly suggests that in the above
account it is a model of the hearer that is being offered ("the
relevance the speaker [i.e., the passerby] intended it to have"),
and that the information processing or inferencing is being done
by the hearer. The additional premises in (5) are then those
provided by the hearer, the ones he believes the speaker may
believe (and, in something like the classic Gricean manner,
believes that the speaker intends him to attribute to the speaker
in the inference process). So, according to that view, the model
proposed (to use Al-psychology terminology without apology) is
of the hearer's model of the speaker.
As to (ii), it is clear that the hearer may in fact attribute a set of
beliefs to the speaker quite different from those in (5), yet still
derive (6), and hence "see the relevance" of the mad passerby's
remark. Thus the final sentence in the quotation above is quite
false.
An alternative set would be (5'):
(5')
a. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution is a charity that
provides cheap holidays for poor elderly people (cf. the lexical
with the real semantics of "The Salvation Army").
b. The speaker is a shabby elderly-looking person.
c. Someone who already has holiday provision will not need the
services of a charity providing it.
d. Someone who has no need of the services of a charity cannot
be expected to subscribe to that charity (the same as 5e).
It is of no importance that (5'a) is a false belief, as was (5e), for
belief attribution in communication cannot require that we
attribute to others only beliefs we happen to hold. If that were
needed, communication would rapidly collapse, and we could
not talk to those of political or linguistic beliefs opposed to our
own. (5'b) has a special quality, in that it appears to be a belief of
the hearer about the speaker, rather than about the speaker's
own beliefs. This proposition might then be an inappropriate
inferential construction by the hearer, if he believed the speaker
was unaware of his own appearance.
Decisions like this, as to what "logical space" or "mental
environment" the inferences are to take place in (e.g., within
the hearer's view of the speaker, the speaker's view of the
hearer's view of the speaker, or . . .) are, in our view, vitally
important, though they have no place in S&W's scheme. They
are the basis of artificial intelligence work in this field (e.g.,
Perrault & Cohen, memtioned above, or Wilks & Ballim 1987).
No account that uses the term "processes" can be taken se-
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riously unless it actually deals in psychological or computational
processes and S&W do neither.
The issue here is simply the wrongness of S&W's "someone
who is unable to supply . . . will be unable to see the intended
relevance of the reply" quoted above. If that really means derive
by means of (5), then it is just wrong, as we have shown. The
difference here is much more than the lack of a footnote from
S&W suggesting the possibility of other derivations: It is that
they do not really accept that such inferences must be some
particular individual's inferences, and so they feel free to opt for
an "objective" set of hypothesised premises, ones they believe
to be correct.
A moment's more ingenuity will provide yet further in-
terpretations, which may have more contextual implications
than the use of (5) or (5'):
(5")
a. People who spend holidays with relatives normally murder
them sooner or later.
b. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution is a charity (same as
5b).
c. People who do not subscribe to charities also murder their
relatives.
The sequence abc yields not only (6) but (6"):
(6")
The passerby is likely to murder or has already murdered his
sister.
This last example is significant as well as baroque because it
refutes S&W's most important and precise claim that, "other
things being equal, an assumption with greater contextual
effects [i.e. a greater number of non-trivial consequences] is
more relevant; and, other things being equal, an assumption
requiring a smaller processing effort is more relevant" (Rele-
vance, p. 125). Again, since (5') appears on the face of it less
complex and in need of processing effort than (5), though
allowing the same consequence (6), it refutes the second part of
the quoted claim.
Editorial commentary
As a criterion for relevance, counting (nontrivial, contextual)
implications seems to entail an infinite regress; for what then is
to serve as the criterion for relevant implications? Nor is it clear
how capacity considerations, likewise ungrounded in them-
selves, can halt the regress. Or are we, like St. Exup6ry's star-
counting businessman, just indiscriminate implication-collec-
tors, restrained only by our limited resources?
Authors' Response
Presumptions of relevance
Dan Sperbera and Deirdre Wilsonb
C.N.R.S., 15 Quai Anatole France, 75007 Paris, France3 and Department
of Linguistics, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, Englandb
Whether they approve of or attack Relevance, the accom-
panying commentaries illustrate its theses. They show
that communication takes place at a risk, that mutual
knowledge does not exist, that what is relevant to one
differs from what is relevant to another, and that we are all
more easily convinced of the relevance of what we have to
say than of what we have to hear. As relevance theory
predicts, each of these commentaries communicates a
presumption of its own relevance, and we have found
them all relevant, though not always in the way their
authors intended. We are grateful to all of our commen-
tators and hope that our response will confirm the pre-
sumption of relevance which, however much modesty
and wisdom tell us we should not, relevance theory tells
us we cannot help but communicate. Our discussion will
roughly follow the plan of the book and of its precis.
1. Communication
1.1. Coding and inference. One common worry with the
Gricean account of communication is that it attributes to
the hearer an implausible amount of reasoning about the
speaker's intentions. We share that worry. This is one of
the reasons we have tried to show that a number of issues
(e.g., the extent of mutual knowledge and the intentions
behind violations of maxims), resolved in the Gricean
framework by reasoning, do not arise at all, and that the
remaining issues can, in the case of successful commu-
nication, be resolved by a form of unconscious inference
simpler than conscious reasoning.
Both Millikan and Pettit feel that too much inference
about the speaker's intentions may still be involved in our
framework. They particularly object to the view that an
essential reason for a hearer to believe what the speaker
told him is his recognition that she intended him to
believe it, combined with his confidence in her. These
commentators would rather have successful communica-
tion convey an assumption "immediately" (Pettit) or
produce a direct "belief transfer" (Millikan).
A possible case of "belief transfer" among humans is
the spreading of panic in a crowd, but most human
communication, especially verbal communication, is not
like this at all. Rather, it is achieved by means of ostensive
stimuli, utterances in particular, which require attention
to be understood, and which only partially encode their
interpretations, if they do so at all. How is decoding to be
supplemented? Millikan and Pettit don't discuss this
question, and the only answer we can think of is that it is
supplemented by inference. Inference goes from evi-
dence to conclusions warranted by the evidence. As far as
we can see, an utterance such as "he is coming" provides
no evidence for the conclusion that William is coming
unless it first provides evidence that the speaker intends
it to be so understood. In addition, the reliability of the
speaker must be taken into account.
But then, to say that understanding consists in forming
a hypothesis about the communicator's informative inten-
tion, and that the fixation of beliefs derived from commu-
nication must be sensitive to considerations of the speak-
er's reliability, is not equivalent to saying that there are
steps in the inferential process where the communicator's
intentions and reliability are scrutinized. According to
our account, the first interpretation of an utterance to be
accessed and found relevant enough is taken to be the one
intended by the speaker, unless there are salient reasons
to think otherwise. Thus Pettit is right (in most cases) to
point out that the relevant "features of context invoked in
such inferences do not concern the speaker's intentions";
nevertheless, the conclusion of the inference is about
these intentions.
Similarly, in many ordinary cases of communication,
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the reliability of the speaker is taken for granted unless
there are salient reasons to doubt it. We agree, then, with
Davies when he argues (against McDowell 1980) that
beliefs are sensitive to reasons and suggests that what this
implies is "a condition about the absence of certain
undermining doubts rather than about the presence of
certain justifying beliefs." To put it in other terms (and to
show Levinson that we do not ignore "default inferenc-
ing"), in our model the speaker's success in predicting
what will be optimally relevant to the hearer, as well as
her reliability, is assumed by default. This simplification
of the inferential task involved in comprehension should
help bridge the gap between Millikan's and Pettit's point
of view and ours.
Millikan sees it as implausible that "extremely young
children represent to themselves that the speaker intends
that they should believe that p." There seems to be some
evidence, however, that children might develop such an
ability in the course of their second year (Bretherton et al.
1981; Leslie, 1987). Agreeing with Leslie that "the rela-
tionship between metarepresentational capacity and
communication in infancy remains an interesting but still
open question," we suggest that relevance theory may
help to clarify it by providing a simpler account of the role
of metarepresentation in communication. In particular,
one might assume that the default values mentioned in
the preceding paragraph are fixed values in the first stages
of verbal communication.
Pettit makes a further point about the distinction we
draw between (peripheral) decoding processes and (cen-
tral) inferential processes. Citing Cummins (1983), he
comments that since a process may be interpretable as
inferential even though it does not explicitly represent
inferential steps, decoding would seem to count as "a
clear instance of inference." But Cummins points out
(1983, p. 53, n. 1) that not all computations over senten-
tial representations are interpretable as inferential: "A
device instantiating a transformational grammar trans-
forms sentential inputs into sentential outputs, but the
inputs and outputs are not related via any pattern of
inference." We assume (Relevance, pp. 71-72) that the
mind has a variety of systems of nonconceptual represen-
tation (e.g., phonetic representation) and of noninferen-
tial computation (e.g., syntactic transformation). Because
the input and output of a syntactic transformation are not
related as premise and conclusion in an argument, the
computation is not interpretable as inferential.
It is true, as Pettit points out, that linguistic input
processes can be characterised as inferential in a broader
sense: From the premise that Mary uttered sounds with a
certain phonetic representation, Peter may be able to
infer that she said she was leaving. But this does not affect
the point at issue: The linguistic decoding processes
embedded in this broader inferential process are not
themselves inferential, in the sense that they are not
truth-preserving (or strength-preserving) operations on
conceptual representations, whereas the operations per-
formed by our deductive device are inferential in just this
sense.
1.2. Mutual knowledge. In Relevance we argue that the
existence of mutual knowledge as defined by Schiffer
(1972) is psychologically implausible, and that its exis-
tence has been assumed not on the basis of any kind of
direct evidence, but because it was needed to patch the
code model of communication or to produce a failsafe
inferential model. Once we aim, realistically, at describ-
ing communication in terms of an inferential heuristic
rather than a code or an inferential algorithm, we need no
longer burden ourselves with mutual knowledge; the
weaker and psychologically more plausible notion of a
mutual cognitive environment, or of mutual manifest-
ness, suffices.
Bach & Harnish point out both that their approach
(1979) is inferential and that they are very aware of the fact
that communication is not failsafe. Their reason for adopt-
ing a mutual knowledge framework is merely "to limit the
speaker's intention and the hearer's inference to informa-
tion that each can expect the other to rely on." On this, as
on the analysis of speech acts, these authors are right to
assert that their approach does not fall squarely under the
criticisms we level at current pragmatics in general. This
being so, they should unhesitatingly adopt mutual man-
ifestness: It will do the job they want done as effectively as
any realistic approximation of mutual knowledge, and it is
much more economical.
Gibbs and Russell believe that our criticisms of mutual
knowledge are in part based on our failure to realize that
knowledge need not be consciously or explicitly repre-
sented. Gibbs suggests further that our distinction be-
tween knowledge and manifestness is merely a distinc-
tion between conscious and tacit knowledge, and sus-
pects us of " 'sneaking' mutual knowledge in the back-
door of [our] theory." As we discuss and illustrate our
theory (p. 40) we point out that humans can be said to
believe tacitly, or virtually, what they are capable of
inferring demonstratively from their mentally repre-
sented beliefs. The problem with mutual knowledge is
not just that humans are incapable of having an infinity of
beliefs explicitly represented in their mind. It is also that
the infinitely many beliefs which together make up mutu-
al knowledge are not demonstratively inferable from a
finite set of premises. Hence they cannot even be held as
tacit or virtual beliefs.
What humans are merely capable of inferring non-
demonstratively from their explicitly represented beliefs
is not a set of further "tacit" beliefs but a set of assump-
tions manifest to them. Hence "manifest" is, as we show
at length in Chapter 1, Section 8 of our book, not at all
equivalent to "believed," let alone "known": There is
nothing surreptitious about our use of "mutual manifest-
ness."
Several commentators acknowledge the psychological
implausibility of mutual knowledge but argue that it can
be remedied by redefining the notion. Russell favors
Halpern and Moses's (1985) "definition" of mutual knowl-
edge of proposition p as, in Russell's informal paraphrase:
"Everyone knows P and everyone knows it is mutually
known." With the definiendum repeated in the defi-
niens, however, this purported definition seems to be
blatantly circular and to provide no psychological en-
lightenment whatsoever.
McCawley argues that one should take mutual knowl-
edge to be "knowledge on the part of a group of two or
more persons as a whole and . . . not attempt to reduce
such knowledge to knowledge on the part of each of those
persons individually." Yet it would seem that either you
reduce mutual knowledge so understood to some set of
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mental and environmental states or processes - but
McCawley does not even suggest how this should be done
- or else you commit yourself to ontological pluralism.
Relevance theory, like most cognitive psychology, re-
mains within a materialist, more specifically a token-
physicalist, framework.
Hinkelman misdescribes mutual manifestness; she
claims that it does not prevent regress (we agree that it
does not prevent it, it merely makes it unnecessary) and
she states, without argument but with a reference to a
forthcoming article of Perrault (1987), that "default for-
mulations of mutual belief are more satisfactory." Davies
makes an explicit proposal in this spirit: Mutual knowl-
edge might be replaced by "mutual absence of doubt."
The general idea is that communicators do not need
reasons to believe in the existence of a common code and
of mutual knowledge, which will simply be taken for
granted in the absence of reasons to doubt them.
The arguments against the standard formulation of
mutual knowledge presented in Relevance carry over,
however, to the default formulation: If some arguments
cast doubt on the very possibility of mutual knowledge,
then, for every proposition, there are reasons to doubt
that it is mutually known by any two people. Of course,
not everybody will be sensitive to these reasons, but this
reduces the plausibility of mutual knowledge still further.
If a simpleton never doubts mutuality, if some philosoph-
ically sophisticated people always doubt it, and if most
people doubt it to varying extents, then no two people are
ever likely to match in their absence of doubt (which
makes systematic doubters right). Default formulations of
mutual knowledge may be attractive qua formulations,
but they come nowhere near explaining how true mutu-
ality might actually be achieved.
We would like to ask Davies in what sense an absence
of doubt may be mutual, as opposed to simply reciprocal:
Communicating bees can be credited with a reciprocal
absence of doubt (since they have no doubts of any kind),
but clearly Davies wants to credit communicating hu-
mans with something stronger. We are not quite sure
what, and why.
Following Lewis (1969) and Clark and Marshall (1981),
Gerrig sees the solution to the psychological problems
raised by the notion of mutual knowledge in the following
induction schema. A and B mutually know that p if and
only if some state of afairs G holds such that:
(i) A and B have reason to believe that G holds.
(ii) G indicates to A and B that each has reason to believe that
G holds.
(iii) G indicates to A and B that p.
Clark and Marshall (1981) give psychologically realistic
examples of how this schema might work, and McCawley
lists "unproblematic sources of mutual knowledge" in the
same vein. Isn't mutual knowledge so understood psy-
chologically plausible after all?
The examples given by Clark and Marshall (1981) and
by McCawley which satisfy the above induction schema
are indeed realistic, but they are not examples of mutual
knowledge, nor even of mutual belief. Peter and Mary are
at home watching television. Does Mary believe that
there is no general strike at the electric company? There
is no way of telling. Yet Mary (like Peter) has reason to
believe that there is a state of affairs G, namely the fact
that she and Peter are watching an electrically powered
television set functioning normally, which indicates that
p: namely, that there is no general strike at the electric
company. Furthermore, G indicates to Peter and Mary
that each has reason to believe that G holds. So, by the
above schema, we should infer that p is a mutual belief
held by Peter and Mary, when there is not even enough
evidence to assume that either of them believes that p!
The missing piece of evidence is this: Did Mary ask
herself whether there was a general strike at the electric
company? If she did, then she probably now believes that
p. Otherwise she does not believe either that p or that
not-p.
As we argued (p. 45 and p. 258, n. 29), what is taken by
Lewis (1969), Clark and Marshall (1981), and Gerrig as a
necessary and sufficient condition for mutual knowledge
is merely a mutual cognitive environment. A mutual
cognitive environment gives each of those who share it
evidence of the other's beliefs, including, to some extent,
beliefs about the other's beliefs, provided they also have
evidence of where the other's attention has been and is
going. (One way of knowing that is to deliberately manip-
ulate the other's attention by means of ostensive be-
haviour.) However, a mutual cognitive environment does
not provide sufficient evidence for mutual knowledge or
belief; nor, as far as we can see, does anything else.
What Gerrig, Gibbs, McCawley and others give as
examples of mutual knowledge are good examples of
mutual manifestness. McCawley even uses one of our
own examples and writes that since the information
alluded to is manifest, it "will count as mutual knowl-
edge!" So we are all referring to the same kinds of
situation. But the difference is not merely one of termi-
nology, it is primarily a difference of analysis, and it leads
to different explanations of communication.
Gerrig, Gibbs, and McCawley maintain not only that
mutual knowledge is possible, but also that it is neces-
sary. What they do, basically, is to evoke in lesser
(McCawley), or greater (Gerrig, Gibbs), detail the stan-
dard mutual knowledge analyses of reference assignment
and presupposition (McCawley), implicature and irony
(Gibbs), and accidental irrelevance (Gerrig) as if this were
enough to establish that no alternative analysis is possi-
ble. Note that our objection to analyses which presuppose
mutual knowledge is not that they do not work: It is that
their presupposition is false. If, as we claim, mutual
manifestness permits enough coordination for successful
communication to take place, so, a fortiori, would mutual
knowledge, if it existed. Gibbs and McCawley do not
discuss our approach to reference assignment, presup-
position, implicature and irony (chap. 4, sec. 3, 4, 5, 9).
We read their remarks as a respectable expression of
theoretical conservatism, but not as arguments that we
must answer. Gerrig also ignores our analysis of acciden-
tal irrelevance (pp. 159-60); but at least he tries to show
that relevance theory without mutual knowledge would
get the wrong results. In fact, as we will show below (sect.
3.3), what he gets wrong is relevance theory.
If mutual knowledge does not exist, how does the
communicator anticipate, as she should, the thought
processes of the audience - a question raised in different
terms by Morgan & Green, Bach & Harnish, and Milli-
kan? The answer lies in the fact that it is not only in
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communicating but in every form of interaction that
humans have to anticipate each other's thoughts. We
claim that the case of the communicator does not differ
essentially from others. We have no novel and elaborate
account of how people can know each other's thoughts in
advance of communication. We believe, however, that
relevance theory can help to develop such an account. If
human thought processes have not only a variety of
changing purposes but also a single constant aim - that of
maximizing relevance - then they are easier to predict.
Moreover, since accessibility affects relevance and is
itself affected by immediately preceding thoughts, pre-
dictions are much easier to make (and to study) in a
situation of ongoing communication, where the commu-
nicator knows what the audience has just been attending
to. Note further that, according to our account, the
communicator's anticipations of the audience's thought
processes need not be accurate. Communication will still
succeed if the audience is capable of recognizing the
communicator's mistaken anticipations.
1.3. Gricean themes. In Chapter 1, we discuss Grice's
views (see references in Relevance) on meaning and
communication and try to show that they contain funda-
mental insights but also serious shortcomings. In Chap-
ters 3 and 4, we compare Grice's views and our own.
Some commentators (Bach & Harnish, Clark) feel that
we depart too much from Grice's approach; others feel
that we have departed from it much less than we claim
(see sect. 3.4 below).
Grice argues that what we call an informative intention
must be "overt" and we agree, but we find the various
analyses of that notion in the Gricean literature un-
satisfactory. Bach & Harnish rightly point out that we do
not discuss the rather vague suggestion of Grice (1969)
that overtness might be characterized by the absence of
covert intentions, a suggestion criticized by Schiffer
(1972). They also maintain that, contrary to what we say, a
reflexive intention (a communicative intention I which
includes the subintention that the audience recognize /)
need not be expanded into an infinitely long formula. Our
claim (pp. 256-57), however, is not that the expansion is
formally necessary, merely that without it the content of
the intention is beyond the individual's grasp; since with
expansion the content of the intention is even more
obviously beyond the individual's grasp, we conclude
that this is not the right way to analyse overtness. The
right way, we suggest, is to say that an informative
intention is overt if and only if it is mutually manifest.
Another problem with Gricean accounts is that they
explain the intuitively correct interpretation of an utter-
ance by showing that it satisfies certain criteria which, for
all we know, very different, intuitively incorrect in-
terpretations might also satisfy. Bach & Harnish say that
we "do not show that Gricean accounts allow this pos-
sibility when communication succeeds." But surely the
burden of proof is on the Griceans. In our theory, we
show that an utterance cannot have more than one in-
terpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. If
we did not, would not Bach & Harnish object that our
theory might fail to exclude intuitively incorrect interpre-
tations?
Clark criticizes us for not "embracing Grice's and
Austin's full insight" that "communication must be
Response/Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
viewed as part of a theory of action." Our characterization
of relevance, he complains, "is always divorced from what
the participants in a discourse are really doing." Our
position is "like claiming that the only purpose I need in
stepping on the car's accelerator is to put more gasoline
into the carburetor."
Still, Clark notes that Grice himself did not do much to
develop his "insight"; and work on speech acts in the
Austinian tradition, however rich, could hardly be de-
scribed as particularly "insightful" (chap. 4, sec. 10).
Moreover, it is far from clear that the very idea of a
"theory of action" has much to commend it: Is action, or
human action, a natural kind to be studied as an isolated
whole? (For similar doubts about a theory of communica-
tion in general, see pp. 2-3).
Generally, of course, communication is not an end in
itself but a means to an end. So is driving a car. But what
makes communication and car driving so useful is that,
with essentially the same procedures, an indefinite vari-
ety of possible ends can be pursued. A technological
study of car driving might end by relating different
driving styles to different driving purposes - taking the
family on a picnic or car racing - but it certainly should
not start there. Similarly, our aim is to describe the
mechanism of ostensive-inferential communication in
general terms, and therefore to develop a notion of
relevance common to all cognitive and communicative
endeavours. Contrary to what Clark suggests, there is
nothing intrinsically paradoxical about such an aim, nor is
the alternative approach he favours obviously superior.
1.4. Ostensive communication. We were surprised that,
whereas our proposal to replace mutual knowledge by
mutual manifestness was hotly debated by six commen-
tators, only Bach & Harnish had remarks to make about
what we feel is a more important proposal, to replace the
Grice/Strawson definition of meaning and communica-
tion by our characterization of ostensive-inferential
communication.
We are grateful to Bach & Harnish for noticing an
inconsistency in our formulation: In introducing our defi-
nition of a communicative intention (pp. 60-61) we inci-
dentally suggest that ostensive communication has to be
intentional, when in fact we believe, and state explicitly
after defining ostensive communication (pp. 63-64) that
it need not be - although unintentional ostensive com-
munication is a very rare occurrence. We answer another
question put by Bach & Harnish, "How does one identify
a stimulus as an instance of ostensive communication?" at
length in Chapter 3, Section 6.
Bach & Harnish's third point about ostensive commu-
nication is of substantive interest: They note that our
definition of ostensive communication "does not require
uptake, since it specifies only that the speaker's infor-
mative intention1 . . . be made mutually manifest, not
that the hearer actually recognize this intention. For
S&W an assumption is manifest to someone merely
because he is capable of representing it and of accepting
its representation as true (p. 39); but then the thought of it
might never occur to him and might never play a role in
his thinking." Bach & Harnish seem to present this
consequence of our definition of communication as an
objection; we believe on the contrary that it is one of the
ways in which our definition improves on previous ones.
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We will illustrate this with two examples, the first
intended merely to show that the association between
uptake and communicative success is not self-evident,
the second to show that there is a positive analytical
benefit in dissociating the two.
Consider a botanical garden where every plant on
exhibition has a label indicating its name. Each label is an
ostensive stimulus, or an utterance in Grice's sense, and
its display constitutes an act of communication. Now if
communication implies uptake, then those labels which
happen not to have been read by any visitors must be
regarded as cases of communicative failure. If manifest-
ness, rather than uptake, is the condition for communica-
tive success, then only those labels which are invisible or
illegible count as communication failures; all the labels
which modify the cognitive environment of the visitors by
making them capable of recognizing that the curators of
the garden intended to inform them that this or that plant
is called so-and-so are cases of communicative success.
This example should show at least that it is not intuitively
obvious in every case that communicative success implies
uptake.
Now take a more ordinary example of verbal commu-
nication, one we used both in our book (pp. 193-99) and
in our accompanying BBS precis:
(1) (a) Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes?
(b) Mary: I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car.
We argue that (lb) has not only the strong implicature (2)
but also a range of weaker implicatures such as (3):
(2) Mary wouldn't drive a Mercedes.
(3) Mary wouldn't drive a Jaguar.
Weak implicatures such as (3) need not achieve uptake in
order to be communicated: On hearing Mary's reply,
Peter might not think of (3) at all. Even so, Peter might,
on a later occasion, wonder whether Mary would drive a
Jaguar and then realize that she has already communi-
cated to him that she would not.
A definition of communication according to which the
addressee must mentally represent every assumption
communicated to him is incompatible with the notion of
weak implicature illustrated by (3), as well as with the
explanation of poetic and other hazy effects of commu-
nication that we build around this notion. We see this as a
strong reason for not making uptake a necessary condition
for communicative success. This is not to deny, however,
that uptake plays an essential role in ordinary communi-
cation.
Take the strong implicature (2) in the above example: If
it becomes manifest at all to Peter, he is sure to entertain
it since it provides him with the very information he asked
for. (Moreover, none of the implicatures of (lb) will
become manifest to Peter if he does not first entertain the
explicit content of the utterance.) In general, for a set / of
assumptions to be communicated, some members of the
set have to be actually entertained; and in general there
are few acts of communication without uptake. However,
this is so for practical rather than for definitional reasons;
moreover, it does not imply that every assumption com-
municated in an act of communication need achieve, or is
even likely to achieve, individual uptake.
2. Inference
A crucial element in our account of communication and
cognition is the operation of a deductive device which can
automatically compute the full set of contextual implica-
tions of a given assumption in a given context. Here are
some objections and questions.
Russell objects that this method of operation is "ab-
surdly impractical" and that some control method must
be used to ensure that only "useful" inference paths are
explored. This misses one of the major points of the book.
A definition of relevance which itself presupposed a
notion of cognitive "usefulness" would be profoundly
unhelpful. On the other hand, given an adequate concept
of relevance, a notion of cognitive "usefulness" can be
defined. For example, a "useful" path in inference is one
that yields enough contextual effects to be worth the
effort.
In our framework, inference is "controlled" by two
main methods, only one of them internal to the deductive
device. In the first place, the distinction between trivial
and nontrivial implications imposes a substantial internal
constraint on the class of implications the device is capa-
ble of computing, but one that is definable independently
of such notions as cognitive usefulness.2 In the second
place, the class of inferences drawn is determined by the
set of assumptions submitted to the deductive device.
The choice of assumptions is determined by such factors
as context selection, perceptual salience, and focus of
attention. Inferences tend to follow "useful" paths be-
cause, we argue, all these factors are geared to the
maximization of relevance.
Russell, pointing out that in our framework all in-
ference rules are explicitly represented, objects that such
a scheme cannot succeed, because "whatever combines
the inference rules with their premises must also be an
inference rule, but procedurally represented." But in-
ference rules are not part of the data base in our frame-
work, and they are not in prepositional form. We see the
distinction between representation and computation as
fundamental, and, as is implicit in the (transformational)
formalism and we explicitly state (pp. 84, 89), our in-
ference rules fall on the computational rather than the
representational side. So, strictly speaking, our inference
rules don't "combine" with premises, they operate on
them; they are procedures in an ordinary sense. How the
rules operate on the premises is not determined by
further rules (and in what sense would they be inference
rules anyhow?) or representations of any kind, but by the
way the deductive device is constructed, as we suggest
(pp. 94-95).
Russell objects that a deductive device with access only
to elimination rules would be unable to use "com-
mutativity laws and axioms defining inductive domains."
But because axioms in our framework are treated as
information in encyclopedic entries rather than as in-
ference rules, the deductive device has access to them as
premises. However, Russell has drawn attention to a
genuine, though easily solvable, problem as far as com-
mutative rules are concerned.
There is indeed no a priori reason why the deductive
device should not have access to such rules, or, more
generally, to analytic rules which reorganise the concep-
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tual structure of assumptions without eliminating any of
their logical content. In Sperber & Wilson 1982 (pp. 102,
109), we cite empirical evidence for two such rules, one
converting assumptions of the form (P v Q) —> R to
conclusions of the form (P —> Q) & (P —> R), the other
converting assumptions of the form (P & Q) —» R to
conclusions of the form P—» (Q —* R). These are allowed
for in our definition of elimination rule (p. 86, Relevance).
But we might also want a rule converting an assumption
such as: X is the cousin ofY into a conclusion such as: Y is
the cousin ofX. Such a rule would fall into a gap between
our definitions of elimination rule and introduction rule
(p. 96). We might then either redefine an elimination rule
as anything that is not an introduction rule, or allow the
deductive device to use rearrangement rules.
Seuren sees it as an awkward consequence of our
system that it rules out the inference from (4) to (5):
(4) Henry and Jack came in.
(5) Two people came in.
Such examples are dealt with in Sperber & Wilson (1982,
p. 102). The move from (4) to (5) involves the ability to
count (more generally, the ability to perform mathe-
matical calculations). We see no reason to attribute such
abilities to the deductive device. Nor do we need to.
Anyone who can count may, on the appropriate occasion,
construct the additional premise "If Henry and Jack came
in, then two people came in," which will combine with (4)
to yield (5) as a contextual implication.
Macnamara has a more general objection to the ban on
introduction rules. "How," he asks, "could there be
anything for elimination rules to work on, if there were no
introduction rules?" The answer is that elimination rules
work on any set of assumptions submitted to the deduc-
tive device. As pointed out in Relevance (pp. 81-83),
unconscious deduction is not the only source of factual
assumptions: Perception, linguistic decoding, assump-
tions and assumption schemas stored in memory, and
conscious reasoning are further sources not affected by
the ban on introduction rules.
The deductive device operates on conceptual repre-
sentations in virtue of their logical structure and the
concepts they contain. We define a concept as an address
in memory which gives access to three types of entries -
logical, encyclopedic, and lexical. Unlike semanticists
who see the semantic properties of a word as specified in
its lexical entry, we see them as provided by the logical
entry filed at the same address. As the context should
make clear, this is what we mean when we say (p. 90) that
"the 'meaning' of a word is provided by the associated
concept." Macnamara, understanding "provided by" in
the sense of "consists of," takes a concept to be all the
information filed under a concept and goes on to establish
that "things are getting seriously muddled."
Things are indeed muddled. The semantic theory Mac-
namara attributes to us is strange: The syntactic and
phonological properties of a word are considered part of
its meaning, "giraffes live in Africa" comes out as analytic,
and so on. This directly contradicts the views we outline
in the section from which this one misunderstood sen-
tence is taken: In particular, we stress the parallel be-
tween the classical analytic/synthetic distinction and our
logical/encyclopedic distinction (p. 88). We even discuss
the logical entry for "giraffe" and suggest that it contains
not more, but much less, than a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for something to fall under the
concept.
Macnamara comments that we proceed as though we
had "no obligation to account for the existence of logic of
the type one finds in the textbooks of formal logic." It is
true that we do not feel obliged to account for the
existence of formal logic: This is not our topic. But we
believe that our approach does throw some light on the
issue. In Relevance, we concentrate on spontaneous in-
ference. As we indicate (p. 75), "Spontaneous inference
plays a role even in scholarly interpretation, whereas
scholarly thinking is a rather exceptional human endeav-
our, even for scholars. The study of spontaneous in-
ference is thus a necessary prerequisite to a proper
investigation of all forms of human inference." More
specifically, we show (p. 102), how the deductive device,
because it monitors contradictions, and in spite of its
incomplete generative capacity, yields intuitions of log-
ical validity or invalidity for inferences it cannot by itself
perform. These might well be the "basic intuitions upon
which formal logic rests" and for which, argues Mac-
namara, "an account of everyday reasoning must at least
give the psychological grounding."
Hinkelman argues that a deductive device with access
only to elimination rules can still generate infinite sets of
conclusions from a finite set of premises, contrary to what
we claim. Citing the example "She is a citizen if her
mother is a citizen," she comments that "Any logic with
modus ponens and function terms can regress infinitely."
The deductive device is not "a logic," however; it is a
computational mechanism limited in its operations not
only by the rules it applies, but also by the way it applies
them. Hinkelman's example is an ill-chosen one in any
case, because it does not even logically warrant any
regress. To make her objection stand, she should have
chosen a more appropriate formulation, say: "Any woman
is a citizen if her mother is a citizen"; and she might have
added to it a finite number of premises of her choice.
Then, if she found elimination rules independently justi-
fied in our framework which started the deductive device
on an infinite regress, she would have had a genuine
objection.
In an earlier review of selected fragments from the first
half of Relevance, Seuren accused us of failing to define
contextual effects (Seuren 1988). Having had the defini-
tion drawn to his attention, he has now read and misun-
derstood it. Contextual effects are contextual implica-
tions, strengthenings, and contradictions; we provide a
two-clause definition (p. 260, n. 26), the first clause
characterizing strengthenings and contradictions, the
second contextual implications. Seuren, conceding that
the second clause defines contextual implications, main-
tains that the first clause does not define anything, and
that the notion of contextual effect is therefore undefined.
The claim made by the first clause of our definition is as
follows: Let two assumptions with the same content but
different strengths count as two different assumptions.
The contextualisation of P in C has no contextual effect if
and only if: {Conclusions of C} is a subset of {Conclusions
of P U C}. Seuren believes that this fails to define
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anything, because "whatever follows from a set of propo-
sitions C also follows from C enriched with any set of
propositions." Not in our framework. Suppose that P
contains the single assumption p and that not-p is a
conclusion of C. When {P U C} is placed in the memory of
the deductive device, the result will be a contradiction.
Suppose, further, that p is stronger than not-p, which is,
accordingly, automatically erased. Then {Conclusions of
C} - which contains not-p — will not be a subset of
{Conclusions of P U C}, which does not; and the con-
textualisation of P in C will be correctly characterized as
having some contextual effect. Similar arguments apply
to contextual effects achieved by strengthening, as read-
ers may check for themselves.
3. Relevance
The notion of relevance put forward in Relevance is novel
in two ways: It concerns relevance in a context or to an
individual rather than to, say, a topic; and it takes into
account not only the cognitive effects of the relevant
information but also the effort required to achieve these
effects.
3.1. Defining relevance. Some commentators (Clark,
Levinson, McCawley, Morgan & Green) think our defi-
nition of relevance fails to do justice to pretheoretical
intuitions. Utterances are relevant, they feel, to pur-
poses, goals, topics, questions, interests, or matters in
hand.
We define relevance in a context and to an individual.
We say what a context is, how it is constructed and how,
once constructed, it affects cognition and comprehen-
sion. One reason we did not set out to define relevance to
a purpose, goal, and so on, is that we had no idea how to
answer the analogous questions for any of these terms:
We could not define them; we could not say how they
were selected or constructed; and we could not say how,
once selected, they affected comprehension.
Given a definition of relevance in a context, and a
method of context construction, however, there is no
reason that assumptions about the goals and purposes of
the individual, or of the participants in a conversation,
should not form part of the context and give rise to
contextual effects in the usual way. Such assumptions are
likely to be particularly rich in contextual effects, since
purposes and goals imply plans for action. We see no
incompatibility between our work and a belief in the
importance of goals, purposes, and plans; on the contrary,
relevance theory sheds light on how these important
notions may play the roles they play.
McCawley is unhappy about our claim (pp. 216-17)
that topic-relevance, if definable at all, is a derivative
notion (like cognitive usefulness, discussed above, sect.
2, para. 2). Here is an illustration of what we mean.
Bransford and McCarrell (1977, p. 391) report the results
of an experiment designed to show the importance of
topic in comprehension. Subjects read a passage which
was incoherent at first sight; told that the topic was
washing clothes, they readily understood it. From the
standpoint of relevance theory, what has gone on is
simply that the mention of washing clothes has provided
access to a chunk of encyclopedic information about
washing clothes, in the context of which the passage
becomes relevant, hence intelligible. Results which seem
to provide decisive evidence about the role of topics
provide equally decisive evidence about the importance
of contexts. Furthermore, it is easy to think of passages
which would remain incomprehensible even given a
topic, for lack of encylopedic information. Conversely, it
would be interesting to see whether (as we predict)
comprehension would be achieved if the encyclopedic
background were made highly accessible but nothing
amounting to a topic was suggested. We see topics as
derivative in the sense that their role (if any) is merely to
provide access to contexts, which play a decisive role in
every act of comprehension.
Is relevance a "unitary" concept - that is, is it a useful
theoretical concept - or does it merely impose an arbi-
trary link between effect and effort, as McCawley and
Russell suggest? Today Peter has two goals: One is to rest,
the other is to get a good suntan. He could rest inside or
he could get a suntan jogging on the beach; so there would
be little theoretical justification for linking the two goals
under a single concept. Today Mary has two goals: One is
to impress Aunt Zelda by inviting her to a good restau-
rant, the other is to spend as little as possible. Her two
goals are linked and can usefully be described as one:
getting the best value for money within a certain range.
Generally speaking, when a cost is incurred for a benefit,
or an effort for an effect, there is nothing arbitrary in
linking them under a unitary concept of efficiency. Rele-
vance, as we describe it, is of course a type of efficiency
(see pp. 46-50).
3.2. Assessing relevance. Bach & Harnish, Clark, Levin-
son, Morgan & Green, and Russell ask: How is process-
ing effort measured, and how is it balanced against con-
textual effects? In Relevance (pp. 78-81) we distinguish
comparative from quantitative concepts and argue (pp.
129-32) that although it would be possible, and of some
interest to computer scientists and AI specialists, to
define a quantitative concept of relevance, the concept of
interest to psychologists is comparative rather than quan-
titative: Relevance, as it affects cognition, is not com-
puted or numerically measured but monitored or as-
sessed, yielding only gross absolute judgments and, in
certain types of cases only, finer relative judgments.
Suppose that the brain is sensitive to the amount of
reorganization brought about by the processing of some
information and to the expenditure of energy thus in-
curred, just as it is sensitive to changes of posture and
expenditure of energy in the case of bodily movement.
This is very vague - hopelessly so, some AI people may
think - but it is not so vague that it could not be false, and
it is what we are claiming anyhow.
Some independently assessable factors affect relevance
in regular ways. For example, lack of contextual effects
entails lack of relevance. The stronger the assumptions,
the greater the contextual effects. The more frequent
and/or recent the use, the smaller the processing effort.
Processing more information in the same context, or the
same information in a larger or less accessible context,
involves greater effort. Greater effects, for the same or
less effort, entail greater relevance; less effort, for the
same or greater effects, entails greater relevance. If we
are right, these factors affect the working of the cognitive
system both at a given moment and over time: They affect
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the individual deciding how best to allocate his process-
ing resources, the speaker deciding what to say and how
to say it, the growth of heuristics governing context-
selection and focusing of attention, the organisation of
memory, and the evolution of peripheral and other auto-
matic systems and processes.
Russell makes four comments on the role of effort in
our theory: first, that our notion of effort is far too flexibly
defined to be a theoretically adequate tool for a real
pragmatic system; second, that the methods we propose
for assessing effort are ad hoc and introduced only in
order to rationalise a desired interpretation; third, that it
seems unlikely such minuscule amounts of effort would
play a significant role, except in highly time-pressured
situations; and fourth, that to place all the burden on an
effort principle, implemented in an ordering on context
accessibility, "abdicates the responsibility for a theory,
passing it on to those studying memory organisation, who
are already overloaded with ordering constraints passed
on by other theories such as the possible-worlds theory of
counterfactuals."
These comments are inconsistent. It does not seem
wise, within the space of a single paragraph, to describe
people both as handing over all the work to others and as
doing it themselves (however badly). Moreover, to say
that our proposals "rationalise a desired interpretation" is
just another way of saying they work; the job of judging
whether they are "ad hoc" should surely be left to the
psychologists. And the effort principle (which is not,
incidentally, restricted to context selection, even in the
examples Russell cites) is consistent with all the experi-
mental results we know of.
The results reported by Cutler, for example, provide
excellent confirmation of our claims. A speaker aiming at
optimal relevance must intend, on the one hand, to
achieve adequate contextual effects, and on the other
hand to put the hearer to no unjustifiable effort in obtain-
ing them. As Cutler comments, distortion of word onsets
disrupts word recognition far more than distortion of later
segments, and speakers make phonological choices in
such a way as to minimise disruption to the listener — or,
in our terms, to achieve the intended effects as eco-
nomically as possible. Compare our remarks (p. 213) that
"greater disruption [of the intonation contour] implies
greater processing effort and, other things being equal,
lowered acceptability" and that "stress placement, like
other stylistic features, should be looked at in terms of
processing effort." We give ample evidence (chap. 4,
sect. 5 and 6) that variations - even minute variations - in
linguistic form can have a profound effect on pragmatic
interpretation. We argue that relevance theory can shed
new light on many aspects of style.
THE EDITORIAL COMMENTARY makes the following
objection: "As a criterion for relevance, counting (non-
trivial, contextual) implications seems to entail an infinite
regress; for what then is to serve as the criterion for
relevant implications?"
Our reply is, first, that relevance in humans is assessed
not by counting implications but by monitoring con-
textual effects (contextual implications being just one
type) and processing effort. Second, the relevance of an
assumption is a function of the context in which it is
processed. Suppose p is processed in context C, and q is a
contextual implication of p in C. Then the relevance of q
Response/Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
in C is the relevance q would have had if it had been
processed on its own in C. A more useful notion, the one
the EDITORIAL COMMENTARY may have intended, is that
of the contribution of q to the relevance of p in C.
According to our definitions, each contextual implication
of p in C contributes to its relevance, but there is a sense
in which they do not contribute to it equally, not because
of qualitative differences in their content, such as "in-
terestingness' or "topicality" (which would make our
definition of relevance useless), but because of the formal
properties of the system we describe.
An assumption p has only a finite number of contextual
implications in a finite context. Some of these contextual
implications (most of them, in most cases) are derived
from others: The nontrivial implications of a contextual
implication of p are themselves contextual implications of
p (unless they are deducible from p alone or C alone). So
the contextual implications of p differ in the number of
further contextual implications of p they themselves im-
ply and for the deduction of which they must first have
been deduced. More generally, contextual implications
of p differ in the size of the fraction of contextual effects of
p they determine. (Incidentally, this difference in the
contribution of various contextual implications to rele-
vance plays an obvious role in the identification of
implicatures.)
The deductive device, lacking insight, computes all the
implications of any set of premises submitted to it, with-
out considering the further effects these implications
might determine (subject to the optional constraints men-
tioned in chap. 2, n. 23).3 It then stops when all the
implications have been computed (and not, contrary to
what the EDITORIAL COMMENTARY takes us to believe,
because of capacity considerations). The effects achieved
and the effort expended (including the effort needed to
describe the stimulus and access the context) determine
relevance. There is no regress. The deductive device is
indeed, in the Editor's phrase, an "indiscriminate im-
plication-collector," but we human beings are not: We
choose the premises the implications of which the deduc-
tive device computes.
3.3. Understanding the principle of relevance. The back-
bone of Relevance is the idea that the goals of human
cognition and communication are related but distinct.
The link between communication and cognition is rele-
vance. Cognitive processes are aimed at maximal rele-
vance. In ostensive-inferential communication the rele-
vance aimed at, or at least presumed to be aimed at, is not
maximal but optimal relevance.
The argument goes as follows. First, there is a principle
of relevance: that every ostensive stimulus communicates
a presumption of its own optimal relevance. Second, an
ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an addressee if
and only if it has enough contextual effects to be worth his
attention and puts him to no unjustified processing effort
in accessing them. Third, a hypothesis about the commu-
nicator's informative intention is consistent with the prin-
ciple of relevance if and only if a rational communicator
might have expected the ostensive stimulus, on that
interpretation, to be optimally relevant to the addressee.
Finally, the first hypothesis tested and found consistent
with the principle of relevance is the only hypothesis
consistent with the principle of relevance, and it is the
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one the hearer will choose. The fact that every ostensive
stimulus has at most one interpretation consistent with
the principle of relevance makes the goal of communica-
tion, at least on some occasions, achievable.
It took us some time to disentangle these notions, and
some commentators are, not surprisingly, confused.
The greatest confusion consists in taking us to be
advocating a criterion of maximal relevance according to
which the right interpretation of an ostensive stimulus is
the most relevant one. Wilks, who succumbs to this
confusion, chooses to discuss the real-life example of a
callous (rather than "mad") passerby which we use (pp.
121-22) merely to illustrate the point that relevance and
contextual effects are linked. Wilks invents an extrava-
gant interpretation of the passerby's utterance — an in-
terpretation which is therefore both highly relevant if
true and totally implausible - to show that the most
relevant interpretation need not be the right one (very
true - we ourselves stress the point, pp. 158-60), as if this
somehow confuted relevance theory. Generally speak-
ing, we agree with Wilks that the views he attributes to us
are badly mistaken; however he is mistaken in attributing
them to us.4
One of Hinkelman s criticisms seems to imply that she
too attributes to us a criterion of maximal relevance. She
objects that, since comparisons of relevance are possible
only in some cases, it may be impossible to compare the
relevance of different interpretations of an utterance and
choose the most relevant one. Concerning the criterion of
consistency with the principle of relevance, the question
to ask of a candidate interpretation is not "Is this the most
relevant interpretation?' but "Could a rational speaker
have thought that this utterance, on this interpretation,
would have enough contextual effects to be worth my
attention, and would also put me to no unjustifiable effort
in achieving them?" As we point out (pp. 165-71), com-
parisons of relevance are required on the first approach,
but not on the second. The first interpretation tested and
found consistent with the principle of relevance is the
only interpretation consistent with the principle of rele-
vance. Moreover, contrary to what Hinkelman takes us to
believe, we do not at all assume that the more easily
computed interpretations are the more relevant ones (p.
168).
Like Wilks and Hinkelman, Seuren takes us to claim
that the hearer should compare all possible interpreta-
tions of an utterance before selecting one. Unlike them,
he claims to have textual support for this mistaken belief,
citing a passage (p. 165) in which we discuss a case in
which all possible hypotheses are compared before the
best is chosen. We go on to point out (p. 166) that this
method of hypothesis selection, though appropriate in
some cognitive domains, is not appropriate for use in
comprehension. In other words, the very passage in
which we reject the view that the correct interpretation of
an utterance is the most relevant one is cited by Seuren as
textual support for attributing this view to us.
Another confusion consists in taking us to be advocat-
ing a criterion of consistency with the presumption
(rather than the principle) of optimal relevance. Gerrig
succumbs to this confusion when he objects that, on our
account, accidental irrelevance would lead to misin-
terpretation. We ourselves consider a case in which Mary
expresses proposition p intending to inform Peter of p,
without realizing that he already knows it (pp. 159-60).
Though p is irrelevant to Peter, and therefore inconsis-
tent with the presumption of relevance, Mary's utterance
is consistent with the principle of relevance: What this
requires is that Mary might have thought it would be
optimally relevant to Peter. Given their common cog-
nitive environment, Peter has no difficulty whatsoever in
attributing this thought to Mary and therefore recogniz-
ing the intended interpretation, and, mutatis mutandis,
this holds for Gerrig's example too.
Several commentators are confused about what is pre-
sumed to be relevant in the presumption of relevance.
Thus Levinson asks whether the principle of relevance
applies to surface structures, semantic representations,
explicated logical forms, or what? The answer is that it
applies to none of these, but to an ostensive stimulus, in
particular to an utterance as a whole. The relevance of a
stimulus is defined in Chapter 3, Section 6; the special
case of utterances is discussed in Chapter 4, Section 2.
McCawley and Clark present objections based on the
assumption that, for us, what is presumed relevant in the
case of an utterance is the proposition it expresses.
McCawley writes that " 'Nice day, isn't it?' comes out as
'irrelevant' in S&W's scheme." Clark (whose more specif-
ic concern with literary discourse we will discuss later)
writes: "Many types of discourse have more than one
distinct layer of action or communication (Bruce 1981;
Clark 1987; Goffman 1974 [he could also have mentioned
Sperber 1975]). S&W, however, presuppose that all
communication is flat," meaning that we take into account
only the relevance of the proposition expressed.
There are cases (such as the one we discuss pp. 159-60,
to which McCawley refers) where, if an utterance is
relevant at all, it is through the relevance of the proposi-
tion it expresses; but we do discuss other possibilities:
(i) The speaker expresses proposition p, which the
hearer manifestly knows already (pp. 247-49). The speak-
er's utterance may nonetheless be optimally relevant to
the hearer. An utterance, like any other phenomenon,
makes manifest a variety of assumptions, any of which
may contribute to its relevance. By expressing p, the
speaker might make manifest to the hearer that she is
aware of p, is prepared to admit it, is happy or sad about
it, and so on.
(ii) Mary expresses proposition p, which is manifestly
incompatible with Peter's firmly held beliefs. Mary's
utterance may nonetheless be optimally relevant to Pe-
ter. It may make manifest to him that she believes p, or is
prepared to maintain p despite him (p. 181).
(iii) Mary expresses proposition p, which is manifestly
irrelevant to Peter. The fact that someone chooses to
express an irrelevant proposition may itself be highly
relevant: For example, it may make manifest a desire to
change the subject or it may be used to illustrate an
abstract point (p. 121). In the case of phatic communica-
tion, such as McCawley's "Nice day, isn't it?," Mary may
express an irrelevant, or weakly relevant, proposition, in
order to make manifest a variety of assumptions concern-
ing her attitude to Peter, her willingness to engage in
conversation, and so on.
There is a further confusion between, on the one hand,
the notion of optimal relevance (defined and discussed,
pp. 158-71), which plays a fundamental role in our theory
of ostensive communication, and, on the other hand, the
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notion of optimal processing (defined, p. 144), which
plays a minor role in defining relevance to an individual
(pp. 145 and 152-53). A phenomenon makes manifest a
variety of assumptions, each of which could be processed
in a variety of contexts. A phenomenon is optimally
processed when the best possible combination of assump-
tion and context is chosen: that is, the combination that
contributes most to overall relevance.
Optimal processing is presupposed in our definition of
optimal relevance, since the relevance in question is that
of a phenomenon (the ostensive stimulus) to an indi-
vidual. However, the two are not at all equivalent, if only
because a phenomenon can be optimally processed but
irrelevant (here optimal processing merely involves fil-
tering out the information), whereas optimal relevance
implies enough relevance to be worth the individual's
attention. We believe that Levinson, who talks of op-
timising relevance but describes the principle of rele-
vance as a function of contextual effects balanced by
processing cost, and C. Smith, who talks of the principle
of relevance as seeking an optimal balance between effort
and effect, have conflated optimal relevance with optimal
processing.
Bach & Harnish ask: "How do speakers and hearers
follow the principle of relevance?" They don't. As we
insist (p. 162), the principle of relevance is a generaliza-
tion, not a rule or a maxim. "Communicators and au-
dience need no more know the principle of relevance to
communicate than they need to know the principles of
genetics in order to reproduce. Communicators do not
'follow' the principle of relevance; and they could not
violate it even if they wanted to. The principle of rele-
vance applies without exception: every act of ostensive
communication communicates a presumption of rele-
vance. "
Quoting the very passage which answers Bach & Har-
nish's question, Morgan & Green want to qualify it by
pointing out that "speaker and interpreter have to 'know'
the Presumption of Optimal Relevance in order for their
[S&W's] claims about how communication is accom-
plished (pp. 165-68) to be correct." Let us qualify Mor-
gan & Green's qualification by stressing that what must
be mutually manifest (rather than known) to commu-
nicator and audience is not the presumption of relevance
in its general and abstract form, but merely the fact that a
particular act of communication was intended by a partic-
ular communicator to appear optimally relevant to a
particular audience.
3.4. The principle of relevance and Grice's maxims. Most
modern pragmaticians accept some version of Grice's
cooperative principle and maxims of truthfulness, infor-
mativeness, relevance, and clarity. Though deeply in-
debted to Grice, we do not follow him here. Neither the
principle of relevance nor the presumption of relevance is
a maxim addressed to speakers, known by hearers, and
obeyed or exploited in communication. We see this
difference as fundamental. Recanati, Adler, and Morgan
& Green have their doubts. Their comments raise ques-
tions about both description and explanation. Is a speaker
engaging in ostensive-inferential communication invari-
ably presumed to obey the maxims or at least the cooper-
ative principle? Does she invarably communicate a pre-
sumption of optimal relevance? And to what extent are
these two descriptions of the speaker equivalent? Behind
these descriptive questions lies an explanatory question:
Why should this be so?
Let's take the explanatory question first. According to
Grice, presumptions of truthfulness, informativeness,
relevance, and clarity follow from the fact that speakers
are deemed to observe the cooperative principle and
maxims. Where do the cooperative principle and maxims
come from, and how do speakers and hearers come to
know them? Grice (1975, pp. 47-49) says he does not
know. By contrast, the presumption of optimal relevance
is not backed by any general principle or maxim to the
effect that speakers should aim at optimal relevance. It is
backed by a theory of cognition from which it follows that
by the very act of requesting the hearer's attention, the
speaker communicates (truly or falsely) that the utterance
is relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention. So
even if the two approaches were descriptively equivalent,
they would differ on the explanatory level: The presump-
tion of relevance is rooted, not in an unexplained maxim
of communication, but in general and independently
motivated hypotheses about cognition.
But the two approaches are not descriptively equiv-
alent. In our approach, a particular presumption of rele-
vance is communicated by every act of ostensive commu-
nication, whatever the communicator does; whether true
or false, believed or disbelieved by the audience, this
presumption plays an essential role in comprehension.
On Grice's approach, the presumptions warranted by the
cooperative principle and maxims are not communicated
but, presumably, inferred from mutual knowledge; if the
communicator blatantly violates a maxim, which she may
very well do, then the corresponding presumption will
not be entertained, nor will it play any role in comprehen-
sion. On the other hand, the presumption that the coop-
erative principle has been obeyed must be accepted as
true for comprehension to work along Gricean lines.
Recanati, suggesting a parallel with the principle of
relevance, says that the communicator "presents himself
as conforming to the cooperative principle" and that "this
is not very far from the notion that every act of commu-
nication communicates that the cooperative principle is
being respected"; but his reason for saying so (as, gener-
ally, for his subtle but very idiosyncratic interpretation of
the pragmatic literature) is that otherwise there would be
something wrong with the Gricean account. Well, maybe
there is something wrong with it. Incidentally, we would
agree with Recanati that Grice's account and ours are "not
very far" apart. The question is not how much they differ,
but how they differ.
3.5. Justifying the principle of relevance. Davies asks:
"From the general claim about the natural order it is said
to follow that drawing someone's attention to a phe-
nomenon 'implies a guarantee of relevance.' How exactly
does this argument go?"
Four empirical claims are involved in the argument:
(i) An ostensive communicator intends the audience to
pay to the ostensive stimulus the attention needed to
comprehend it.
(ii) When they have the choice, people direct their
attention to what is, to them, manifestly relevant enough
to be worth their attention.
(iii) A particularized version of claim (i) - that is, a
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version referring to a particular communicator, stimulus
and audience - is mutually manifest to communicator and
(attentive) audience.
(iv) Claim (ii) is a truism, mutually manifest to all
normally developed humans.
The general tenor of these claims, if not their formulation,
is trivial. But now remember two definitional points in
our framework:
(v) An assumption is manifest if it is inferable from
other manifest assumptions.
(vi) An assumption p is communicated if and only if it is
mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the
communicator intends p to be manifest to the audience.
It follows from (i)-(v) that it is mutually manifest to
communicator and audience that the communicator
intends it to be manifest to the audience that the osten-
sive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the au-
dience's attention. From this and (vi), it follows that the
communicator communicates that the stimulus is relevant
enough to be worth the audience's attention. This argu-
ment is presented, possibly in too terse a form, on page
156.
Millikan wonders whether an utterance always has to
be relevant in order to be worth the hearer's attention:
Could it not equally well be pleasant, amusing, or intrin-
sically interesting to the hearer? And is it not the case that
speakers will occasionally say something for their own
sake only, for example, "Please, pass the salt"?
Let us take these cases in order of increasing difficulty.
First, if some information matters to the point of making
you act upon it, it is surely relevant enough to be worth
your attention. Requests likely to be granted are relevant
in just this way. Of course, it may be more important to
me to have the salt than it is to you to help me; but
knowing that you are in a position to help me, and,
moreover, knowing that this is mutually manifest to both
of us as a result of my asking, is quite relevant to you.
Being told by the one you love that you are loved
(Millikan's example of intrinsic interest), even if it is the
tenth time in the day, may be relevant enough because it
updates and thus strengthens a very wide and accessible
range of assumptions: Depending on your degree of self-
confidence, the effect may be greater or lesser, but the
effort of comprehension is so little!
Now consider the more difficult case of something
amusing. The problem, to begin with, is that we do not
know what makes, say, a joke amusing. We would like to
suggest that it has to do with effect and effort, more
specifically, with the fact that effort is apparently re-
quested in vain up to the punchline, when it is rewarded
by rich and unexpected effects. We do not have a devel-
oped theory to offer, but suggest that relevance theory
might be extendable to aesthetics; we accept the risk of
being wrong in maintaining that a proper analysis of the
cases Millikan considers will show them to be no excep-
tions to the principle of relevance (see also para. 4.4
below).
Morgan & Green find ours "a very Panglossian view in
that it treats the fact that a speaker has just uttered
something communicatively as presupposing that it is the
most relevant utterance that he could have uttered." Not
so. We point out (on p. 157 and again on p. 162) that "The
communicator may want to keep to herself the most
relevant information at her disposal; she may have rea-
sons of her own for communicating information that is less
relevant." The presumption communicated by every act
of communication is, on the effect side, just one of
adequate relevance (that is, enough to deserve attention),
and not one of maximal relevance.
Morgan & Green see an empirical difference between
our context-based account of relevance and one in terms
of purposes and goals. In the middle of a syntax lecture,
the lecturer says (truthfully), "I am allergic to chocolate."
According to Morgan and Green, this utterance would
count as relevant according to our theory, but be cor-
rectly predicted as irrelevant in a purpose-based account,
since it "achieves no advance toward any current goal of
the interchange."
In the middle of a syntax lecture, the lecturer says
(truthfully), "The room is on fire." Would Morgan &
Green be willing to have this remark ruled out as irrele-
vant on the ground that it achieves no advance toward any
current goal of the interchange? We all have hundreds of
longstanding goals (e.g., staying alive, remaining com-
fortable), which can be called up by any utterance; and
new utterances can introduce new purposes and goals.
The idea that any interchange has a small, preestablished
set of goals is as implausible as the idea (see chap. 3, sect.
4 and 5) that the context for comprehension is fixed in
advance. Given that goals can contribute to comprehen-
sion, some method of selection is needed; relevance
theory provides the only one we know of that is suitable
for use in anything other than the highly artificial situa-
tions considered by much work in artificial intelligence.
In the circumstances described, relevance theory
would predict (correctly) that the utterance "I am allergic
to chocolate" could be relevant in having contextual
effects in the context of the audience's knowledge of the
lecturer. Remember, though, that to be judged appropri-
ate an utterance must be not relevant but consistent with
the principle of relevance. In ordinary circumstances, "I
am allergic to chocolate" would be inconsistent with the
principle of relevance, unlike "The room is on fire."
Morgan & Green, who have a knack for beautiful
examples, discuss cases in which silence is an ostensive
stimulus. Their question is: How could silence be the
most relevant ostensive stimulus the communicator could
have used? Where silence conveys refusal, for example,
would it not have caused the hearer less processing effort
if the speaker had simply said "No"?
Morgan & Green answer their own question. To
achieve an interpretation consistent with the principle of
relevance, the addressee must find some contextual ef-
fects that would not be conveyed by the direct answer -
effects, for example, concerning the communicator's at-
titude to the addressee, doubt about what she thinks or
whether she should say it, and so on. As we show (pp.
196-197), any element of indirectness in an answer en-
courages the hearer to look for additional contextual
effects to offset the extra processing effort incurred.
Bach & Harnish wonder: "How can a speaker commu-
nicate one thing by way of communicating another if the
addressee stops inferring after the first thing occurs to
him? More generally, how do S&W explain how the
addressee can modify, supplement, or replace the first
assumption that comes to mind, even if it is consistent
with the PR?" First, it should be clear that the addressee
does not stop at the first interpretation which occurs to
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him, but at the first one which is consistent with the
principle of relevance, and there indeed he stops in-
terpreting; he does not "modify, supplement, or replace"
any more.
To return to the Morgan & Green example of a silent
refusal, why not stop when a sensible and relevant in-
terpretation - namely: the communicator refuses - has
been reached? Well, because that interpretation is not
consistent with the principle of relevance: Some effort is
left unjustified. Of course, the addressee may already
have all the information he cares about. He may feel, as
Morgan & Green suggest, that whatever else was intend-
ed is not worth the effort, and stop considering in-
terpretations. It should be manifest to him, however, that
what he has is an incomplete interpretation. Or consider
an indirect speech act such as Mary's coming back with
her shopping and saying to Peter: "Oh, I forgot to buy
butter and I'm too exhausted to go out again!" implicating
a request that he should go and buy some butter. Why not
stop at the proposition expressed? Well, again, there are
circumstances in which that interpretation would not be
consistent with the principle of relevance, and hence in
which Mary could not have expected her utterance, on
that interpretation, to be relevant enough to Peter.
And what if the communicator intended an interpreta-
tion richer than the first interpretation consistent with
the principle of relevance? Too bad. She should have
eliminated that first interpretation one way or another; as
things stand she will be misunderstood or, at best, only
partially understood. One consequence of our approach is
worth noting here. As we show (p. 169) in discussing
another example of silent communication, when there is a
series of richer and richer conceivable interpretations of a
given stimulus, the right one is the poorest interpretation
consistent with the principle of relevance. It is the only
interpretation the communicator can rationally intend to
convey by means of this stimulus, however much more
she may want to convey. This is part of what is implied by
saying that human communication is inferential: The
addressee might, in many cases, compute an interpreta-
tion more relevant than the first interpretation consistent
with the principle of relevance by considering further
implications to have been implicated by the commu-
nicator. However, he would have no rational ground for
doing so. This provides a substantial constraint on in-
terpretation, and one we have not seen mentioned
elsewhere.
You know the child's riddle: Why is it that when you
have mislaid your keys it is always in the last place you
look that you find them? Adler suggests that our argu-
ment that the first interpretation found consistent with
the principle of relevance is the only one shares this
riddle's false profundity. "The first hypothesis," he
writes, "is just that hypothesis, whatever it happens to
be, beyond which we are not rationally justified in going.
For if we were so rationally justified, it would no longer
be the first appropriate hypothesis."
In part this is false, in part it begs the question.
Suppose you are reading Kierkegaard and find after a
while that it takes you a lot of effort to arrive at interpreta-
tions you are quite unsure of. Then it is rational for you to
stop, but not to accept your interpretations as correct.
Now take the case where it is rational for you to accept the
interpretation you arrived at and therefore to stop search-
ing; the question remains: What made your interpreta-
tion rationally acceptable to begin with? Or to put it in
other terms, suppose you are searching for your key in a
drawer where there are no other keys: When you have
found one, you have found yours. On the other hand, if
the drawer is full of keys similar to yours, you have a
problem that truisms, however disguised, won't help you
solve. Our argument shows that if you find an interpreta-
tion that is consistent with the principle of relevance and
therefore might be the right one, then either it is the right
one or there isn't any right one, and that is no truism.
4. Verbal communication
Several commentaries (Blakemore, Carston, Haege-
man, Kempson, Reboul) are in the form of contributions
to the development of relevance theory in the domain of
verbal communication, rather than questions or crit-
icisms, and therefore do not call for a detailed reply on our
part. We greatly welcome these contributions, which is
not to say that we necessarily agree with them. One
aspect of the development of pragmatics which these
contributions illustrate is that more and more questions
which were seen as linguistic, or more generally as
semiotic, and therefore to be analyzed in terms of the
rules of a code, can be treated more parsimoniously in
inferential terms. This raises the issue of the exact rela-
tionship between linguistics and pragmatics.
4.1. Relevance theory and linguistics. The obvious do-
main of interaction between pragmatics and linguistics is
semantics, but syntax and phonology may also be con-
cerned. Blakemore's arguments for studying nontruth-
conditional semantics as a distinct domain of special
linguistic properties attuned to the pursuit of relevance
are both important and convincing. Haegeman gives a
very specific and clear example of a linguistic regularity
which, in the framework of relevance theory, is better
handled at a pragmatic than at a syntactic level. Kempson
sees an impressive array of implications of relevance
theory for the theory of grammar. The questions she
raises are clearly fundamental. We do not feel competent
enough, however, to evaluate her answers until they are
further developed.
At the phonological level, there is a well-known in-
teraction between stress patterns and pragmatic effects
(see chap. 4, sect. 5). On the other hand, it might seem
that standard segmental phonology is not affected by
pragmatic considerations, and that is what Cutler takes us
to imply, not just about phonology but about the whole
linguistic decoding level when we stress its automatic
character. She then shows beautifully how speakers en-
code their messages as to spare their hearers unnecessary
decoding effort, however minute.
To say that a process is automatic is not, however, to
"dismiss" it, as Cutler says we do with linguistic decod-
ing, nor is it to say that the amount of effort the process
requires is beyond the speaker's control: It can be con-
trolled by controlling the input. The level of effort which
affects the relevance of an utterance is not just that of the
inferential process which takes as input the output of
the decoding process: It is that of the whole processing of
the utterance, including decoding. Cutler writes that
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"speakers' attention to ensuring relevance is merely one
end of a continuum of hearer-coddling; there is certainly
nothing special about it, and nothing that makes attention
to hearers' inference processes qualitatively different
from attention to hearers' decoding processes." From our
point of view, speakers' attention to hearers' decoding
processes is part of their attention to ensuring relevance;
it contributes to relevance by diminishing effort and in
that sense is not qualitatively different from attention to
hearers' inference processes. The only point at which we
disagree with Cutler is when she writes as if we would
disagree with her.
4.2. Relevance, explicature, and implicature. In Rele-
vance we define explicitness in a nonconventional way:
"An assumption communicated by an utterance U is
explicit if and only if it is a development of a logical form
encoded by Y" (p. 182). We do not define "develop-
ment," and we should have done so: the omission con-
fuses Levinson. But we do discuss and illustrate at length
what we have in mind: the inferential completion of a
decoded logical form by identifying referents, by seman-
tic enrichment, and by specifying propositional attitudes.
We have coined the term "explicature" to refer to an
explicitly communicated assumption, and we redefine
"implicature" as a nonexplicitly communicated assump-
tion. Levinson complains that the explicature/ implica-
ture distinction "is not clear. The only criterion offered is
that explicatures must contain the encoded SR [semantic
representation] or LF [logical form] as a proper subpart."
He then gives an example of what we would agree is an
implicature that nevertheless meets this criterion.
To answer Levinson, let us take an even simpler
example. Suppose that (6b), which explicitly communi-
cates (7), implicitly communicates (8):
(6) (a) Mary: Who bought this car?
(b) Peter: John did.
(7) John bought this car.
(8) John did something silly.
Now (8) contains the logical form of (6b) and yet is
implicit. Is this a counterexample to our definition? No,
because our criterion is the development of the logical
form, not merely its implicature. (8) is arrived at purely
inferentially whereas (7), the true explicature of (6b),
results from the inferential development of the decoded
logical form of (6b). Many of the implications of the
explicature/implicature distinction drawn this way are
cogently presented in Carston s commentary.
According to Levinson, an understanding of gener-
alized conversational implicatures is the signal achieve-
ment of neo-Gricean pragmatics, but Relevance hardly
engages this work.
Grice (1975, p. 56) distinguished between generalized
implicatures, those "normally carried by saying that p , "
and particularized implicatures, "carried by saying that p
on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the
context." His best-known examples are particularized
implicatures; the discussion of generalized implicatures is
restricted to a few cases; and there is no evidence that he
saw the distinction as theoretically significant.
"Generalized implicature' and "particularized im-
plicature" are not classificatory theoretical concepts.
They do not define distinct natural kinds but lie at
different ends of a spectrum, with a fuzzy borderline area
in between. The methods by which generalized and
particularized implicatures are created must be the same,
and the same theory must account for both. The danger of
concentrating on generalized implicatures is that one may
end by inventing specialized procedures which deal more
or less well with central cases, but do not extend to
particularized implicatures at all. The equation of "gener-
alized implicatures" with "default inferences" seems to us
to run this risk.
According to Levinson, the theory of generalized im-
plicatures makes predictions about the following example
which differ from those made by relevance theory:
(9) A: If it's possible that the spy has more than two passports,
he may yet escape.
B: He has two passports.
The theory of generalized implicatures predicts that B
implicates that the spy has only two passports because the
use of "two" normally implicates "at most two." Levinson
believes relevance theory would predict "that there
would be no explicature 'at most two', because that would
rule out the low-cost contextual implication 'he may
escape,' thus lowering R[elevance]. Thus B's utterance
should implicate 'He may escape.'" Since this is coun-
terintuitive, he concludes that his theory is better than
ours.
This is a total misapplication of relevance theory, which
does not predict that the most relevant interpretation
conceivable is the right one. Moreover, "the spy has (at
least) two passports" does not imply "it is possible that he
has more than two" so that, with or without the "at most"
implicature, B's utterance does not normally implicate
that the spy may escape. It would carry this implicature
only in the odd case in which the assumption "If the spy
has two passports, then it is possible that he has more than
two" were manifest. Otherwise, two types of cases must
be considered: If it is manifest both that B knows exactly
how many passports the spy has and that he is willing to
share the information with A, then B's utterance will
communicate (by enrichment of the explicature rather
than by implicature) that the spy has exactly two pass-
ports. If either of these two conditions is not met, B's
utterance would indicate, and might implicate, that B is
unable or unwilling to say whether the spy has more than
two passports. Thus, relevance theory predicts a range of
possible interpretations, the plausibility of which de-
pends on that of the situations in which they occur.
For Levinson, the best approach to this example is to
assign it a "default" interpretation which must somehow
be overridden in cases in which it is not in fact used. We
see no reason to follow him. For both generalized and
particularized implicatures, the correct interpretation is
determined by an interaction between contextual as-
sumptions, linguistic form, and some pragmatic criterion.
A theory which sets out to concentrate only on particular
aspects of linguistic form, or particular types of context, is
in danger of being trapped by the stereotypes it should be
studying and might miss significant generalizations over
the whole domain.
Where do interpretive hypotheses come from? ask
Bach & Harnish. C. Smith makes the question much
more precise by analyzing a few linguistic examples and
showing in detail the different sources of the information
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needed in our account of inferential comprehension. She
concludes, however, that our account is not detailed
enough to "work out how information is accessed and how
assumptions are constructed; in short, to see how the
processes of inference work." Where do implicated
premises come from? asks Levinson, even more specifi-
cally. They cannot be deduced; nor can they always be
retrieved, since an implicated premise may contain infor-
mation that is new to the hearer.
At the general level envisaged by Bach & Harnish, it is
true that our speculative remarks (pp. 82-83, and chap.
4, sect. 2) do not provide a satisfactory answer to the
question of where hypotheses come from. However, this
question is not an artifact of relevance theory but a very
general problem of cognitive psychology. As we point
out, "Since relevance theory is, among other things, an
attempt to ground models of human communication
squarely in cognitive psychology, it cannot just take
advantage of the insights of cognitive psychology, but
must also share its weaknesses" (p. 170). It seems to us,
however, that, when the issues are considered in detail,
relevance theory does illuminate them. To each of the
specific questions raised by C. Smith there are, in Rele-
vance, at least fragments of an answer, which she does not
discuss. We will therefore restrict our discussion to the
case of implicated premises raised by Levinson.
Let us, to begin with, distinguish retrievability and
accessibility. Information is retrievable if it is explicitly
represented in memory. Information that is not retrieva-
ble may nonetheless be accessible: from the environ-
ment, by perception; from memory, by deduction, non-
demonstrative inference, or the development of assump-
tion schemas; and by the type of heuristic described (pp.
82-83), by which, on presentation of assumptions of a
certain form, one considers whether one has evidence for
assumptions of a related form. For example, given an
assumption of the form IfP then Q, a reasonable heuristic
would be to consider whether one has evidence for an
assumption of the form P; given an assumption of the form
All F are G, a reasonable heuristic (and hence one that a
speaker might expect a hearer to use) would be to consid-
er whether one has evidence for an assumption of the
form x is F.
Consider the exchange discussed by Levinson:
(10) (a) Peter: Would you drive a Zordia?
(b) Mary: I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car.
On hearing Mary's reply to his question, a reasonable
heuristic for Peter would be to consider whether he has
any evidence for the assumption in (11):
(11) A Zordia is an expensive car.
Let us suppose that before Mary spoke he had no evi-
dence for it. We claim (pp. 116, 195) that Mary's utter-
ance will provide it. Her utterance, let us further sup-
pose, is consistent with the principle of relevance only if
(11) is added to the context as an assumption of a certain
degree of strength. It follows that Mary must have ex-
pected Peter to use that assumption at least at that degree
of strength. That is, Mary's utterance provides Peter with
indirect evidence that she believes (11); and if he trusts
her enough, he may come to believe it too. In Wilson and
Sperber (1986a), many of Grice's examples of implica-
ture, and other standard cases, for example bridging
Response/Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
implicature, are reanalyzed along these lines (though in an
earlier framework than the one developed in Relevance).
4.3. Relevance, tropes, and interpretive use. An impor-
tant difference between Gricean pragmatics and rele-
vance theory is that a presumption of optimal relevance
does not entail a presumption of literal truthfulness.
Noting this, Levinson, Adler and McCawley suggest that
our framework should be supplemented with a maxim of
truthfulness. Yet in Relevance (chap. 4, sect. 8) and in
Sperber and Wilson (1986b) we argue that the maxim of
truthfulness is too strong. To adopt such a maxim is to
commit oneself to analysing metaphor and irony, loose
talk, and free indirect speech, for example, as deviations
from the norm, or at least from the favoured interpreta-
tion. And accounts along these lines, we argue, are both
descriptively and explanatorily inadequate.
The account offered in Relevance (chap. 4, sect. 7-9) is
superior from both descriptive and explanatory points of
view. We show that the presumption of relevance entails
something much weaker than a presumption of literal
truthfulness, and weaker in just the right way. Utterances
purport to be optimally relevant representations of the
speaker's thoughts - hopes, fears, desires, beliefs, fan-
tasies, and so on. An utterance can be optimally relevant
without being literally truthful: For example, it may
represent not a belief of the speaker's but a belief at-
tributed to someone else (as in the case of irony and free
indirect speech); and it may merely resemble, rather than
literally reproduce, the belief it represents (as in the case
of metaphor and loose talk). Seen from this perspective,
literal truthfulness is just one way of achieving optimal
relevance, adequate on some occasions only. It needs no
special maxim to explain it, and its existence does not
make metaphor and irony any harder to explain.
Our accounts of metaphor and irony are based on a
notion of representation by resemblance, or interpretive
use, which also sheds light on the problem of the ex-
pression of propositional attitudes. Recanati believes that
an adequate account of the same phenomena can be
developed without recourse to the notion of interpretive
use. The communicatum, he says, may bear one of several
relations R* to the proposition p expressed by an utter-
ance: It may be identical to p (as in ordinary assertions); it
may be an embedding of p under some higher predicate
(as in irony and free indirect speech); or it may be a subset
of the "entailments" of p (as in metaphor and loose talk).
The problem with Recanati s account is that, even if it
could be made descriptively adequate, unless it were
backed by the notion of interpretive use it would still not
be explanatory. What determines the class of relations R*
which the communicatum may bear to the proposition
expressed? Why just this list of relations? Why could the
communicatum not be a conjunction or disjunction of p
with some contextually salient proposition, or a condi-
tional with p as antecedent and some contextually salient
proposition as consequent? How does the child acquire
knowledge of R*? What is needed is an explanatory
account of R* itself.
In our framework, such an account is given by the
notion of interpretive use. Given that any object in the
world may be used to represent any other object it
resembles, it is no surprise to find that utterances may be
used for their interpretive resemblance to thoughts of the
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1987) 10:4 749
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00055539
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:52:38, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Response/Sperber & Wilson: Relevance
speaker, which may themselves be interpretive repre-
sentations of thoughts attributed to someone else. The
difference between literal and nonliteral assertions is
simply a difference in degree of resemblance between the
proposition expressed by the utterance and the thought of
the speaker; the difference between literal and ironical
utterances is simply a difference between attributive and
nonattributive utterances. The notion of interpretive use
explains phenomena which Recanati's account at best
describes.
Cibbs believes that in our model a nonliteral in-
terpretation would take more processing effort than a
literal one. (He points out that this is contradicted by
much recent research.) Recanati seems to believe some-
thing similar, but he draws an opposite conclusion -
namely, that we should assume that a literal interpreta-
tion is preferred, or, as he puts it, that there is a "pre-
sumption of literalness. '
Both Cibbs and Recanati make an erroneous assump-
tion: Our model does not predict that a literal interpreta-
tion requires less processing effort; if anything, it predicts
the opposite. A literal interpretation (in a case of "saying
that") is one in which the speaker guarantees the truth of
the proposition literally expressed. In the comprehension
process, as we describe it, the hearer starts computing
contextual implications even before the sentence has
been entirely uttered, stopping when the set of implica-
tions so computed allows him to identify an interpretation
consistent with the principle of relevance. If accepting
that interpretation as true makes manifest all the implica-
tions, analytic or contextual, of the proposition ex-
pressed, then the interpretation is literal; otherwise it is
not. In most cases, the interpretation arrived at does not
carry all the implications of the proposition expressed,
but only a subset of them. Those implications of the
proposition expressed that are not implied by the in-
terpretation arrived at need not have been rejected: They
may not have been considered at all.
If we followed Recanati's advice and introduced a
presumption of literalness, then enough implications
would have to be considered for the literal interpretation
to be accepted or rejected. The amount of effort required
for comprehension would be systematically greater than
we claim; nonliteral interpretations would require even
more processing effort; and Cibbs would be right in using
against our account evidence which we see, on the con-
trary, as very much in its favour.
Adler suggests, as an alternative to our proposal, that
Grice's account of irony should be supplemented with a
condition requiring mutual knowledge that there exists a
practice of ironical usage (i.e., of saying one thing and
implicating the opposite).
Grice himself (1978, p. 124) is dissatisfied with his own
account of irony as saying one thing and implicating the
opposite (a variant of the classical view of irony as saying
one thing and figuratively meaning the opposite).5 What
is missing from both accounts, we argue, is that irony is
echoic: The speaker echoes and dissociates herself from
an opinion implicitly attributed to someone else. This
proposal is empirically distinguishable from the classical
view in that a speaker can ironically echo an opinion she
finds absurd or irrelevant without necessarily indicating
that she believes the opposite, a possibility illustrated by
many ironical quotations, exclamations and understate-
ments. Moreover, Adler's proposed view of tropes as a
matter of convention or social practice - (a view, inciden-
tally, that is rejected by Grice (1978, p. 124) - is not
explanatory: Why the same tropes in culture after
culture? Why not a trope based on permutation of subject
and object, or of the referents of "I" and "you"? The
account in Relevance suggests an explanation: Metaphor
and irony are special cases of representation by re-
semblance, which, as we show, is universally exploited in
both verbal and nonverbal communication.
N. V. Smith has asked us to draw attention to any
misapprehensions in his comments on interpretive use,
on the ground that they are (a) likely to be shared by
others and (b) our fault. Well, first, there is not, as he
suggests, an equivocation in our uses of "interpretation"
in Figure 3 (p. 232). In both cases, the term refers to
resemblances between propositional forms: of an utter-
ance and a thought of the speaker's on the one hand, and
of a thought of the speaker's and an attributed or desirable
thought on the other.
In a sense, all utterances could be said to be in-
terpretive in that they represent thoughts of the speaker.
However, we talk of an utterance as descriptive when the
speaker's thought is itself descriptive, and as interpretive
only when the speaker's thought is itself interpretive.
Second, the existence of ironical and, more generally,
echoic imperatives and interrogatives is not incompatible
with figure 3. The fact that attributed thoughts may
themselves be descriptive or interpretive introduces an
element of recursion (as mentioned on p. 231). Consider
(12):
(12) Don't mind me.
This utterance has at least two interpretations. Mary
might be expressing her own belief that it's all right for
Peter to ignore her. This interpretation requires just one
pass through the diagram, taking path (d). Or Mary might
be speaking ironically, attributing to Peter the thought
that it's all right for him to ignore her, and dissociating
herself from that thought. This interpretation requires (at
least) two passes through the diagram: the first, taking
path (a), to indicate that the utterance is a second-degree
interpretation; the second, taking path (d), to indicate the
properties of the attributed thought. If the attributed
thought is itself attributive (e.g.,if Mary attributes to
Peter the thought that she thinks it is all right for him to
ignore her), a still further pass is needed.
Third, ironical utterances and utterances marked with
"hearsay" particles are interpretive in just the same
sense: Both are second-degree interpretations. What
distinguishes irony from regular "hearsay" utterances is
not the type and degree of interpretiveness involved but
the presence or absence of a certain type of attitude. In
irony, the speaker dissociates herself from the opinion
echoed. As Blass (1987) shows, utterances marked with
hearsay particles need not be accompanied by such dis-
sociative attitudes; but they can be, and the result is
irony. The use of hearsay particles for irony - entirely
puzzling on the classical account - is striking confirmation
of our analysis of irony.
Fourth, as the text was supposed to make clear, exam-
ple (104) "If giraffes had wings, they would lay eggs" (p.
229) is a case of interpretive as opposed to descriptive use
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not because it is a conditional but because it is an
example, used to represent an utterance type or assump-
tion not attributed to anyone, but worth considering for
its intrinsic properties.
4.4. Relevance and fiction. Clark believes that relevance
theory does not apply to fiction because it cannot handle
"layering," the phenomenon whereby communication
takes place simultaneously at different levels. Reboul
believes that, on the contrary, relevance theory, and
more particularly its treatment of metaphor, offers an
adequate (and novel) approach to fiction. We agree with
Reboul that relevance theory is relevant to the study of
fiction, and with Clark that layering is essential to the
issue. We believe moreover that relevance theory is
uniquely well equipped to handle layering. As we define
it, a communicative intention is an informative intention
about an informative intention, making it possible for a
communicative intention itself to be the object of a
second-order (or an nth-order) communicative intention.
In other words, a first-level act of ostensive communica-
tion can serve as an ostensive stimulus for a second-level
act of ostensive communication.
A good example of layering is provided by Morgan &
Green: Mozart says to Salieri, "I never thought music like
that was possible" in a context such that Salieri is incapa-
ble of resolving the equivocation and deciding whether to
take the remark as an insult or as a compliment. Morgan
& Green believe this case should pose problems for us
because they take the principle of relevance to be incom-
patible with deliberate ambiguity. However, deliberate
ambiguity at one level can be used as a nonambiguous
ostensive stimulus at another level. By putting Salieri in a
situation in which he cannot tell whether he is being
complimented or insulted, Mozart makes it manifest that
there is much less mutual understanding between them
than Salieri might wish. Moreover, Mozart does so in a
manifestly intentional way: The failure of the first-level
communication successfully communicates Mozart's
sense of distance from Salieri on a second level.
There are cases when successful first-level communica-
tion is complemented by equally successful second-level
communication. Good fiction is a case in point. As you
read, say, a novel, each sentence, whether descriptive of
situations or interpretive of the characters' thoughts and
words, is relevant in a context essentially provided by
preceding sentences and general knowledge; it is under-
stood on the basis of the principle of relevance in the usual
way. But there is a discontinuity between the world
described in a work of fiction and the world of the reader
such that the relevance of the work as a whole is not
immediately obvious. As Reboul puts it: Why are people
prepared to spend time on fiction, when they know it is
false? We are not convinced that extending the idea of a
metaphor, understood as an interpretation of the author's
thoughts, really answers the question. We believe that
the notion of second-order communication (Clark's layer-
ing), together with the notions of weak implicature and of
showing as a form of communication, may be more
helpful.
Contextual effects come not only in the form of new
contextual implications, but also in the form of the
strengthening of previously manifest assumptions. Rele-
vance can be achieved not only by informing someone of
new facts, but also by altering saliences and strengths in
the cognitive environment. This is, we suggest, the way
in which many examples are relevant: They force the
listener or reader to develop or otherwise modify mental
models, scenarios, scripts, or schemas. For examples to
be relevant in this way, it does not matter whether they
are true or fictional provided that they are recognizably,
in some respects at least, truthlike. So communicating, at
one level, information about Hamlet or Ishmael which is
relevant only in its own artificial context communicates at
a second level by showing what is possible or conceivable,
rather than what is.
Clark is right: What Shakespeare and Melville commu-
nicate to us through their work is not a Gricean speaker's
meaning. But Clark is also wrong: These works are
perfectly good cases of ostensive communication because
they are, at the higher level, cases of showing rather than
of "saying that." They achieve relevance through a vast
array of weak effects, rather than through a "meaning" or
a "message."
NOTES
1. Here Bach & Harnish, referring to the speaker's infor-
mative intention, oddly add parenthetically: ("if he even has
one"). By our definition, a communicator necessarily has an
informative intention, since communication consists in making
such an informative intention mutually manifest. What a com-
municator may lack is a communicative intention (see pp. 63-
64).
2. A further possible constraint is mentioned in Chapter 2,
footnote 23 and discussed in Chapter 4, Section 5.
3. Contrary to the claim Hinkelman attributes to us, the
deductive device does not compute "the most relevant im-
plicatures [i.e., implications] first."
4. Wilks misrepresents our view to such an extent that
correction rather than discussion is called for. He describes our
work as remaining "within the process-free linguistic paradigm"
while in fact what we outline is, good or bad, a process model, as
emphasized by other commentators. He imagines that we "do
not really accept that such inferences [as occur in utterance
interpretation] must be some particular individual's inferences,
and so [we] feel free to opt for an 'objective' set of hypothesized
premises, ones [we] believe to be correct." In reality, we are the
first in the literature to develop a concept of relevance to an
individual (chap. 3, sect. 5), which is essential to our whole
theory.
5. Grice gives an example of his own designed to show that all
his conditions for irony could be met without irony being
perceived. Our example (113) (on p. 240), discussed by Adler,
was designed to make a different though related point: The
failure to perceive irony cannot be put down to a lack of mutual
knowledge or shared assumptions, because even when the lack
is repaired and the intended interpretation spelled out, the
utterance is still not acceptable as irony.
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